CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of current developments
in Soviet Central Asia and
Kazakhstan.

The area covered in this Review embraces the five S.S.R. of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. According to Soviet classification "Central Asia" (Srednyaya Aziya) comprises only the first four of these, Kazakhstan being regarded as a separate area.

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In addition, the REVIEW analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to Soviet Central Asia.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
SV	Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

TSARIST POLICY TOWARDS ISLAM: THE SOVIET VERSION

Since the Revolution the Communist Party has been consistent in its condemnation of Islam on ideological as well as on sociological and economic grounds. The methods which it has used to combat the influence of Islam inside the USSR have varied from violent abuse and ridicule to so-called scientific enlightenment. For tactical reasons certain concessions and indulgences have occasionally been granted or promised, but there has never been any question of attaching any merit to Islam as a way of life. As a religion it has of course come under the general Communist ban and suggestions that a good Communist could also be a good Muslim have always been severely criticized.

In dealing with the Tsarist attitude towards Islam, however, the Soviet authorities have been much less consistent. The proclamation of 24th November 1917 towards the Muslims of Russia declared that their "mosques and shrines had been destroyed and their beliefs and customs trampled on by the Tsars and taskmasters of Russia". Later, when hopes of whole-hearted Muslim cooperation with the new regime began to fade, a new line was developed: the Tsarist civil and military administration was found to have allied itself with the reactionary clergy against the real interests of the people. Anti-Russian revolts organized by Muslims such as Shamil in the Caucasus, Kenesary Kasymov in Kazakhstan and Dukchi Ishan in Andizhan were, and still are, partly attributed to British machinations. The line about such revolts, however, has often changed in order to accord with the policy of the day, or in deference to local feeling. The latest attempt to rehabilitate Shamil, for instance, was probably abandoned because of the traditional anti-Muslim sentiment of the Georgians and Armenians.

In the past, different views have been expressed about whether the revolts were directed against the Russians as a whole or only against the administration. Tarasov writing in VOPROSY ISTORII No.9 of 1951 said: "All the hatred which the peasants cherished for the colonial regime was directed, under the influence of reactionary leaders, against the Russians as a whole; it did not distinguish between the Tsarist administrators and the remainder of the Russian population. This was clearly evident in the course of the attack on Tedzhen on the night of the 6th October 1916, when the rebels, under

the leadership of Aziz Chapykov, and armed with rifles, revolvers, swords, axes, knives, sticks and stones, advanced on the town of Tedzhen with the object of destroying not only all the officials of the Russian Government there, but the whole Russian population." Later Tarasov says: "The 1916 movement in Turkmenistan prevented the establishment of a single front between the toilers of Turkmenistan and the Russian working class; the movement was anti-Russian." Yakunin and Kuliyev, however, in VOPROSY ISTORII No.3 of 1953, found that the revolt of 1916 was only made possible by contact between the Russian people and the Central Asians and that any anti-Russian manifestations were deliberately organized by highly placed civil and military members of the Tsarist administration, who were alleged to be in the pay of the German and Turkish governments, and by British and American agents.

Until recently Soviet writers seem to have avoided expressing any detailed opinion about the attitude of the Tsarist administration towards Islam beyond saying that it exploited the ability of the clerical element to delude the people. It was therefore something of a surprise to find a long article by A.P. Savitskiy in the journal of the Central Asian University of Tashkent+ which expatiates on the fundamentally anti-Russian attitude of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, on the strongly anti-Muslim views of senior Tsarist administrators, and on the short-sighted leniency of the Central Government towards Islam in general. The article can hardly be regarded as an important contribution to scholarship: it is badly arranged and its exact purpose is not clearly stated. Nevertheless, it contains passages of considerable interest, including quotations from Tsarist records and information about Muslim organizations in Turkestan which are not available in the West.

The article deals with four main subjects: first, the views on Islam of Tsarist military governors; second, Islamic institutions existing in the Syr-Dar'ya oblast and what is now Karakalpakia at the end of the nineteenth century, and an account of the alleged activity among them of British agents; third, a long tirade against Sufiism and the exploits of Turkish spies and of Karakum and other Ishans and Pirs; fourth, the alleged revival of panislam and panturkism from 1910 onwards.

Although it is difficult to discern any connected argument in this long study there is no mistaking the approval which is accorded to the strongly anti-Islamic sentiments of the Tsarist military governors. Indeed, one object of the article is undoubtedly to emphasize orthodox Soviet views on the wholly obnoxious and anti-Russian character of Islam in general and of the Central Asian Muslims in particular. The article ends with the words:

+ Trudy SAGU, Vypusk LXXVIII of 1956

"The Great October Socialist Revolution decidedly and for ever put an end to the plans of the panislamists and their foreign masters. The above facts prove that muridism was always a weapon of aggression and obscurantism and had nothing in common with the interests of the workers."

The following extract from Savitskiy's article consists of the first part only as this is by far the most interesting. The remaining sections are very diffuse and difficult to follow.

. . .

After a brief introduction designed to justify the Russian conquest of Central Asia as a necessary defensive move following on the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris of 1856, the article continues:

The habitual and well-known methods of the British colonizers began to be applied in Central Asia by their numerous agents who had been sent there in ever greater numbers since the start of the nineteenth century. Here their active helpers were members of the Muslim clergy. Numerous examples confirm their activity in realizing the aggressive plans of the British. It is remarkable, moreover, that in the period under review this activity was apparent simultaneously in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Shamil's reactionary movement started at the same moment as action on the part of the Turkestan Muslim clergy against the Russian advance into the Kazakh steppe. Further on we shall prove this by concrete facts. In any case, in the light of new information, there are now increasing grounds for supposing that Shamil's movement and that of Kenesary Kasimov were connected. The movements have much similarity in their character and aims.

Even after the final union of Central Asia with Russia, the policy of the Turkestan clergy changed little; its methods and forms did, however, perhaps change somewhat. One thing is certain - during the whole of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century not one anti-Russian movement started without the participation of the servants of Islam, and in most cases, they were its leaders. Islam remained as before an ideology irreconcilably and consistently hostile to everything Russian. Everything progressive was essentially alien to the servants of Islam.

The Tsarist policy of non-interference in the affairs of Islamic leaders and institutions contributed not a little to the success of the Muslim clergy's activity in Turkestan. As is well-known, the policy of the first Governor-General of Turkestan, K.P. Kaufman, was confined to the partial secularization

of the waqf (religious endowment) lands and the prohibition of further waqf bequests. The numerous and extensive ramifications of the Islamic institutions were left entirely alone. The Turkestan authorities of that time were fully convinced that these "archaic institutions" would fade away of themselves in contact with European civilization, which had been brought to the area by the union with Russia. It is easy to understand how groundless this conviction was. The events of 1898 necessitated radical revision in the conception, current until then, of the essence and activity of Islamic institutions in Central Asia.

We shall not dwell on the well-known report of the then Governor-General, Dukhovskoy, "Islam v Turkestane" (Islam in Turkestan), but we shall quote the interesting views of several important figures of the Tsarist Turkestan administration, who served there for many years and who were considered experts on the East. The deputy Governor-General, and later Governor-General, of Turkestan, General Ivanov, gave his views on the question of the Muslim clergy in the following special Note: "After the occupation of Turkestan," he wrote in the Note, "no control was established over religious affairs. General Kaufman's policy was in fact to prevent the establishment of a unifying religious centre. The posts of Kazi Kalan (Chief Justice of the Canon Law) and Sheykh-ul-Islam were abolished. The efforts of the Mufti of Orenburg to bring the population of Turkestan under his spiritual guidance were rebuffed. Elections of kazis and imams were conducted separately and the former had no connection with the mosques." "New waqf legacies were forbidden, and rights over existing ones were gradually reviewed and doubtful ones abolished." Ivanov considered that it was premature to change the existing order. ". . . There are not yet anough loyal men in the population to place in the higher posts in religious institutions. . . Taking into account the hostility of the shariat to everything Christian, a strong religious authority, sanctioned by the government, could be highly dangerous for us. . . The appointment of a senior spiritual figure such as a mufti would be politically dangerous."

Believing that not one of the regulations adopted by the government for the administration of spiritual affairs was suitable, General Ivanov concluded his Note with the proposal that ". . . Turkestan, with its peculiarities, with its solid six million population, surrounded by Muslim countries, needs special regulations. Strange though this may seem, these new regulations should resemble those for the Jews, under which there are no religious institutions sanctioned by the government. . ."

A short note by Governor-General Dukhovskoy was attached to General Ivanov's report in which Dukhovskoy expressed his views on the question raised by Ivanov. ". . . Of course, it is useless to consider either a mufti or a kazi kalan or any other leader for our Muslim people. Our first

task is to dissolve Muslim solidarity and this correct idea was at the basis of Adjutant-General Kaufman's actions. But under his successors matters went so far that no-one had any information on the matter of mosques and imams or on the ishans and their activity. . ." Dukhovskoy concludes: "It is essential to learn the opinion of the governors and then for a special commission to consider the question as a whole." He asked General Ivanov to head this commission.

Of the governors' reports, a very long one by General Korol'kov, the Governor of Syr-Dar'ya, is of interest. He pointed out that until the middle of the eighteenth century the Russian state was hostile to Islam, "changing at times from scornful tolerance to active persecution". From the end of the eighteenth century, with the spread of liberal ideas and teachings, the attitude to Islam changed radically.

General Korol'kov pointed out the error of an internal policy by which "this teaching, with its dogmas, has become one of the religious faiths recognized by the government. . . The establishment of mosques in Muslim villages and Kirgiz encampments, the official recognition of the steppe as Muslim, the training of mullas on government and public money. . . the placing of Cossack pickets to protect mosques from looting by Kirgiz", none of this was in the interests of the State since "no law which is not based on the Koran is a law in the eyes of Muslims. To obey it is tantamount to a betrayal of the faith; to disobey it constitutes not infrequently a direct merit for the true believer. Jealous and wrathful Allah allows no love other than love of himself. Patriotism, service of the fatherland, can amount to a betrayal of him." The Governor of Syr-Dar'ya categorically denied the possibility of peace and friendship between a Christian state and Islam, and came to the conclusion "that the Russian authorities should merely seek out the best method of fighting Islam. . . By not meeting it face to face, the State will leave it to its own devices. The State will not defend it, but it will not persecute its enemies. By not allowing it to unite under the wing of the State, the State will condemn it to decay, and. . . Islam, which has never lived independently, will no longer be able to exist. Having no force to rely on, and rejected by civilization and by the State administration, Islam will lose its attraction. . . The Shariat will lose its practical application. . . and will become a dry dogma. . . The word of the Prophet will be realized: Islam will splinter into 199,000 heresies. The Russian authorities must not come to terms with a force that is alien and dangerous to them, but should watch the decay. . . of Islam which will disintegrate under an open but restrained contempt. Islam is positively dangerous as an ally, but completely harmless as an enemy. . . Islam left to its own resources will never develop them on a durable basis. . ."

General Korol'kov did not, however, rely entirely on the collapse of

Islam while the State remained a passive onlooker; he proposed active measures as well. He proposed that all members of the Russian administration should be charged with the active and energetic surveillance of the spiritual and religious life of the native population, and frankly advised that ". . . by officially recognizing the least harmful part of Islam, shall we not find in it a sure ally in the struggle with the other, more dangerous, part of Islam, which is far from being acknowledged by all Muslims? Is not the principle 'divide and rule' just the means which will lead soonest to the decay of Islam . . . History shows us many examples of the application of this principle. . Our Government, after nearly two hundred years of struggle against heresy . . acknowledges the least harmful of its sects. . ." Further on, he proposed as a sop the establishment of a religious authority "outwardly independent, but in fact subject to a strong control", bearing in mind that among Muslims "there are few who would not sell the Prophet himself for a medal. . ."

The Governor-General of the steppes proposed in view of the Muslim question to introduce zemskiye nachal'niki (territorial controllers) in Central Asia. The Governor of Samarkand invited the well-known orientalists, V.P. Nalivkin and V.L. Vyatkin, to assist in drawing up plans for a new statute on the administration of Muslim institutions in Turkestan. General Ivanov's commission, however, categorically refused to consider any form of religious organization for Muslims believing this to be harmful and directed "towards the realization of the dreams of the panislamists". Only a number of individual measures were passed.

The reactionary religio-political ideology of panislam which originated in the era of imperialism among the exploiter classes of the East found favourable conditions for wide dissemination and great influence in Turkestan. By force of circumstances (the Andizhan rising and several other factors), the Turkestan Tsarist authorities had to discontinue their policy of non-interference, and, having summed up the situation, came to a very disquieting conclusion. On 6th September 1899, General Dukhovskoy wrote to the Minister of War: "Having arrived, on my appointment to the post of Governor-General of Turkestan, in the region still disturbed by the Andizhan rising, I was soon forced to the conclusion that this area is far from peaceful; that the embers of religious and national hatred for their conquerors, skilfully concealed by the natives and smouldering under a mask of outward submission and even gratitude for the material benefits brought to the area, were ready at the first opportunity to burst into flames; and that, for this reason, the native Muslim population should be kept under the most watchful and unremitting surveillance. . . Our continued absolute non-interference in this sphere of native life and our widespread lack of interest in Islam which is a very stable and certainly hostile force should be considered harmful to Russian interests in the Muslim area. . ."

When all Muslim religious institutions in Central Asia were listed for the first time, the Tsarist authorities came face to face with an astounding picture of their own complete ideological impotence. In General Dukhovskoy's report "Islam v Turkestane" mentioned above, the paltriness of the cultural means in the hands of the administration for combating Islam is directly referred to.

The report also gives the following figures: for 119 Russian schools of various denominations in the Syr-Dar'ya, Fergana, and Samarkand oblasts, there were 5,246 Muslim schools; and for six Orthodox churches in the Fergana oblast there were 6,134 mosques.

In 1900, on the basis of a census of Islamic institutions which was carried out in the oblasts, even more impressive figures were received which left no doubt of the breadth of appeal and stability of the position of Islam in the region.

In all in the region there were 1,503 congregational mosques (masjed-i-juma'a) and 11,230 parish mosques with 12,499 imams. There were 5,771 teachers listed in 5,755 schools (maktab); 686 imams had 66,487 murids (disciples). There were 1,526 sheykhs for 1,415 tombs (mazars).

In 1908 the number of maktabs increased: in 6,107 boys' maktabs there were 6,361 teachers and 14,208 pupils. (In 801 girls' maktabs there were 875 teachers and 9,773 pupils.) In addition, there were 336 medresehs with 459 teachers (mudaris) and 14,375 pupils. In addition there were 327 other institutions (kari-khana, dala'il-khana etc.) with 360 teachers and 4,681 pupils. Kari-khana (lit. reading room) was a special educational establishment and at the same time an asylum for the blind. The permanent inhabitants of the kari-khana were the blind, mostly adults. Under the guidance of the Karibashi (head reader) they learnt texts from the Koran by heart. Dala'il-khana was an educational establishment of the lowest level where the pupils, under the guidance of the dala'il-khan learnt the prayers dala'il-i-khayrot (charitable precepts) by heart; these were written in Arabic and their meaning was thus quite incomprehensible to the pupils. There were schools of this type in Fergana and Tashkent. All this legion of Islam (the figures do not include Muslim institutions of the Bukhara and Khiva khanates) daily preached religious and national intolerance and instilled blind fanaticism. And it was only with the greatest difficulty that the light of culture and knowledge could penetrate this darkness.

It was in the muddy waters of oppression and ignorance that the British "fishermen" and their Turkish apprentices became active. This area was the forefront of the "trade battle-field" which had been shifted to Turkestan where the fortresses were the mosques, maktabs and medresehs.

As we have seen, the Turkestan authorities believed that the Andizhan rising of 1898 was the first openly hostile action under the flag of Islam against Russia. This, however, should not be considered correct; neither should the Andizhan rising be considered merely as a chance episode. The hostile activity of panislamist elements against Russia, which was directed by the British and the Turks, was carried on consistently and resolutely. The Turkestan administration knew that the 1875 rising in Fergana was anti-Russian and that immediately before the rising Abdurrahman Avtobachi (sic) made the pilgrimage to Mecca and brought back with him the blessing of the Turkish Sultan for a "holy" war.

It was also well known that the leading clerics, led by Issa-Auliye, opposed the conclusion of a peace agreement with the Russians. Mumin's attempted rising in the Tashkent uyezd; the attack on Kuropatkin's mission travelling to China in 1876; actions by the Alay Kirgiz in the same year; the Dzhety-khans' movement in 1878; the Margelan and Andizhan disturbances in 1882 and 1886 (that of Dervish-khan); Sabir-khan's action in the Kokand uyezd in 1892 - all these events are connected by the same aim and the same task. Even junior administrators, such as Colonel Bryanov, understood that "leaven from Stambul is pouring into this life - there is no doubt about it".

On closer acquaintance with the Muslim question the Tsarist officials realized one important fact: Islam was a divided faith. Even General Dukhovskoy came to the conclusion that "Sufism is in many respects more dangerous to us than orthodox Islam". And in fact 'Ishan Sufism' was the chief instrument of foreign intelligence agents, chiefly British and Turkish, in influencing the masses and in realizing their plans. It does not, of course, follow from this that the so-called orthodox clergy took another line. Islamic institutions in Turkestan were always hostile to the Russian authorities. This attitude was directed from London and Istambul and coincided with Islamic dogma and with the smouldering, never-forgotten, hatred towards those who dared lay hands on the waqfs. The proposition encountered in several historical works, including ISTORIYA NARODOV UZBEKISTANA (History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan), Vol.II, and which can be summarized by saying that at certain periods the Muslim clergy supported the policy of the Tsarist administration in Turkestan, can hardly be considered to have historical foundation. It may be admitted that individual clerics, but not the clergy as a whole, showed loyalty on several occasions. For example, such men were to be found in the "Russian" party when Tashkent and Samarkand were captured. But this relates only to the period of Central Asia's annexation to Russia and is not to be seen in later similar occurrences.

Even I. Gasprinskiy is no exception in this respect. His followers wanted "to bring European education to the Tatars, only certainly not through

Russia". (Quoted from General Korol'kov's above-mentioned report.)

By means of the hajj (pilgrimage), Islamic institutions in Turkestan had a constant channel of communication with foreign Islamic centres. In 1911, the number of pilgrims from the Fergana oblast alone was four to five thousand and these spent not less than four million rubles on the journey to Mecca. It remains to say that the numerous printing shops in the towns of Turkestan were used by the Muslim clergy to publish an enormous amount of religio-mystical and, of course, openly panislamist and panturkist literature. A very flood of such literature poured into Turkestan from Kazan', Ufa, and Orenburg.

The activity of Islamic institutions and of the panislamists on the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya - in Kara-Kalpakia - is of particular interest. We shall briefly consider the reasons why pre-revolutionary Kara-Kalpakia, that remote, poor, region with an impoverished people, became the object of special attention both from foreign Islamic centres and from internal Turkestani ones.

A simple comparison of the number of religious institutions places Kara-Kalpakia - the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya - in a special position. The following are figures taken from the census of mosques and maktabs in various areas of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast in 1900.

	Mosques		Imams	Maktabs	Teachers
	Congregational	Parish			
Tashkent town	111	230	331	242	242
Chimkent uyezd	61	304	351	121	121
Chimkent town	1	30	31	8	8
Aulieata town	-	14	14	22	22
Perovsk town	-	4	4	1	1
Perovsk uyezd	1	19	19	201	201
Kazalinsk town	-	2	2	2	2
Kazalinsk uyezd	-	78	78	49	49
Amu-Dar'ya otdel	3	827	794	749	749

Ishans

Tashkent town	87
Tashkent uyezd	9
Chimkent town	none
Chimkent uyezd	15
Aulieata town & uyezd	none
Perovsk town & uyezd	none
Kazalinsk town	12
Amu-Dar'ya otdel	114

This sharp difference becomes still more amazing if it is remembered that the population of the Amu-Dar'ya otdel - about 200,000 - was considerably less than that of the other uyezds of the Syr-Dar'ya oblast. It should also be borne in mind that the above figures for Muslim institutions refer only to the right bank, while in the khanate of Khiva and, especially in the Kara-Kalpak areas of the left bank, there were as many mosques and imam-ishans.

It is self-evident that this large number of Muslim religious institutions can in no way be explained by the richness of the parishes (prikhod) which were, on the contrary, all poor. The unusual attention paid by the servants of the Prophet to this region can be explained comparatively easily. The Kara-Kalpak lands of the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya are situated in an exceptionally favourable geographical position, not because they lie on the great ancient caravan routes but because they border on the Kazakh steppe.

In the first half of the nineteenth century Russia's advance into Central Asia began, as is well known, with the annexation of the Kazakh hordes (zhuz) and the Kazakh steppe. This was the first stage of the advance and it was precisely here that the Anglo-Turkish opponents were faced with the task of creating more obstacles and impediments to the further advance of the Russians into Central Asia. Thus, the khanate of Khiva and the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya, like the Caucasus, were important vantage points. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century British agents, one after another, began to appear in Central Asia, Khiva, and the Caucasus. While David Urquhart, or Daud bey, Bell (Yakub bey), Longwart /Longworth?/ (Aslil bey), Knight (Nadir bey), and others were active in the Caucasus, from 1824 onwards a stream went to Central Asia and to Khiva: Moorcroft, Connoly, Wolf, Burnes, Strendus Stoddart, Abbot, Shakespeare, Colonel Stuart, disguised as the Armenian merchant Ibrahim Sahib, and many others.

Alla-kul, the Khan of Khiva, was the devoted servant of the British

colonizers. On the orders of British agents, he carried out much provocationary work in the Kazakh steppe. Russian attempts to paralyse this activity by diplomatic means had no success. On the contrary, after Captain Nikiforov's visit to Khiva in 1841 and that of Colonel Danilevskiy in 1842, the Khan continued to give every assistance to Kenesary Kasimov, and from 1845 a Khivan emissary was present at Iset.

At just this period Shamil's movement started in the Caucasus.

After the subjection of Bukhara and the annexation of the khanate of Kokand, the importance of Khiva and the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya increased still further. In plans made by foreign aggressive centres, Khiva frequently was given the most importance. And the importance of the Muslim clergy in these plans grew correspondingly. Of growing significance were the imams and their entangled mesh of murids who felt themselves to be in the greatest security since no one was concerned with their activity. Even in 1916 Colonel Volkov, an official of the Turkestan Secret Police, admitted that the Khivan domains and the Russian bank of the Amu-Dar'ya were beyond the scope of the Okhrana (Secret Police).

One of the most remarkable features of this and other accounts of the Russian attitude towards Islam is the apprehension with which the hostility of the Muslims of Central Asia has always been regarded by the Russians. At the time of which Savitsky writes, the Russian military garrison in Turkestan and Transcaspia, an area containing a population of less than five million inhabitants, amounted to 45,000 men. In India, on the other hand, with its population at that period of nearly 300 million, the British garrison did not exceed 70,000 men, and this number decreased with the increase in the native population. At the outbreak of the Second World War, for instance, when the population of India had reached nearly 400 million, the British garrison was only 55,000. - Ed. CAR.

HISTORY

THE RISING OF ISHAQ KHAN IN SOUTHERN TURKESTAN (1888)

The rebellion of Ishaq Khan and his attempt to seize the throne of Afghanistan from his cousin Abdurrahman has received on the whole scant attention from Western historians. Some ignore the episode altogether, while others, notably Sir Percy Sykes in his HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN, and Macmunn in AFGHANISTAN give only a brief resume of the events; the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica barely refers to the rising, and little detail is to be found even in the autobiography of Abdurrahman. The fullest account is provided by Stephen Wheeler in THE AMIR but he does not cover all aspects of the affair. However, a comparatively long article on the subject by N.A. Khalfin has been published in Russian (1) giving a very detailed account not only of the causes and course of the rebellion, but of the attitude of Russia towards it and her influence upon it - a facet of the situation usually ignored entirely by British and American historians. The following is a slightly abridged translation of this article which appeared in TRUDY SAGU (Central Asian State University), History of Eastern Countries, No.LXVIII, Book 9, 1955, under the title of "The Rising of Ishaq Khan in Southern Turkestan and the Position of Russian Tsarism (1888)". It is prefaced by a short introduction denouncing the Pokrovskiy school of thought which maintained that the rising was actively supported by the Russian government. "Such treatment of the question", writes Khalfin, "is factually untrue and politically harmful. It takes its source from the falsified publications of British bourgeois historians. . .(2) A study of the appropriate documents and an analysis of the facts forces one to the directly opposite conclusion that the ruling circles of Russia, in spite of the convenient chance which presented itself, refused entirely to interfere in Afghan affairs."

Khalfin's article is in keeping with the present Soviet tendency to vindicate Tsarist policy and action, particularly with reference to Persia and Afghanistan.

Causes of the Uprising

The introduction is followed by a brief description of the situation in Afghanistan after the death of Sher Ali and the accession to power of Abdurrahman; this sets the scene for the account of the actual rising. After his recognition by the British as Emir of Afghanistan, Abdurrahman energetically set about consolidating his new position. The population of the country, exhausted by the prolonged feudal quarrels and by the invasion of the British, was subjected to new taxes and duties from which the non-Afghan peoples of the northern regions - Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens - suffered particularly badly. The replenished state coffers enabled the Emir to consolidate the state apparatus which he had created and with which he and the other Afghan leaders hoped to centralize power. "This wealth went towards the creation of a powerful army and the transformation of Afghanistan - in the interests of the British imperialists - into a base for the struggle against Russia in Central Asia." Severe measures were taken against those who expressed discontent with the regime. "These attempts to centralize power were met by the Afghan feudal lords with rebellions; and the working masses rose in protest against the feudal bondage, against the burdensome taxation and other oppressions. . ." The situation was even tenser in southern Turkestan where the overwhelming majority of the population were Uzbeks and Tadzhiks. In the past southern Turkestan had consisted of independent khanates which politically and economically turned towards Bukhara. It was only in the middle of the nineteenth century that this territory was seized by the Afghan feudal lords and incorporated by the Emir Dost Muhammed into Afghanistan. The subjection of the khanates of the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya was to a certain extent facilitated by the quarrels which raged between the rulers. On the other hand, the territory never became fully part of Afghanistan as the population, with the exception of the Afghan soldiers stationed in fortresses and important administrative centres, was entirely foreign. The following table reveals the relative proportions of Afghans and Uzbeks in the khanates of southern Turkestan in the eighties:

		Uzbeks	Afghans
1.	Maimana	300,000	2,000
2.	Kunduz	100,000	6,000
3.	Mazar-i-Sharif	50,000	3,000
4.	Tashkurghan	50,000	-
5.	San-Chayrak	35,000	50
6.	Sary-Pul'	25,000	300
7.	Balkh	25,000	200
8.	Shibarghan	20,000	100
9.	Geybak	20,000	-
10.	Andkhui	15,000	100
	Total	640,000	11,750

A certain number of Turkmens and Tadzhiks are included in the Uzbek figures. The Uzbeks cut off from the rest of the Uzbek population in Russian Turkestan, tried to establish contact with the Uzbeks of the right bank of the Amu-Dar'ya. At the same time the Afghan authorities, especially during the reign of Abdurrahman, tried to hinder these relations fearing that they might endanger the credit of Afghanistan in the eyes of the British. Trade between the right and left banks was formally forbidden, but the existing "unofficial" exchange of goods was allowed to continue. The abolition of long-established economic and political ties represented a serious loss to the population of southern Turkestan.

"The problem of Afghan colonization became particularly acute in this area. In order to strengthen its position in the north of the country the Afghan government attempted to populate the territory of the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks with Afghan tribes and brought about both voluntary and forced emigration of Afghans into the territory of the left bank of the Amu-Dar'ya. Besides this, a certain number of Afghan families were obliged to settle in the north as a result of the predatory policy of Britain who had seized their land on the frontier with India. This colonization was accompanied by an unceasing struggle for land between the immigrant Afghans and the native Tadzhik and Uzbek population; the struggle was aggravated by the fact that the great majority of immigrants were cattle-breeders and therefore needed more extensive lands than those who lived by agriculture. About a thousand Afghan families were settled in the environs of Meymen and Balkh. And many colonizers went to the districts of Kunduz and Mazar-i-Sharif."

Discontent with the heavy taxation and political and religious (3) oppression brought about a very tense situation in southern Turkestan. ". . . When in 1885 an Afghan military detachment, together with British 'instructors' was routed and put to flight in the Pende (Panjdeh) oasis by a Russian detachment of General Komarov (4), the population of southern Turkestan began to hope for help from Russia, whose prestige at this period had grown considerably." Discontent expressed itself in the form of popular risings and a sharp increase in the number of immigrants into Russian and Bukharan territory. Char-Vilayat, which consisted of the four provinces of Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Tashkurgan, and was the most important region of southern Turkestan, was ruled at this period by Muhammad Ishaq Khan, the grandson of Dost Muhammad. Under the impression that he had more right to the Afghan throne than Abdurrahman, Ishaq decided to turn the tense situation to his own ends. Several times the Emir attempted to quell Ishaq's separatist tendencies and relieve him of the post of ruler. On documentary evidence Ishaq was continually receiving invitations to go to Kabul, which, under the circumstances, would have meant removal from his position. However, under various pretexts he managed to avoid the summons; but such a situation could not last long, and he began to realize that passive insubordination

would not bring him favourable results.

At the beginning of 1888 it became known in Afghanistan that Abdurrahman was sending his son Habibullah, who had recently been nominated as heir to the throne, to replace Ishaq. In the summer of the same year it was announced that a conference of the rulers of the northern provinces of the country was to meet in Kabul to which Ishaq was invited. The ruler of Char-Vilayat decided that the moment had come to take open action. Aware of his military weakness, he had already in the spring of 1888 made an effort to gain Russia's support, interest her in his plans and secure himself a refuge in the event of failure. Now he sent a personal envoy to Russian Turkestan in the person of General Ahmad Khan, suitably disguised in order to keep the mission secret. At the beginning of May 1888 Ahmad Khan arrived at the Russian frontier at Kerki and asked permission to cross into Russian territory for himself and for Ishaq, under the pretext that he was flying from Abdurrahman. The question was referred to Petersburg, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giers, telegraphed his permission for the Afghan General to enter Russian Turkestan. At the same time Giers expressed the wish that Ishaq should be dissuaded from coming to Russia because, as he said, "the arrival of a person in his position in our territory will react unfavourably on our relations with the Emir of Afghanistan". Ahmad Khan was settled in Samarkand. He asked for no grant from the Russian government as refugees usually did, and had evidently enough money at his disposal.

The Russian political agent in Bukhara, N.V. Charykov, made use of the arrival of the Afghan General to gather information on the situation in Afghanistan. He succeeded in finding out that Abdurrahman had already summoned Ishaq to Kabul in four successive years, but that the situation in the country was such that the Emir was unable, unless absolutely compelled, to attack Char-Vilayat. In a letter to the Governor-General of Turkestan, N.O. Rosenbakh, on the 26th of June 1888 Charykov expressed the opinion that the situation in southern Turkestan was "favourable to Russian interests"; he remarked on the increased trade between Russia and southern Turkestan and the recent improvement of relations with Char-Vilayat and pointed out: "These relations are gradually opening up a new market for Russian trade and a new sphere of influence for the Russian government." Charykov considered the basic problem of the Russian government to be the maintenance of peace and order on the frontier. "It is curious that both he and Colonel Shorokhov, the temporary head of the garrison at Kerki, considered that fear of a Russian invasion of southern Turkestan was the chief force driving Ishaq to enter into relations with Russia. This was not true. Ishaq turned to Russia because his adversary, Abdurrahman was supported by Britain, and because the population of Char-Vilayat was sympathetic to Russia."

On the instructions of Ishaq Khan Ahmad Khan informed the Turkestan

authorities of the former's intended revolt and of his tense relations with the Emir. In his desire to gain Russia's support he even went so far as to say that Ishaq had the backing of the ruler of Badakhshan, which in fact was not true. In this way Ahmad Khan tried to give the Tsarist authorities the impression that there was widespread opposition to Kabul among the population of the northern provinces who desired the protection of the "white tsar". In the middle of 1888 it became known in Samarkand that Ishaq was preparing for action; and Ahmad Khan received a series of letters informing him that Ishaq intended to put a powerful army into action in order to dethrone Abdurrahman. This information was passed on to the Tsarist officials. According to Ahmad Khan Ishaq ordered him to return to Afghanistan at this point; whether this was true, or whether Ahmad Khan was frightened to stay in Samarkand during the overthrow of Abdurrahman is not known; in any case Ahmad Khan began to ask the Tsarist authorities for permission to go, and at the end of August left for Afghanistan. The following letter which Ishaq sent to Ahmad Khan in Samarkand reveals both his reasons for sending an envoy to Russian Turkestan, and his frame of mind and his plans during the first stages of the uprising: ". . . I want also to ensure our friendly relations with the Russian government and firmly consolidate them. I have entrusted you with this affair and I hope that you will attain our desired end. . . I have set out with my army from Mazar-i-Sharif on the Kattaghan road to Kabul. As we go people and troops meet me joyfully, bow down before me, put themselves entirely at my disposal and without demur fulfil all my demands. . . Yes, my friend, I am beginning to feel firm ground beneath me. My power is increasing all the time, and with my forces, I have already reached Khanabad. I have subjugated everyone and strengthened my power, starting with Badakhshan, Kattaghan and Khanajan, and I am now already near Kabul. . ." Such was Ishaq's view of the situation. The letter may have been written solely to inform Ahmad Khan of the latest events, in which case it reviewed the situation too optimistically. It may, however, have been written in order to mislead the Russians into believing that the ruler of Char-Vilayat would ultimately be victorious and that he was worth supporting.

The Course of the Rebellion

The rising in Char-Vilayat began on the 18th of July 1888. On that day Ishaq collected his forces in Mazar-i-Sharif and to them and to the population of the town announced the separation of Char-Vilayat from Afghanistan. This was received with great enthusiasm, and an oath was solemnly sworn to defend the independence of Char-Vilayat from the forces of Abdurrahman. The population and soldiers swore fidelity to Ishaq who put on the golden crown (taj).

"During the first stage of the rebellion Ishaq enjoyed the support of the broad masses of the population. This enabled him to achieve considerable

Map of
AFGHANISTAN
showing as principal features the Mountains of the HINDU KUSH and subsidiary ranges to the west; the principal roads, and a number of localities and rivers.
0 50 100 miles
Kerki
Ashkabad
Kara Kum Sands
Sarakhs
Andkhui
Akchu
Balkh
Khulm
Kunduz
Kishm
Jurm
FAIZABAD
Baroghil P.
MAZAR-I-SHARIF
Tashkurgan
Khanabad
Shibarghan
BADAKSHAN
Haibak
Pul-i-Khumri
Mandal P.
Chitral
Gilgit
Indus R.
Pul-i-Khatun
Zulfiqar
Maruchak
Matmana
Bala Murghab
BAND-I-TURKESTAN
Kushk
Islam Qua
PANJDEH
Kara Bel Plateau
Murghab R.
Hari Rud
KHURASAN
PARAPOMISUS MOUNTAINS
HERAT
Obeh
Daulat Yar
BAMIYAN
KOH-I BABARAVX
BAND-I BAIAN RANGE
PANJAO
Helmand R.
KAHMERD
BANDI AMIR
Ak Robat P.
Nili P.
Bamiyan
Shibar
SHORBAND
Charikar
Bgram
HINDU KUSH
NORTH ROAD
Panjshir R.
ANDARAB
NURISTAN
Kunar R.
Asmar
Pech R.
DIR
SWAT
BAJAUR
Swat R.
Malakand P.
LAGHMAN
Laraband
Jagdalak
Kabul R.
KABUL
Jalalabad
MOHMAND
Nimla
GANDAMAK
Khyber P.
Peshawar
Attock
Parachinar
Altimur P.
GARDEZ
Ghazni
KHOST
Kohat
Marun
Thal
FRONTIER PROVINCE
Bannu
Tochi Valley
Urgun
MUKUR
KATAWAZ
WESTERN SULAIMAN RANGE
ZAMINDWAR
Farah
Helmand R.
Kalat i Ghilzai
Gurishk
QANDAHAR
Tarnak R.
Hamun-i-Sabari
SISTAN
CHAKAN SUR
REGISTAN
Helmand R.
Koh-i-Malik Siah
WAZIRISTAN
NORTH WEST
Gumal R.
Dera Ismail Khan
Ft Sandeman
ZHOB
Tochi R.
Chaman
Pishin
Quetta
Loralai
PUNJAB
BALUCHISTAN
Kalat
Sibi
62
64
66
68
70
72
74

successes, and by the end of August he had occupied the towns of Ak-Saray, Kunduz, Khanabad and others. According to Charykov's report support was given to Ishaq by the popular masses of Char-Vilayat in the hope that 'he would change the rule of Abdurrahman for the rule of the Russians'".

On the day of the rising a messenger from Ishaq Khan was admitted to the head of the garrison at Kerki bringing news of the proclamation of southern Turkestan's independence "under the protection of Russia". The head of the garrison replied that Ishaq must not count on help from Russia who "needed no territorial acquisitions". Undaunted, Ishaq sent an official emissary attended by a numerous suite and bearing rich presents for the Russian authorities together with letters for the Tsar and Governor-General. In Kerki the emissary orally transmitted Ishaq's request for help in the form of arms and men, and asked for a reply as soon as possible so that Ishaq could know where he stood. A solemn and official reception of the emissary by the Tsarist authorities would have represented an open violation of the Anglo-Russian agreement on Russia's non-interference in Afghan affairs and might have led to action on the part of Britain and to a serious worsening of Anglo-Russian relations. So, loyal to the agreement, the Russian government refused the presents and ignored Ishaq's petition for help. Giers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, thought it best to adopt a policy of "wait and see" believing that this, better than anything, would ensure Russia's freedom of action in the future.

Doubts as to the advisability of this plan assailed the Minister of War, P. Vannovskiy, who thought that complete indifference to the affairs of southern Turkestan might injure Russian prestige and breed difficulties for the future. The Governor-General of Turkestan tried to dispel these fears by answering that as arms would have been given to Ishaq and not to the people, they might have regarded him as a Russian protege; and if he failed Russia would be forced to give him armed help in order to maintain her own prestige. On the 11th of August an answer to Rosenbakh's report on the arrival of an official emissary from Ishaq was received from Petersburg in Tashkent. Giers wrote that to satisfy the wishes of the ruler of Char-Vilayat would "not be in accordance with the neutral and temporizing position which the Russian government must maintain". Russia, he said did not consider it possible to take any part in "his risky undertaking, of whose opportuneness we are a little doubtful". It was evident, however, that the War Ministry was not entirely sure what line to take. "As in a number of other questions of foreign policy the members of the Ministry, who reflected the point of view of the aggressive military-feudal circles of Russia, preferred a more active policy than that conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In a telegram to Rosenbakh on the 11th of August, Vannovskiy again expressed the fear that by ignoring Ishaq's petitions Russia would alienate both him and his people who would ascribe Russia's unwillingness to participate in the affair to weakness and fear of the

British. Rosenbakh replied that the Russian government had never encouraged the inhabitants of Char-Vilayat to make a break with Afghanistan, and therefore a refusal to send help could hardly alienate them from Russia. "Our non-interference" he wrote "will not be ascribed to weakness, as they know our power; they will more likely be surprised at our reluctance to seize what we can". As a result of these divergences of opinion a conference was held in Petersburg to solve the problem of what policy was to be adopted with respect to Ishaq. After a lengthy discussion the meeting was unable to come to any decision, but it was agreed that the Governor-General of Turkestan should increase his forces on the frontier with Afghanistan in order to be ready for any eventuality.

There were several reasons why the Russian government refused to make use of the opportunity of interfering in the affairs of Afghanistan:

"1. The most important of these reasons undoubtedly was (Russia's) reluctance to bring about complications in foreign relations or an open conflict with Britain. . . The Russian government was fairly sure that Britain would not hesitate to go to war if Russia attempted to consolidate her position in southern Turkestan. The incorporation of this territory into Russia was therefore considered to be completely out of the question, for, among other reasons, the tense state of affairs in Europe made it impossible for Russia to run the risk of war in Asia.

2. The Tsarist authorities knew very well that Ishaq (particularly in view of his initial successes) would not restrict himself to fighting the Emir for the independence (or the dependence on Russia) of Char-Vilayat, but would try to seize the throne of Kabul. . . The appearance of a russophile emir in Kabul (if Ishaq were successful) would soon lead to decisive action on the part of Britain 'to bring him to order' and even to armed intervention; it was clear that Britain would make no withdrawals of any kind from her dominating position in Afghanistan. From this point of view Russia had nothing to gain from supporting Ishaq Khan. There was besides no guarantee that when Ishaq had become emir he would not follow the pro-British policy of his predecessor. It is significant that on entering into relations with Russia, he revealed no definite attitude towards Britain in any of his speeches or his letters to the Russian authorities. . .

3. The Russian government was not certain that the rebellion would be successful. The campaign in the view of the Tsarist authorities was a 'risky undertaking'. . ."

The untimeliness of the rising is of considerable importance in the analysis not only of the reasons of foreign policy but also of internal policy which

hindered Russia from offering her support. There were several reasons of internal policy, both economic and political:

1. In spite of the fact that Abdurrahman had formally forbidden trade, Russian goods penetrated Afghanistan (and in particular southern Turkestan which had long maintained close economic ties with Central Asia) through the agency of Muslim merchants and successfully competed with British goods bringing considerable revenue to traders and industrialists. . . Ishaq's rebellion, which involved mainly southern Turkestan, was damaging to these trade connections.

2. The interests of the ruling circles in Russia at the time consisted not so much in seizing new territory as consolidating their position in the extensive lands already acquired and exploiting them economically.

3. It was feared that Ishaq's rising, independently of its ultimate aim, might excite disturbances among the population of the khanate of Bukhara. This fear was the motive for the partial regrouping of troops in Turkestan.

Until September 1888 no clash occurred between the main forces of the Emir and the rebels, and Ishaq took advantage of this to prepare for a decisive battle. As well as attempting to obtain help from Russia, he tried to make allies among the small rulers of northern and north-western India; and with this aim in view he sent a number of letters to the rulers of Chitral, Dir, Bajaur, Swat and other states inviting them to take part in a joint campaign against Abdurrahman, who, he said, was threatening their possessions, and making generous promises in the event of victory. Failing to gain the support of the ruler of Chitral, Ishaq Khan concentrated his attention on activities in Afghanistan itself. He arrested any supporters of Abdurrahman Khan in territory under his control, rallied faithful troops and consolidated his connections with mountain tribes hostile to the Emir, who inhabited the country between southern Turkestan and Kabul. He occupied all the important centres of southern Turkestan, and, moving further south, his forces took the Kara-Kotal pass and reached the pass of Dendan-Shikan, having seized the town of Seygan on the road to Kabul. In this position Ishaq's forces awaited the arrival of reinforcements with a view to attacking the capital. "This was proof that Ishaq had outgrown his former ambitions and that his struggle for the independence of southern Turkestan had changed to a dynastic struggle between two claimants for the throne."

At the beginning of August 1888 the course of the rebellion began to change, and the popular masses, who were disillusioned with Ishaq because he only sought to seize the throne and did nothing to improve their lot, rose

in defence of their own interests. Withdrawal of support for Ishaq's cause by the population of southern Turkestan began with the inhabitants of the Maimana region. Taking advantage of a weakening of the Afghan garrisons they rebelled and declared that they would submit neither to Abdurrahman nor to Ishaq. Concessions made by Ishaq to Uzbek feudal lords in order to win them to his side only revealed to the broad masses of the population that they had nothing to gain by supporting him. The popular rising spread to the neighbouring district of Andkhui whose inhabitants sent a cavalry detachment of 300 men to help Maimana. The feudal aristocracy who "saw a threat to themselves in the rising of the masses" hastened to guide the popular movement into the channel of the struggle between Ishaq and Abdurrahman. The ruler of Maimana announced that he was going over to Abdurrahman's side and without delay arrested the most active members of the popular rising and the adherents of Ishaq. All these people were sent to Herat which had remained faithful to the Emir, and the Maimana popular rising was nipped in the bud. "The main reason for the failure of this popular movement was the absence of sufficiently powerful anti-feudal forces, the elemental and disorganized character of the movement, and the treachery of the feudal rulers." Without the support of the people Ishaq was doomed to failure. But about a month passed before the decisive battle between the Emir and himself. Still hopeful of obtaining help from Russia, he made one more effort to gain her support in order to ensure himself a line of retreat before the last fight. His letter to the Russian authorities received no answer.

The position of Abdurrahman at this period was not easy. To repulse the enemy he had drawn his forces from various parts of the country, a circumstance which might have favoured a sudden rising in remote regions; and Britain, who had already lost much in the war of 1878-80 refused to interfere on his behalf, although she followed the course of events very closely. "Dissatisfied with the irresolution with which Abdurrahman conducted the struggle with Ishaq, and desiring to make use of the situation for a further penetration of Afghanistan, particularly in the northern regions of the country, the British government decided to send a special mission to Kabul. . ." Owing, however, to Abdurrahman's hostility and to the defeat of Ishaq's rebellion, the mission had to be cancelled. "At the same time, following her traditional policy of using other people to fight her battles, Britain was ready to replace Abdurrahman with his cousin and rival - Ayub. With this aim in view, Ayub, who was a British prisoner at the time, was given the opportunity of settling near Afghan territory, not far from Peshawar, in order to urge the people to rise against the Emir. . ."

Abdurrahman prepared for battle with great care; and having concentrated his forces in the region of Kabul he sent them against Ishaq, while he himself remained in Kabul. In the first half of September Ishaq was forced to retreat and again sent a representative to Kerki with a petition for advice if nothing

else, but was given the usual answer. The emissary submissively agreed with the Tsarist authorities that the rising had been hastily undertaken, but tried to explain to them the desperate situation in which Ishaq had found himself immediately before it. The rebellion, he said, arose because Ishaq was summoned to Kabul for his failure to obey Abdurrahman's order that no cattle or goods were to be sold on Russian territory. The military situation had so far worsened for Ishaq, however, that he could not wait for an answer. On the 14th of September near the town of Gazinakh, 25 to 30km. to the south of Tashkurgan, a decisive battle took place, in which Ishaq Khan suffered a bad defeat and lost almost all his artillery. He tried to take refuge in Mazar-i-Sharif but the town garrison would not allow him to enter his former capital. He then took up a position to the north of Mazar-i-Sharif in order to be able to cross over to the northern bank of the Amu-Dar'ya whenever it should become necessary. He was also defeated in the eastern part of southern Turkestan, for the major part of his army of 6,000 went over to the enemy and the rest ran away. He was again defeated near Maimana, and on the 24th of September it became known in Tashkent that Ishaq and his son, abandoned by their army, had fled to Russian territory. On the evidence of General Khristiani - head of the Kerki garrison - they still hoped for Russian help with which to continue the struggle. Ishaq was given asylum in Samarkand and a pension on condition that he refrained from any further political activity; he died in 1909. In the second half of September 1888 Abdurrahman's army occupied the whole of southern Turkestan and took bloodthirsty reprisals on all those who had participated, or who were suspected of participating, in the rising.

. . .

From the emphasis given to Russia's policy of non-interference in Afghan affairs it is clear that one of the chief aims of the article is to exculpate her from any hand in the rebellion, and refute those historians who maintain that it started and developed owing to her encouragement. The article ends with a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Murav'yev, to the new Minister of War, Kuropatkin, which sums up some of the main factors determinirg Tsarist policy towards Afghanistan in the eighties and nineties of the nineteenth century. And although the letter was written ten years after the Ishaq Khan rebellion, it is none the less applicable to the earlier period. Informing Kuropatkin of the ill-health of Abdurrahman and the necessity to decide on a policy in the event of his death Murav'yev wrote:

"Our encouragement of the ambitious plans of one or the other of the claimants to the Afghan throne to the detriment of the rights of the proclaimed heir would not be at all expedient and might only arouse distrust of us in Britain, which we should try to avoid. Our position in Central Asia is very firm and at the present moment we need not fear any serious difficulties in our possessions as a result of disturbances in Afghanistan. . . We do not need to extend our Central Asian possessions by the annexation of Char-Vilayat or Herat, and to cooperate in making them into small independent states would hardly answer our interests. The Imperial Government has always held the view that as neighbours in Central Asia Russia needs to have states which are not strong military powers, but which are none the less well organized, rather than small states constantly ravaged by disturbances and internecine quarrels which have a harmful effect on our frontier population; such states, ultimately, we are obliged to incorporate in the Empire. The examples of the sultanate of Kul'dzhan and the states of Kokand and Kashgar have shown us sufficiently the inconveniences of having small, not fully sovereign rulers as neighbours."

Notes

(1) In a note at the end of his article the author writes: "Of Russian works known to us only an article by A. Galkin in VOYENNIY SBORNIK, 1889, No.4, entitled 'Iskhak-khan and the Afghan disturbance of 1888' is specially devoted to the rebellion of 1888". Although this is an adequate factual account, he continues, it makes no attempt to interpret events. He refers in the same note to an English work entitled THE BIOGRAPHY OF ABDURRAHMAN KHAN a section of which is devoted to the rising; it is described, however, as "tendentiously" written, and it is objected that Abdurrahman "quite without foundation alludes to Russia's support of the disturbances in southern Turkestan". Besides these two sources, the Central State Historical Archive of Uzbekistan has been extensively used, and a few other sources are mentioned.

(2) In fact no mention of Russian influence in the affair has been found in any of the many British historical works consulted.

(3) Some of the Tadzhiks, who mainly populated the regions of Badakhshan, Rushan, Shugnan and Vakhan, professed Ismailism, and were persecuted by the Sunni Afghans for their faith.

(4) Details of the official British and previous Soviet accounts of the Pende (Panjdeh) incident were given in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.VI, No.2, pp.129-30.

HISTORY

THE MIGRATION OF THE DUNGANS

1877 - 1882

The following abridged translation of an article by M. Sushanlo entitled "The Migration of Part of the Dungan Population from North-West China to Semirech'ye, 1877-1882" (Trudy Instituta Yazyka i Literatury, Akademiya Nauk Kirgizskoy SSR, Issue VIII (Frunze, 1957)), deals with the two migrations of the Dungans to Russian held territory, in 1877-78 and 1882.

The Dungans, or "Khuetsu" in Chinese, inhabit together with the Chinese and other peoples, the north-west provinces of the Chinese People's Republic; there are between eight and nine million of them. Their origin and relation to the Chinese people is so far unsolved. One theory is that the Dungans are the descendants of the Arabs who came to China in the eighth and ninth centuries and formed a trading centre in Kansu province. Another, that they are Chinese converted to Islam. The author of the present article believes that they are Chinese of the north-western provinces of China who adopted the Muslim faith at some date.

The first wave of migrants, in 1877-78, followed the revolt of the peasants of north-west China against the Manchu government and the conditions to which it had reduced them, and covered the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang. The second wave, in 1882, was precipitated by the transfer back to China of the territory of the Ili valley in Sinkiang which Russia had occupied with the agreement of China in 1871.

As a result of the Chinese people's "peasant revolution" in the second half of the nineteenth century, part of the Dungan population moved from north-western China into the territory of what is now Kirgizia and Kazakhstan.

The exodus of the Dungans from north-west China (Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang provinces) to Russian territory is a typical example of the unwilling-

ness of the Chinese masses to submit to the feudal regime of the Manchu dynasty. The domination of the Manchu-Tsin dynasty was the most difficult and darkest period in the history of China. The Manchu feudal bureaucratic system was a social calamity for the people and particularly for the peasants. The peasant was deprived of all rights and was completely dependent on the feudal hierarchy from the village elders to the governor of the province.

The land, the chief means of existence of the peasants, was in the hands of the Manchu, Chinese and Dungan landlords; Dungan merchants and usurers were closely linked with agriculture, and the majority were also landlords. Thus the rural population of China suffered from lack of land, enormous rents, and frauds by merchants and usurers. They also suffered from the heavy taxation established by the Manchu-Tsin government. These conditions led to the migration; one season of bad crops could result in mass starvation and death. Moreover the Manchu-Tsin government burdened the masses with heavy military expenditure and with contributions to cover deficits in foreign trade.

This heavy yoke was the principal cause of the peasant revolts of the second part of the nineteenth century. During the same period the national minorities of China were the victims of oppression and persecution by the Manchu authorities and the local feudal lords. At this time the Dungans lived in the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Hebei, Sinkiang and others; (a wave of Dungans had migrated to Sinkiang in the second half of the eighteenth century as the result of exploitation and lack of land). The majority of the Dungans were peasants who, like all peasants in China, were suffering from land hunger; their position did not differ from that of the Chinese peasants in other parts of the country, though one may assume that it was even worse. The combination of feudal and landlord exploitation, with the penetration of trading capital into the country, was one of the principal causes which hindered the social development of the north-west provinces of China. Despite the relatively wide development of "trading capitalism" it was closely tied up with feudal relationships and did not therefore evolve into industrial capitalism and contribute to the expansion of capitalist production. Enormous wealth was accumulated in the hands of individual firms, part of which was spent in gifts and bribes to the bureaucrats, part on individual needs, and the rest was transformed into usury capital thus permitting its owners to squeeze still more from the peasants and urban poor.

The exploitation of the Dungan peasants was intensified by the fact that at the beginning of the thirties of the nineteenth century the best lands in the north-western provinces were reserved for the cultivation of the opium poppy. This brought new miseries to the population, as the extension of poppy cultivation destroyed the natural pattern of agriculture, rents and the prices of foodstuffs rose, thus increasing the dependence of the peasants on the merchants and usurers. Extortion by the provincial bureaucrats added to the

exploitation of the peasants. H. Huchlots in his book THROUGH HIDDEN SHENSI said: "When an order came from Peking to collect the annual taxes in the provinces, the governor would add on a large amount for himself and the mandarins of lower status. Each of the latter, in turn, would add on a bit for himself and would provide liberally for his subordinates. As a result the burden of taxes borne by a poor peasant became heavier than it should have been originally."(1)

After the outbreak of the Tai-Pin revolution tax oppression by the Manchu authorities in the provinces of the north-west grew with every year. The cause of this lay in the loss to the Manchu authorities of the rich southern districts of the country, which was the area of the popular mass movement. Also, after the victory of the united army of Europeans and Americans in the second and third "opium wars" of 1858-60, new, heavy contributions were forced upon China, to pay which the Manchu authorities introduced new taxes. Furthermore, the government was in need of large sums of money to pay the European and American mercenaries who took part in the military actions against the Tai-Pin. This money could no longer be raised from the southern provinces. Therefore during the years of the Tai-Pin revolt the north-western provinces were living under exceptionally hard conditions. These provinces had not then joined the popular revolt, but their plunder by the authorities and landlords, which reached an unbelievable scale, and the violent repression for failure to pay taxes and rents, provoked them to revolt. According to G. Williams in his SREDINNOYE GOSUDARSTVO (2), taxes received by the State treasury in the provinces of Kansu and Shensi amounted to 3,595,000 silver lan in 1840; by the seventies they had reached 8,326,000 silver lan, or more than twice as much (3).

The feudal aristocracy was exploiting the toiling masses with the active assistance of the Muslim clergy. This top class was completely assimilated with the Manchu colonialists; on the other hand the provincial Manchu authorities were actively kindling national antagonism among the peoples of Shensi, Kansu, and particularly Sinkiang, but when the Manchu power in Sinkiang province was overthrown by the popular revolt, this national antagonism could no longer be manifested. Thus the main cause of the mass migration from the north-west in the second half of the nineteenth century was the inhuman and ruthless exploitation of the population by the Manchu authorities and feudal aristocracy.

The Migration of 1877-78

The migration of part of the Dungan population to the territory of what is now Kirgizia and Kazakhstan was in two stages. The first stage, covering the period 1877-78, was during the pursuit by the retaliation forces of General

Teo-Tsun-Tana when the Dungan insurgents from the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang crossed the Russian border in three directions. The remnants of the Dungan rebels from inner China, led by Bai-Yan'-Khu, were engaged in a fierce struggle in the Sinkiang territory against the punitive forces of the Manchu dynasty and, under pressure from the latter, fled to Russia.

With the fall of Aksu (25th October 1877) and of Uch-Turfan (28th October 1877) the Dungan insurgents, led by their chiefs, began to cross the Russian border. Early in November the first group, consisting mainly of the Kansu Dungans and numbering 1,116, crossed the Bedel' pass under the leadership of Da-Sy-Fu and entered the town of Przhevalsk. Another group, composed chiefly of Turfan Dungans and led by Ma-Da-Zhen, crossed from Aksu through Maralbashi and Kashgar into the Fergana Valley; early in January 1878 they reached the town of Osh. The Russian administration at Osh gave great assistance to the immigrant settlers. The paper GOLOS wrote that the following measures were taken by the head of the Osh district to help the settlers: 579 pack-horses were sent to transport the sick; moreover 30 horses and camels were hired in the mountains from the Kirgiz, and altogether 1,779 people were transported at the expense of the Russian treasury (4). First-aid stations were organized along the route from Terekdavan to Osh, and food and transport was available for the sick at these points. In this way the timely assistance of the local Russian authorities, and the Kirgiz and Uzbek population, saved many fugitives from death.

The third group - the Shensi Dungans - led by Bai-Yan'-Khu, by-passed Kashgar and crossed from Uch-Turfan through the mountain passes of the Tyan'-Shan' to the fortified Russian settlement of Naryn. Under harsh winter conditions the insurgents had to face a difficult route over the snow covered passes of the Tyan'-Shan' - such passes as Tashrabat, Charkaratma and Turugart, normally accessible only in summer. The newspaper TURKESTANSKAYA VEDOMOST' wrote of the march: "He (Bai-Yan'-Khu) managed in a hard winter to lead his people, with women and children, sick and wounded, across the 14,000 feet passes. . . Several thousands of half-starved, semi-clad men, women, children and old people marched forward having entrusted their destiny to Bai-Yan'-Khu. He mobilized his whole moral and spiritual strength to save the lives of several thousands of his compatriots from death in the Tyan'-Shan' mountains." (5) Early in December the refugees reached Naryn; their arrival at this time of year was quite unexpected, not only by the local inhabitants but also by the Russian authorities. The district chief gave permission for them to settle in the Tokmak area and on the 27th of December the first groups began to arrive - 3,314 people in all.(6)

With the settlement of the Shensi Dungans at Tokmak the first stage of the migration came to an end.

The Migration of 1882

The second stage of the Dungan migration to Russia is connected with the transfer by the Russian government of the Kuldja territory to the Manchu-Tsin authorities. A characteristic detail of the period was that the population of this territory did not wish to be under the Manchu authorities and began to cross the Russian border, asking to become Russian subjects.

The popular revolt of 1864 had led to the downfall of the Manchu power in Sinkiang province (eastern Turkestan) and to the emergence of three autonomous feudal unions: Dzhety-Shaar, the Ili Sultanate, and the Dungan Khanate. These feudal unions struggled among themselves for the domination of the province. Yaqub Bek, backed by the British, wished to establish his supremacy in Sinkiang; Abil' Ogly was striving to become master in Dzhety-Shaar; and the Dungan leader, Lao-Tai, was endeavouring to control these regions himself. Helped by the Muslim clergy these leaders kindled national strife among the peoples in Sinkiang.

During the hard years of the struggle against Yaqub Bek, Lao-Tai strove to establish a close liaison with the Russian authorities in Turkestan and in his letters asked for assistance against the despotism of Yaqub Bek. In this connection the attitude of the Sinkiang Dungans towards the Russians was not accidental; it had developed over the years through travellers visiting such towns as Chuguchak, Manas, Urumchi, Kuldja and Suydun. Not only in the eyes of the Dungans, but also in those of other peoples of Central Asia and Sinkiang, was Russia an advanced state, strong economically, culturally and in other senses. The Dungan population of Sinkiang was attracted to Russia by her culture and its influence upon the peoples of Central Asia and, in particular, those of Kazakhstan. Of this Russian role in the life of Eastern peoples Engels wrote: "Russia in fact plays a progressive role for the East. . . a civilizing role for the Black and Caspian seas and Central Asia."(7)

This friendly attitude of the Dungans towards the Russians invoked the enmity of Yaqub Bek who was actively implementing his policy of British orientation. The ruling circles in Britain were striving to use Yaqub Bek as a tool against the Russians in Central Asia under the false pretence of the defence of India from possible Russian attack. With this purpose in view the British government recognized Yaqub Bek's state in Eastern Turkestan and signed a treaty with him on 12th February 1874; meanwhile the British ambassador in Peking was trying to obtain similar recognition from the Manchu government.

In the interests of Britain and of local feudal lords, Yaqub Bek wanted to control the whole of Sinkiang and the Dungans of the Ili (Kuldja) territory. After having obtained the submission of the Urumchi and Manas Dungans, Yaqub Bek tried to win over Abil' Ogly by kindling his hatred of the Russians. The

hostile activities of Abil' Ogly preoccupied the Russian government. Fearing that Yaqub Bek might take control of the Tarancha Khanate, situated in the strategically and economically important Ili river valley, the Russian government, with the agreement of China, occupied the town of Kuldja and areas adjacent to it in 1871. (8) The temporary occupation of the Ili territory by the Russian forces was of great importance for the population of the northern Tyan'-Shan' region. Firstly, it brought an end to inter-tribal warfare, and, secondly, it prevented the danger of seizure by Yaqub Bek. This action of the Russian government was approved by all the peoples of Sinkiang who were under the menace of enslavement by Yaqub Bek. Dungans having previous connection with the Russians were insistently inviting them to intervene in their conflicts and expressed a desire to become Russian subjects. Lao-Tai wrote to General Kolpakovskiy, Commander of the Russian forces in Semirech'ye: "We invite you to come here with a thousand or two thousand men, let us unite together and act in accord. We shall come out to meet you, we shall be in the same camp, one body and one man."(9)

When the Dungans took possession of the large trading town of Chuguchak, they did not destroy the Russian trading post. Immediately after the occupation of the town on 15th January 1865, the Dungans informed the Russian Consul at Chuguchak, Vardugin, that the trading post was safe and under guard. They also expressed their desire to continue trading and to maintain peaceful relations.(10) A typical proof of the friendliness of the Dungans towards Russia is to be found in the address of the Suydin Dungans to K.I. Schreider (11): "We Dungans welcomed the coming of the Russians. We were glad of it when they were not yet here but we learned that they would come. For this we suffered much from the Sultan (Abil' Ogly and his troops - M.S.) though we helped them to get rid of the Manchu. We were glad (to know) that a special chief will be appointed for us. . . He ordered the gallows to be burnt and by so doing gave us hope that we shall live. . . Let our old men be fathers and our young people brothers of every Russian."

Ten years of Russian administration in the Ili territory left wonderful souvenirs with the inhabitants of this area. The population considered the Russians as their liberators from the tyranny which previously prevailed there. When the population learned that the Russians were going they asked to leave with them. The Russian government satisfied this wish of the people of the Ili territory in the St.Petersburg agreement of 1881 by which the territory was transferred to the Manchu authorities. Under Article III of the agreement the population was given the right to choose whether to remain where they were as Chinese subjects, or to migrate into Russian territory and become Russian subjects.

The inhabitants should have been questioned prior to the re-establishment of Chinese power. The Russian government created a special commission to

ascertain the wishes of the people; in the first half of 1881 alone the commission received requests for transfer to Russia from 1,308 Dungan and 11,365 Uygur families.

The Russian administration of the Semirech'ye region determined the area of settlement for the Ili immigrants. When the Manchu-Tsin authorities were informed of the wish of the Ili valley population to migrate to Russia, all steps were taken to keep them where they were. With this purpose a proclamation was made and the local leaders were persuaded to stay. However, these attempts to hold them failed and in March 1882 the first groups of Dungans from the Ili valley began to cross into Russian territory. More than 4,000 - 2,439 males and 2,243 females - migrated in all. These groups were settled in the towns of Dzharkent, Vernyy (Alma-Ata), Pishpek (Frunze) and in the Vernyy district of the Semirech'ye oblast (Turkestan Governorate General).

The exodus of the population from the Ili valley ended in 1883. It should be pointed out, however, that in the following years groups of Dungans continued to arrive in Semirech'ye, fleeing to Russia from the heavy yoke of the Manchu-Tsin power. In this way more than 10,000 Dungans settled in the regions known today as Kirgizia and Kazakhstan.(12)

With the arrival of these Dungans in Russian territory new pages were begun in their history and culture. The destiny of the Dungan people after their coming to Russia is closely tied to the history and culture of the neighbouring peoples, the Kazakhs and Russian settlers.

Notes

(1) THROUGH HIDDEN SHENSI. H. Huchlots. New York, 1907, pp.146-7.

(2) SREDINNOYE GOSUDARSTVO; Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh i statisticheskikh materialov po Azii. G. Williams. St.Petersburg, 1884, Issue 12, p.214.

(3) KITAY. E. Parker. St.Petersburg, 1903, p.381 (see table).

(4) TURKESTANSKIY SBORNIK, Vol.195, pp.137-9.

(5) TURKESTANSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, 1903, No.107.

(6) Ts.G.I.A. Leningrad, Fund 1284, register 233, file 201, sheet 61.

(7) WORKS OF K. MARX AND F. ENGELS. Vol.XXI, p.211.

(8) DIPLOMATICHESKIY SLOVAR'. Vol.II, 1950, p. 18.

(9) MATERIALY PO STATISTIKE TURKESTANSKOGO KRAYA. St.Petersburg, 1873, Issue 2, p.173.

(10) Ibid.

(11) PO OKRAYNE? K.I. Schreider. St.Petersburg, 1893, p.78.

(12) For an account of the present situation of the Dungans in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan see CAR, Vol.II (1954), No.3, pp.246-50.

Excavations in the Fergana region

Under the direction of Professor Ya.G. Gulyamov excavation work has started on the ancient town of Kuvy (second and first centuries B.C.) in the Fergana region. A number of monuments have already been found.

SV. 1958, No.1

Archaeological map of Kazakhstan

The Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences is to publish early next year an archaeological map of the republic showing the location of some 6,000 ancient monuments. In an appendix brief descriptions of the monuments will be given together with references to other descriptions in archives and ancient manuscripts.

KP. 8th June 1958

Eighteenth century map of Kara-Bogaz-Gol

A detailed map of the Kara-Bogaz-Gol bay was recently discovered by the section for ancient maps of the Caspian Sea in the Central Military and Naval Museum in Leningrad. The map was drawn up in 1715 by members of a Russian marine expedition.

TI. 24th May 1958

HISTORY

CENTRAL ASIAN HISTORY

1917 - 1924

By

A Correspondent

During the past few years, a number of Soviet publications have appeared, mainly sponsored by regional Academies of Sciences, dealing with the historical events of the 1918-24 period of revolution and reconstruction in Soviet Central Asia.

Among these works, the two most outstanding in their comprehensive treatment of the subject, are Klych Kuliyev's BORBA KOMMUNISTICHESKOY PARTII ZA UPROCHENIYE SOVETSKOY VLASTI I OSUSHCHESTVLENIYE NATSIONAL'NOY POLITIKI V SREDNEY AZII (1917-1925). (The Struggle of the Communist Party for the Consolidation of Soviet Authority and the Accomplishment of a National Policy in Central Asia), published in Ashkhabad in 1956, and A.K. Babakhodzhayev's PROVAL ANGLIYSKOY AGRESSIVNOY POLITIKI V SREDNEY AZII, 1917-1920. (The Downfall of British Aggressive Policy in Central Asia), sponsored by the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan in Tashkent (1955). An article by B.E. Iskandarov in the Journal of the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences, Stalinabad, TRUDY (Vol.XIX) 1954, elaborates the same theme on similar lines, but with particular reference to Bukhara.

Each account, while containing much of historical interest, is marred, for the western reader at least, by a constantly intruding search for motivation, and by a simplification of interpretive analysis which frequently reduces an otherwise spirited description to a somewhat plausible piece of invective.

As both Kuliyev's and Babakhodzhayev's books were published before Krushchev's speech before the XXth Congress had been made, the tendency, common to most Soviet political and historical writing up to that time, to attribute omniscience and unqualified wisdom and foresight to Stalin, is a marked feature of all these works. Iskandarov, whose article, published a year earlier than Babakhodzhayev's more detailed but somewhat repetitive account, and two years before Kuliyev's book, is less temperate in tone, but while denying all virtue to antagonists, real or conjectural, he makes admission of tactical errors on the part of local leadership during the early revolutionary period, attributing

these to lack of experience and to the difficulties encountered by these leaders in dealing with resistance and organized revolt, instigated by British intrigue and pan-Turanian agitation.

Kuliyev, in the light of recent Soviet reassessment of Tsarist colonization policies, emphasizes the difference between Tsarist and Soviet policies in Central Asia, stressing the imperialist character of Tsarist rule, the exploitation of local resources in the interests of capitalist industry, and the indifference displayed towards the interests and well-being of the native population. At the same time, he regards Russian expansion into the area as "inevitable" and considers that, despite the indifference and neglect shown by the Tsarist administration towards the local population, the latter benefited "objectively" from contact with Russian settlers and the impact of a superior civilization. In developing this familiar theme, Kuliyev writes with approval of the development of Russian economic expansion in the region, the construction of railways, and the penetration of Russian cultural influence during the last decades of the nineteenth and the early part of the present century.(1)

In contrast, however, with the purely incidental benefits derived from Tsarist occupation and exploitation, Kuliyev, with a wealth of statistical quotation, expounds the more positive economic and social gains realized under Soviet administration, the development of natural resources for the benefit of the population as a whole, and, above all, the growth of mutual understanding and good-will which he claims has been engendered by the "brotherly" attitude of the Russian settler, administrator and worker towards the native population.(2)

Babakhodzhayev, writing more specifically of the early period of the revolution, elaborates the same theme, and attributes to the mass of the native population a degree of gratitude towards their Russian mentors, and an appreciation of Soviet Russian attitudes that hardly accords with his own, and other Soviet writers' accounts of the protracted Basmachi revolt, and the stubborn resistance of Kazakh and Turkmen to the almost exclusively Russian Soviet regime in the early days of the Turkestan Soviet Republic. Both Kuliyev and Iskandarov extol this acclamatory acceptance by the Muslim population of Soviet administration and the Russian fraternal attitude, quoting resolutions passed by Turkmen and Uzbek "workers" as proof thereof; both writers ignore the overwhelming pressure exercised by Red Army troops and Russian settlers after 1919.

The story of the large-scale revolt of the Kazakh and Kirgiz population against the Tashkent Soviet which followed the Kokand incident in February 1918 is presented by each writer in considerable detail, but is treated as a rising by misguided and misled nomads and expropriated landowners, petty

bourgeois, ulema and "intelligentsia" who had been subjected to pan-Turanian and pan-Islamic propaganda, and who were supported by "international imperialists", above all by the British government. Kuliyev's account of the crushing of the Kokand autonomists asserts that the Kokand Muslim leaders aimed at overturning the Soviet State and that the punitive action undertaken by the Tashkent Soviet was therefore justified on grounds of internal security. In referring to resistance to the Tashkent Soviet regime (which was 100 per cent Russian), Kuliyev states:

"The victory of the proletarian revolution in Turkestan provoked the furious attack of the exploiting class. All the forces of the national bourgeoisie, Russian and native, the Muslim clergy, ex-officials and other White Guard elements. . . inspired and controlled by international imperialism, and above all, by Britain, opened the attack against Soviet Turkestan . . . The Kokand Autonomists sought to overturn the Tashkent Soviet. . .and received active assistance from Russian counter-revolutionaries; the most active assistance was provided by international imperialism, above all, the British."(3) The author declares on the same page: "British colonizers had long dreamed of seizing Central Asia and turning it into a colony."

The activities of the various "White" counter-revolutionary organizations and the resistance of the Emir of Bukhara to the Tashkent Soviet, are described as having been inspired and encouraged by the British. Each writer, citing statements in PRAVDA of 22nd November 1922 and 5th June 1923 as evidence, refers to the existence of an alleged treaty, concluded at an unspecified date and time, between the White Russian leaders and the British government, whereby in return for financial and military support the whole of Turkestan was to be recognized as a "British protectorate" for a period of 55 years.(4)

The account by all three writers of the local revolt against the Tashkent Soviet in Transcaspia in June and July 1918, and the subsequent appeal by the Menshevik Socialist Revolutionary - Turkmen regime in Ashkhabad to the British Mission in Mashhad for assistance, is treated similarly. This revolt, which began with the resistance of the workers on the Central Asian railway to the imposition of a mobilization decree and was supported by most of the Turkmen population and a considerable proportion of the town population of Transcaspia is described as having been instigated by British agents directed by the Mashhad Mission.(5) In fact the British Mission had not at that time arrived in N. Persia, nor were there any British or Indian troops in the vicinity. According to British accounts of this episode the support accorded to the Ashkhabad government was a military move to deny the use of the port of Krasnovodsk and the Central Asian railway to the advancing Turks and Germans, whose progress through the Caucasus was a matter of deep concern to the British Command in Mesopotamia and the Government of India.(6)

The account given by Kuliyev and Babakhodzhayev of the shooting in September 1918 of the 26 Baku Commissars is based on the official Soviet version contained in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, which in turn follows the account of this incident given by a Socialist Revolutionary journalist Vadim Chaykin, who wrote a book on the subject in 1922. The shooting of the Commissars, which was carried out by representatives of the Menshevik Socialist Revolutionary "government" in Transcaspia, has become part of the epic of the Revolution, and is the subject of much Soviet writing and pictorial representation of the period. Despite the fact that the Ashkhabad government acted in opposition to the advice of the head of the British Mission in N. Persia, and that no representative of that Mission was in Krasnovodsk, near which town the shooting took place, the Soviet version, restated by Kuliyev and Babakhodzhayev places the whole responsibility on the British Mission, and even accuses members of the Mission of having participated in the actual shooting.(7)

Relations between the Tashkent Soviet, and later, the Turkestan Soviet Republic and Bukhara are described at some length by all three writers. Blame for the unsuccessful first attempt by Kolesov, the head of the first Tashkent Soviet, to seize Bukhara is squarely placed on Kolesov by Iskandarov. His account of this operation and of subsequent steps to reduce Bukhara differs in points of detail with those of Kuliyev and Babakhodzhayev. Their accounts are historically of considerable interest. The same can be said for the struggles of the Emir of Bukhara against absorption by the Tashkent Soviet culminating in the latter's successful seizure of the Emirate. The Emir's abortive negotiations with King Amanullah of Afghanistan and his only partly successful efforts to obtain military supplies and army instructors from him, are described by Babakhodzhayev in detail. Both these accounts suffer from the confusion of fact and fiction and the determination to discover the hand of Britain behind every incident. British contact with Bukhara for intelligence purposes, and the provision of a small quantity of rifles by the British Mission in Mashhad is magnified by both Babakhodzhayev and Iskandarov into systematic military and political support. The transit of Bukhara by an Indian Army officer, Colonel Bailey, who, after the departure from Tashkent of a Government of India Mission in October 1918 had gone into hiding to escape arrest, and eventually made his way to Persia, is described, without substantiating evidence, as "proof" of his role as the directing hand of Britain's alleged support to the native and "White Guard" movements in Turkestan.(8) Iskandarov refers with indignation to the fact that a number of Austro-Hungarian ex-prisoners were employed by the Emir of Bukhara as instructors, but fails to mention that many thousands of the same prisoners had been recruited into the Turkestan Red Army.

The situation that developed in Tashkent and the vicinity during the critical period that followed the crushing of the Kokand Autonomists is

described by both Kuliyev and Babakhodzhayev with a profusion of reference to the works of Lenin and Stalin in support of the policies undertaken at that time. Dutov's operations in the Orenburg area and the severing of communications with Russia; native revolt in Fergana and Semirech'ye; growing resistance to the Tashkent Soviet on the part of Menshevik Socialist Revolutionary groups, as well as ex-officer and other counter-revolutionary "White" organizations, are described as having brought about a critical state of affairs which caused undisguised anxiety to the Soviet government in Petrograd. The Tashkent Soviet at this stage depended almost entirely on the support of the Russian railway and factory workers and demobilized soldiers, and the alienation of the Muslim population by its chauvinistic attitude is not acknowledged by either writer, though the visit of representatives of the SOVNARKOM (RSFSR) and VTSIK is recorded. It was, in fact, not until these emissaries arrived from Moscow in February and April 1918 that steps were taken to provide for native Muslim representation and to ensure that their special interests were recognized.

In dealing with this situation, both Kuliyev and Babakhodzhayev show a disposition to represent the existing state of affairs as the outcome of foreign inspired counter-revolutionary action, rather than as the inevitable outcome of conditions which had been developing for some time past, aggravated and given scope by years of war and the breakdown of the administration.

The main part of Babakhodzhayev's story deals with the situation up to the end of 1920, although he refers briefly to events following the defeat of the counter-revolution in Transcaspia in 1920 by Frunze's Red Army and the confused situation that developed during and immediately after the Third Afghan war.

Kuliyev devotes considerably more space to these events and enlarges on the fluctuating and uncertain relationship between the Turkestan Soviet government and the governments of Persia and Afghanistan. King Amanullah's alternating displays of friendship and suspicion; his attempt to secure Soviet support against the Government of India, while at the same time maintaining relations with Muslim insurrectionary bands in Soviet territory and the Emir of Bukhara are "explained" rather than related. Afghan demands for territorial adjustments in the Tedzhen area, and the provision of a few instructors and a quantity of arms to Bukhara are attributed to British instigation, although Kuliyev's ingenuity is somewhat strained to explain the ambiguous nature of Afghan policy.

Enver Pasha's ill-fated adventure in Turkestan is treated with greater detail by Babakhodzhayev. His relations with Lenin prior to his arrival in Turkestan with the declared object of conducting an anti-British campaign, receives only brief reference. He is stated to have been a British agent, and

his efforts to unite the various Muslim elements into a Central Asian Islamic state to have had the support of the British government. Kuliyev presents a similar interpretation of the episode which he regards as the final effort of the British imperialists to tear Turkestan away from Russia and turn it into a British colony.

It is noteworthy that in earlier Soviet writing, particularly in reference to Afghanistan, it was not claimed that the British made any material contribution to the opposition forces in Central Asia, although it was often stated that the aims of the forces were directed by British, and latterly also by American imperialism. The only sources for the charges of British collusion made by Kuliyev and Babakhodzhaev are press reports and the published speeches and proclamations of Soviet leaders. They also cite extracts from the memoirs of various British military leaders and consular officers, which, taken from their context, appear to suggest that relations existed between them and certain insurrectionary groups and their leaders that had more than intelligence significance.

The second part of Kuliyev's book which deals with the period of reconstruction in Turkestan, the constitution of the various Central Asian Soviet republican units, and with social developments, education and economic life is written with much greater objectivity and attention to detail than the earlier part. Space does not admit of a detailed analysis of this part of his work. The account of the social and economic development of the region, while of interest, contains very little that has not been described in many Soviet publications. The various changes and shifts of Soviet policy in regard to national groups are touched upon lightly, but the book does not go beyond 1925.

Briefly stated, the theme of all three writers in regard to developments in the area since the end of the revolutionary period may be summarized as follows:

Soviet policy in Central Asia has proceeded by stages, in accordance with the principles laid down by Lenin and the Soviet government in Moscow, to raise the cultural and economic level of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. Encouragement has been given to the development of local languages, arts and crafts, literature and theatre, and by the spread of education the people of Turkestan have been enabled to take a full part in the administration and public life of their autonomous regions. Turkestan has been divided into autonomous republics, mainly on a linguistic basis; the nomadic tribes have been encouraged to settle; industry has been promoted, and the economic life of the community has been raised many times above the level of Tsarist days. This has been made possible by the brotherly cooperation and friendly guidance of the Russian people in their midst, by bringing Russian education, science and skills to the service of the community as a whole.

It will have been noted that throughout these accounts of the struggle to retain Russian ascendency over the Central Asian region, particular emphasis is placed by the autnors on the benign attitude and goodwill of the Soviet Russian regime towards the native population, while the attempts made by local Muslim leaders and intellectuals to achieve independence are denounced as reactionary, and as having been supported by foreign imperialists, notably the British, as a means to achieve their own ends. These alleged aims, it is contended, were thwarted by the victory of the Red Army over all reactionary forces and their imperialist supporters.

While to some extent, this thesis may be regarded as a plausible rationalization of a number of disconnected, and in some cases, somewhat embarrassing facts, the element of suspicion, deep-seated and intensified by ideological attitudes, undoubtedly plays a part in determining the authors treatment of the alleged British role.

Suspicion of British designs and the tendency to discover British intrigue behind all local disturbances are of course not recent phenomena. They date back to the early days of Russian expansion in the Oxus area and towards the Hindukush barrier, when every Russian advance during the latter part of the last century provoked counter measures on the part of the Government of India, which saw in these moves a threat to the frontiers of India and to British interests in the Middle East as a whole. Each move by either side, from whatever motive, was inevitably interpreted by the opposing side as a threat to its own security.

On the British-Indian side the suspicion regarding Russian aims in Central Asia and the implied threat to the Indian frontier, were mainly confined to the British official class, although reflected in Parliament and press, and have been largely forgotten - probably because of the remoteness of the area and the withdrawal of Britain from the Indian peninsula. In Turkestan, however, where the Tsarist government was not only advancing its military frontier, but was extending its influence in every way, the official attitude towards British moves permeated all classes of the rapidly increasing local Russian population. The closed frontiers and consequent isolation from contact with foreign nationa engendered suspicion towards all foreigners, particularly towards the British, which the 1907 Agreement between the British and Russian governments, defining their respective spheres of influence in relation to Persia and Afghanistan did little to allay; local Russian officialdom regarding it as a tactical move of n particular consequence.

During the 1914-18 war the establishment of vast prisoner-of-war camps in Turkestan and the disturbed conditions which prevailed throughout the area from 1916 onwards, compelled the government to keep a large military force there. The decision to extend conscription to the native population of Turkestan, hitherto exempt, resulted in widespread rebellion in which resentment against

the allotment of native lands to Russian and Ukrainian settlers was expressed in attacks on their settlements. The revolt was crushed by the military government with great severity, but this revolt of the non-Russian population against Russian settlers and Russian administration, was to play an important part in the subsequent attitude towards the native population of the Russian revolutionary regime. Soviet writers ignore, or minimize, the fact that at this time (October 1917 - November 1918) the Entente powers were still at war with Germany and her allies. German and Turkish troops were in occupation of the Ukraine and the Black Sea area and were advancing towards the Caspian. All Russian resistance had come to an end, and as a result the British forces in Mesopotamia and north Persia were threatened by the Turko-German advance. Pan-Islam and pan-Turk propagandists and agitators and German agents were actively engaged in stirring up trouble in Afghanistan, and in establishing contacts with the Muslim population of Central Asia.

It is in the light of these circumstances, together with the hostile attitude towards Russia's former allies adopted by the Soviet government after Russian withdrawal from the war, that judgment on the Soviet standpoint towards British involvement in Central Asian affairs in 1918-19 must be considered. A complete and objective account of events in Russian Central Asia during the revolutionary period has yet to be written.

Notes

(1) Kuliyev, op.cit. pp.8-10.

(2) Ibid, pp.11-13, 23; Babakhodzhayev, op.cit. p.85.

(3) Kuliyev, p. 14.

(4) Babakhodzhayev, pp.68-69; Kuliyev, p.14; Iskandarov, pp.21-24.

(5) Iskandarov, p.21; Babakhodzhayev, p.71; Kuliyev, p.19.

(6) OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR (1914-1918), Vol.IV, London, 1922. Article "The 26 Commissars", Sir W. Malleson, FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, March 1923. Article by Sir W. Malleson in Journal of Central Asian Society, Vol.IX-X, 1922-23. Article "Operations in Transcaspia", Col. J.K. Tod, ARMY QUARTERLY, March 1923.

(7) Babakhodzhayev, pp.77-79. [The recently published (1957) ISTORIYA GRAZHDANSKOY VOYNY V SSSR (Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, Moscow), Vol.3, pp.207-8, repeats the Chaykin version, illustrated with a reproduction of a painting by I.I. Brodskiy depicting the shooting of the 26 Commissars in the presence of 3 British officers. - Ed.]

(8) Iskandarov, pp.21-22; MISSION TO TASHKENT, Lt.Col. F.M. Bailey, London, 1946.

Western fiction for Central Asian youth

The Uzbek, Kirgiz and Kazakh State Publishing Houses have printed in the local languages 100,000-200,000 copies of Dumas's THE COUNT OF MONTE CRISTO, THE THREE MUSKETEERS and Conan Doyle's THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES. The publication of the latter work is greatly deplored as it is considered to have little or no intrinsic merit and to be unnecessary for the development of Soviet youth. LT. 29th May 1958

Commemorating Rudaki

To mark the 1100th anniversary of the birth of Rudaki his complete poems are to be published in Tadzhikistan together with Tadzhik and Russian translations of his other works. A statue will be put up in Stalinabad, and in his birthplace, the kolkhoz village Pandzhrud, a library will be opened. Moreover the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences will devote a special session to his work. SV. 1958, No.2

Alisher Navoi museum

An Alisher Navoi Museum of Uzbek Literature has been opened in the Institute of Language and Literature, of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in Tashkent. The museum contains the works of Alisher Navoi and his followers, Furkat, Mukimi and others. SV. 1958, No.1

COMMUNICATIONS

DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT IN NORTHERN KAZAKHSTAN

The present article is based on the book VOPROSY KOMPLEKSNOGO RAZVITIYA TRANSPORTA V RAYONAKH OSVOYENIYA TSELINNYKH I ZALEZHNYKH ZEMEL' SEVERNOGO KAZAKHSTANA by A.V. Osorgin, I.V. Lavrov and others, published in the latter half of 1957. It should be read in conjunction with the article which appeared under the same heading in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.2, pp.114-29.

I. Railways - II. Roads - III. Oblast Communications

I. RAILWAYS

Once the present programme of broad- (Russian 'standard') and narrow-gauge railway construction is completed the density of the railway network in northern Kazakhstan will be 0.65 km. per 100 sq.km. But to meet the growing needs of this rapidly expanding area for transport 1-1.1 km. of broad-gauge railway per 100 sq.km. is required. It is therefore proposed to build the following railways by 1965:

1. Aydyrlya - Mamlyutka (broad-gauge, 760 km.; a section 225 km. long is under construction).

The railway will start from the station Aydyrlya (the junction for the Orenburg - South Ural railway) and will run through the rayon centre Dzhetygara where the gold and asbestos industries are being developed to Tobol (the junction for the Karaganda - South Ural railway). At Tobol the line will link up with the main South Siberian railway. The next section of the railway Tobol - Kustanay (100 km.), which is now under construction, will bring the railway to the Sokolovsko-Sarbay combine. At Kustanay the main line will link up with the old branch railway line Troitsk-Kustanay and

the new narrow-gauge line Kustanay-Kokchetav. At some future date this line will have to be altered to broad-gauge and will become the Middle Siberian main line; work on the conversion of the Kustanay-Uritskoye stretch is to start shortly.

From Kustanay the railway will follow a straight course to Kayrankul' where it will intersect the railway Kurgan - Peski now under construction. From the intersection the line will go by the shortest route through the rayon centre Presnovka to the station Mamlyutka on the Omsk railway.

The freight turnover for agricultural goods is estimated at 2,823,000 tons, of which 763,000 tons will be outward and 2,050,000 tons inward.

2. Middle Siberian railway: Kustanay - Kaymanchikha - Karasuk (broad-gauge, 1040 km.).

On 20th September 1957 the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the construction of a narrow-gauge railway line Kustanay-Kaymanchikha (830 km.), subsequently the sections of this railway: Kokchetav - Kzyl-Tu (180 km.), Peski - Uritskoye (79 km.), and Peski - Volodarskoye (97 km.) were replanned and now a broad-gauge line is under construction and already opened on the stretch Peski-Uritskoye. This line cuts through the central areas of the virgin lands in northern Kazakhstan and when completed will have a decisive significance for normal transport and the development of agriculture.

It is proposed to extend this line to the south through Irtysh and the settlement Zhelezinka to the station Karasuk on the line Tatarskaya - Kulunda, where it will link up with the broad-gauge railway Karasuk - Kamen' - Barnaul now under construction, and so have a straight outlet to the Kuzbas through Cherepanovo. The terminal points of the railway will be Chelyabinsk in the west via Troitsk - Kustanay, and Kuybyshev via Kustanay - Troitsk - Beloretsk - Abdullino; and in the south Ural'sk - Saratov and Gur'yev - Astrakhan via Kustanay - Tobol - Aydyrlya - Orsk.

The three broad-gauge Siberian lines will have meridional interlinking lines: Tobol - Kustanay - Mamlyutka; Kurgan - Peski (with a narrow-gauge extension to Atbasar); Petropavlovsk - Kokchetav - Akmolinsk; Ekibastuz - Pushkin sovkhoz - Kulomzino (Omsk); and Tatarskaya - Karasuk - Kulunda. The Middle Siberian railway will thus acquire a transit significance as a reserve route.

The estimated freight turnover of the railway within the borders of Kazakhstan for 1965 is 3,555,000 tons, of which 931,000 tons will be outward


Communications in Northern Kazakhstan
95 0 95 190 285 klm.
Existing broad gauge railways.
Broad gauge railways under construction.
Narrow gauge railways under construction.
Proposed broad gauge railways
Sections of main motor roads.
Motor road under construction.
Proposed roads.
CHELYABINSKAYA OBLAST'
KURGANSKAYA OBLAST'
OMSKAYA OBLAST'
KARAGANDINSKAYA OBLAST'
ALTAYSKIY KRAY
Chelyabinsk
Kurgan
Troitsk
Kartaly
Kustanay
Zatobol'sk
Rzd 65
Viktorovka
Tobol
Denisovka
Uzunkol'
Aydarly
Sharakol'
Kamyshnyy
Akkarga
Zhaltma
Sov. Karabalynskiy
Sov. Ukrainskiy
Novo-Troitskiy
Tashkinskiy
Kar'-Aul'skiy
Im. Molotova
Feshkovskoye
Burli
Fedorovka
Aleksandrovka
Vladimirovskiy
Vvedenka
Dolbushinskiy
Borovskoye
Yershovka
Dem'yakovka
Fedorovka
Kazanarskiy
Tobol
Presnogor'kovka
Presnovka
Troitskoye
Nikolayevka
May-Bulak
Novopokrovka
Suly
Kreshchenka
Ishim
Maryevka
Volodarskoye
Peski
Unitskoye
Semenovskiy
Alekseyevka
Kirilovka
Andreyevka
Sov. im Lomonosova
Stavropolka
Ruzayevka
Oz. Kush-Murun
Karasu
Kazanbasy
Aman-Karagay
Semiozernoye
Kayran-Kul'skiy
Sov. Tyumlyugurskiy
Kaybagar
Raz 76
Oktyabr'skiy
Sov. im Vil'yamsa
Sholaksay
Sov. im. Ushakova
Yesil'
Koko
Ishimskoye
Barankul'
Sov. Tersakanskiy
Ken
Arkalyk (Rudnik)
Amangel'dy
Oz. Tengiz
Dzhaksy
Perekatnoye
Kiyma
Ishim
Albasar
Adyr
Novosel'skoye
Prishimskiy
Veseloye
Chistopol'ye
Konstantinovka
Zerenda
Balkashino
Ostrogorka
Krasnoyarka
Sokolovka
Mamlyutka
Nikol'skoye
Konyukhovo
Oktyabr'skoye
Petropavlovsk
Poludino
Bulayevo
Uspenka
Kara-Guda
Ivanovka
Smirnovo
Yavlenka
Pokrovka
Kiyaly
Korneyevka
Voloshinka
Voroshilovskiy
Novo-Sukhotino
Kellerovka
Karasevka
Lavrovka
Kr. Yar
Yelenovka
Kokchetav
Aleksandrovka
Borovoye
Shchuchinsk
Kazgorodok
Zhana-Aul
Aysary
Stepnyak
Makinsk
Makinka
Nikolayevka
Voznesenka
Bestyube
Astrakhanka
Kamyshenka
Shortandy
Alekseyevka
Zhuravlevka
Akmolinsk
Ermen' Tau
Blagodatnoye
Mikhaylovka
Vishnevka
Rozhdestvenka
Krasno-Znamenskiy
Sov. im.
Abaya
Kurgal'dzhino
Bersuat
Sov. im. Malenkova
Sov. im. Gor'kogo
Berlik
Sov. Bidaikskiy
Aktuz-say
Podol'skoye
Leningradskiy
Chkalovo
Kzyl-Tu
Irtysh
Alembay
Mikhaylovka
Zhelezinka
Kaymanachikha
Irtyshskoye
L'vovka
Kachiry
Krasnokutskoye
Sov. im. Zhdanova
Uspenka
Veselyy Kliv
Novo-Pokrovskoye
Kulunda
Shcherbakty
Pavlodar
Galkino
Kalkaman
Yermak
Chigirinovskiy
Chalday
Ekibastuz
Maykain
Lebyazh'ye
Semenovka
Mayskoye
Semiyarskoye
Bayan-Aul
Irtysh
J P - 1958

and 2,624,000 tons inward; grain will account for 1,959,000 tons, i.e. 56 per cent of the total freight turnover.

3. Ekibastuz - Kulomzino (Omsk) (400 km., of which 250 km. lie within the borders of Kazakhstan).

From Ekibastuz the railway will run in a north-westerly direction. The terminal point in the south will be 140 km. from the Irtysh and in the north it will be beside the river.

The main purpose of the railway will be to supply the Omsk power-station with Ekibastuz coal; part of the coal will be brought by river in the navigable seasons, the rest, approximately 3m. tons, will be carried by rail. The proposed railway will shorten the route by 410 km. in comparison with the present one which runs through Kulunda - Tatarskaya.

The freight turnover of the railway within Kazakhstan, i.e. of the Ekibastuz - Pushkin sovkhoz section, is estimated at 3,408,000 tons of which coal will account for 3m. and grain 247,000 tons.

4. Kustanay - Amankaragay (broad-gauge, 100 km.).

It is estimated that by 1965 the consumption of coal in the recently discovered deposits near Kushmurun by the industries and power-stations of southern Ural, Kustanay and Troitsk will amount to 20m. tons. At present the coal can only be brought to Kustanay and Troitsk by a roundabout way through Tobol which considerably increases the cost of transportation. A direct railway from Kustanay to Amankaragay will therefore considerably shorten the distance and so reduce costs.

Estimated freight turnover for agricultural produce is 225,000 tons.

5. Branch line Shortandy - Zholymbet - Minsk sovkhoz (broad-gauge 125 km.).

The railway will serve eight sovkhozes and two industrial centres, the Zholymbet gold works and the future Bestyube brown coal deposits. From Shortandy on the Karaganda main line the railway will run in an easterly direction to Zholymbet and thence in a north-westerly direction through the Ashchilyayryk and Sholakkarsu river valleys to the brown coal deposits in the vicinity of Minsk sovkhoz.

Estimated freight turnover 367-530,000 tons, of which coal will account for 200,000 and grain 179,000 tons.

II. ROADS

At present many trunk roads run parallel with the railways; this means that bulk loads which normally should be transported by rail cannot be brought to the railways from rayon centres. The planning and construction of new roads must therefore be directed to making good this deficiency and the provision of an interlinking network of roads between the rayons and Karaganda - the main industrial centre in Kazakhstan.

Although a number of first class roads already exist in the area, and others are under construction, the following additional main roads are proposed:

1. Chelyabinsk - Kustanay - Akmolinsk - Karaganda (thus providing a link between the industries of the Ural and Kazakhstan).

The section Troitsk - Kustanay will provide inter-oblast connections between the centres Fedorovskoye, Peshkovskoye and Karabalyk.

The second section, Kustanay - Uritskoye, will link the oblast centre with the Uritskiy, Ubagan and Karasu rayons.

Third section, Uritskoye - Ruzayevka, will leave the alignment of the railway now under construction and will run through Sevastopol'skiy and Stavropolka. On the first stage of this section, Uritskoye-Sevastopol'skiy, will be concentrated the loads from the roads from Karasu and Kozubay. Just before Stavropolka the road will enter the Kokchetav oblast.

Fourth section, Ruzayevka - Atbasar, will run to the new rayon centre Chistopolka and thence to Kalmakkol'. Thereafter it may take one of two courses, either to Novokiyevka - Perekratnoye, or to Baraktay - Sovetskoye. If it takes the latter route it will run parallel with the railway Peski - Atbasar which is currently under construction and so lose its economic importance. The first variant is therefore more expedient and practical as it would transform the section Kalmakkol' - Novokiyevka - Perekratnoye into an approach to the railway Kartaly - Akmolinsk. Furthermore the section Perekratnoye - Atbasar is of considerable economic importance as it connects the oblast centre with the three rayon centres of Kiyma, Barankul' and Yesil'.

Fifth section, Atbasar - Akmolinsk, will run for the whole of its length along the Ishim thus crossing a number of settlements.

Sixth section, Akmolinsk - Karaganda, will run along the Karaganda railway and will link Akmolinsk with the rayon centre Vishnevka.

2. Petropavlovsk - Kokchetav - Akmolinsk

Seven kilometres from Petropavlovsk the road will branch off from the main highway (first class road), Petropavlovsk - Par'yevka and run in a southerly direction to Kellerovka, the centre of the Kellerovka rayon of the Kokchetav oblast. At this point the road will be 5-25 km. from the railway line Petropavlovsk - Akmolinsk. After Kellerovka the road and railway converge and from the station Anar to Kokchetav run parallel. From Kokchetav the road continues parallel with the railway through Dzhamantuz and Shuchinsk to Makinsk where it will leave the railway for Voznesenka, Zhuravlevka and Astrakhanka. This section will serve as an approach to the stations Makinsk and Daltyr and will therefore be of great economic importance. From Astrakhanka the road will join the highway Kustanay - Akmolinsk.

3. Pavlodar - Bayan-Aul - Semiz-Bugu - Kolkhoznoye - Karaganda

The road, besides linking the two industrial centres Pavlodar and Karaganda, will also link Pavlodar with Maykain, the centre of the gold industry in the area.

4. Semipalatinsk - Pavlodar - Omsk

This road will link north and east Kazakhstan with the Omsk oblast. For the whole of its length it will follow the Irtysh river. In the Pavlodar oblast it will be of particular importance as it will link the oblast centre with the rayons.

5. Petropavlovsk - Kustanay - Yuzhniy Ural

In northern Kazakhstan the road will intersect the Mamlyutka and Presnov rayons and provide a link with the oblast centre. Sections of the road will serve as approaches to the railway station Mamlyutka on the Omsk line and for the projected line Aydyrlya - Mamlyutka. Near the railway station at Troyebratnaya on the Kurgan-Peski railway, the road will swerve into the Kustanay oblast and run past the rayon centre Presnogor'kovka to Dem'yanovka and the large settlement Borovskoye. This section will link the north and eastern regions of the Kustanay oblast where grain is extensively grown. From Kustanay the road will run to the Sokolovsko-Sarbay combine, and thence through Viktorovka (centre of the Taranov rayon) to Tobol and Denisovka (centre of the Ordzhonikidza rayon) to Dzhetygara and so out of Kazakhstan.

III. OBLAST COMMUNICATIONS

Kustanay Oblast (197,000 sq.km.)

A. Railways

The following railway lines are either already in existence or under construction:

1. Section of the Karataly - Akmolinsk line (348 km.) links the southern and eastern sections of the oblast.

2. Troitsk - Kustanay (166 km.) links the oblast centre with south Ural.

3. Troitsk - Kartaly (55 km.) intersects the north-western end of the oblast

4. Kustanay - Tobol (100 km., newly completed) links Kustanay with the Sokolovsko-Sarbay combine and provides an outlet for the goods to the Urals and central Kazakhstan.

5. Kurgan - Peski (broad-gauge, 70 km., under construction), will intersect the extreme north-eastern end of the oblast.

6. Kustanay - Peski (within the oblast 55 km. are broad-gauge and 135 km. narrow-gauge).

7. Section of the line Yesil' (Akmolinsk oblast) - Turgay bauxite deposits (Amangel'dy rayon, Kustanay oblast). Under construction.

The total length of existing railways and of those under construction in the oblast is 1,008 km. of which 873 km. are broad- and 135 km. narrow-gauge. In view of the size of the oblast this is far from adequate to meet the requirements of the rapidly expanding agricultural and industrial enterprises. In order to bring the density of the railway network within the oblast to 1.1 km. per 100 sq.km. the construction of the following railways is proposed:

Mamlyutka - Kustanay (550 km.). Includes the Kustanay - Tobol and the Tobol - Dzhetygara - Aydyrlya lines. The section Tobol-Dzhetygara was recently completed and is in use.

Kustanay - Amankaragay (100 km.).

B. Roads

The following are the more important motor-roads already existing or currently under construction:

1. Kustanay - Uritskoye (135 km.)

2. Uritskoye - Sevastopol'skoye - Ruzayevka (Kokchetav oblast) (120 km.)
The road is a continuation of the present one; it will also form a section of the Chelyabinsk - Kustanay - Akmolinsk - Karaganda highway which is now under construction.

3. Kustanay - Borovskoye - Dem'yanovka (165 km.)
The road runs through three rayons in the northern part of the oblast which are not served by railways. This road, particularly the section Kustanay - Borovskoye carries more traffic than any other in the oblast. In 1955 the construction of a motor highway from Dem'yanovka to Presnovka (North Kazakhstan oblast) was started; it will eventually be extended to Mamlyutka on the Omsk railway.

4. Zhaul'ma - siding No.63 (Kocherzhinovka) (140 km.)
This road, which is now under construction, will serve as the main highway for the Ordzhonikidzevskiy and Kamyshinskiy rayons and their many sovkhozes. When the railway line to Dzhetygara is completed the road will serve as an approach to siding No.63 on the railway line Kartaly - Akmolinsk and to the station Denisovka on the Kustanay - Dzhetygara line. Estimated freight density at siding No.63 is 120,000 tons, and 250,000 tons at Denisovka.

5. Kaybagor - Karasu - Uritskoye (140 km.)
The northern section of the road near the settlement Sevastopol'skoye joins the motor road Uritskoye - Stavropolka - Ruzayevka at present under construction. This road will be particularly important as at present routes in this area are impassable in the spring and autumn months.

6. Dzhetygara - Denisovka - Tobol (103 km., and its extension Dzhetygara - Bredy, 40 km.)
At present these roads carry fairly heavy traffic but by 1965 they will be less important and will be used as approaches to railway stations.

It is proposed to construct by 1965 the following additional roads with a total length of 1,378 km. Most of these will have a gravel surface with a bottoming foundation:

1. Dzhetygara - Akkarga (Prirechniy sovkhoz) (86 km.)
Will serve as the principal approach from the south to the rayon centre and the future railway station at Dzhetygara. For the whole of its length the road will run through the Dzhetygara rayon and will pass six sovkhozes and several gold mining areas.
Estimated freight density: 126,000 tons.

2. Tobol - Sharakol' (83 km.)
Will link a number of MT stations and sovkhozes in the Taranovskiy rayon. The northern section will join up with the proposed Tobol - Denisovka road.
Estimated freight density will range from 60,000 tons in the southern section to 100,000 tons in the northern.

3. Kustanay - Sokolovka - Viktorovka - Tobol (113 km.)
The section from Sokolovka to Viktorovka will run along the Ayat river and will cross to the opposite bank at Viktorovka. The road will link several rayon centres and sovkhozes.
Freight density will range from 60,000 tons at Kustanay to 127,000 at Tobol.

4. Kazanbasy station - Moskalevskiy - Kayrankul'skiy (60 km.)
Will serve as an approach from the south to Kazanbasy railway station and will link a number of sovkhozes and kolkhozes in the Semiozerniy rayon.
Freight density: 177,000 tons.

5. Amankaragay - Sholaksy (92 km.)
Will serve as the principal approach from the south to the railway station at Amankaragay. The road will run through the Oktyabr' and Semiozerniy rayons and link the Amangel'dy and Turgay rayons with Kustanay and the railway.
Freight density of the northern section will be 319,000 tons, and of the southern 100,000 tons.

6. Kaybagor - Villyams sovkhoz (45 km.)
An offshoot of the Amankaragay-Sholaksy road. Will provide communicatio for the sovkhozes of the Oktyabr' rayon.
Freight density: 161,000 tons.

7. Siding No.76 - Tyuntyugurskiy sovkhoz (60 km.)
The road will run along the bank of the river Tyuntyugur and will then swerve to Lake Kaybagor. Will link sovkhozes of the Oktyabr' and Karasu rayons.
Freight density: 323,000 tons.

8. Novo-Alekseyevka - Zuyevka - Kun-Shash (station on the Kustanay-Uritskoye railway) (40 km.)
Will provide communication for the eastern part of the Ubagan rayon.
Freight density: 139,000 tons.

9. Ukrainskiy sovkhoz - Dzharkul' - Ken'-Aral'skiy (142 km.)
Freight density of the southern section, 85,000 tons and of the northern, 185,000 tons.

10. Karabalyk sovkhoz - Peshkovka station - Pushkinskoye (70 km.)
Will serve as an approach from the south and north to the station Peshkovka.
Freight density will range from 59,000 tons in the southern section to 90,000 tons in the northern.

11. Mikhaylovka - Burli - Toguzak station (45 km.)
For the most of its length will run along the right bank of the river Toguzak.
Freight density will range from 50,000 tons at Burli to 95,000 tons at Toguzak.

12. Uritskoye - Veseliy Podol - Lesnoy sovkhoz (50 km.)
Will connect the north-eastern part of the Uritsk rayon with the railway station.
Freight density: 130,000 tons.

13. Borovskoye - Dolbushinskiy - Karatal'skaya MTS (Uzun-Agach) (62 km.)
From Borovskoye the road will run north through Dolbushinskiy to the border of the Kustanay oblast, and will form an offshoot of the union motor highway Kustanay - Borovskoye-Dem'yanovka which is now under construction.
Freight density: 94,000 tons.

14. Dem'yanovka - Yershovka - Granichniy (33 km.)
Will serve as an approach to the union road Kustanay-Dem'yanovka.
Freight density: 87,000 tons.

15. Amangel'dy - Turgayskiy rudnik (80 km.)
Will serve as an approach to the terminal station of the new railway line Yesil' - Turgay. The road will run between the rivers Karaturgay and Tasty and will provide communication for over 20 kolkhozes.
Freight density: 96,000 tons.

16. Zhail'ma- Kamyshnoye - Dzhetygara (135 km.)
The first section of the road will form part of the Zhail'ma - Denisovka - siding No.63 road which is now under construction. The second section will be 47 km. long and will link the centres of two adjoining rayons with the railway station.
Freight density: 253,000 tons.

17. Kustanay - Vvedenka (100 km.)
Will follow the left bank of the Tobol and through the Kustanay and Vvedenskiy rayons.
Freight density: 263,000 tons.

18. Kustanay - Semiozernoye (93 km.)
Will run through the Zatobol'sk and Semiozerniy rayons to the railway station Amankaragay. The road will run parallel to the proposed railway Kustanay - Amankaragay.
Freight density will range from 60,000 tons in the northern section to 100-130,000 tons in the southern.

North-Kazakhstan Oblast (41,600 sq.km.)

A. Railways

The oblast is well-served by the following railways:

1. Gorbunovo - Mamlyutka - Petropavlovsk - Kara-Guga (187 km.), section of the Omsk railway.

2. Petropavlovsk - Kiyaly (84 km.), section of the Karaganda line.

3. Kayrankul' - Kreshchenka (100 km.), section of the Kurgan - Peski broad-gauge railway now under construction. Will intersect the south-western part of the Oktyabr' rayon.

4. Bulayevo - Malenkovo (100 km.), narrow-gauge line; crosses the Bulayevo rayon from north to south.
The total length of existing railways and of those currently under construction is 521 km., of which 421 km. are broad-gauge and 100 km. narrow gauge.

B. Roads

At the beginning of the new lands campaign in 1954 there were 4,225 km. of motor-roads in the oblast, but many are impassable at certain seasons of the year and a number of inter-village roads have been ploughed up.

By 1965 it is proposed to build the following additional roads with a total length of 741 km., of which 520 km. will be metalled and 221 km. will have a gravel surface:

1. Petropavlovsk - Yavlenka - Mar'yevka - Kreshchenka station (275 km.)
The road will run through the Petropavlovskiy, Priishimskiy, Leninskiy and Oktyabr'skiy rayons, and will provide communication for a number of sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
Freight density at Petropavlovsk 419,000 tons, and in the southern section 180,000 tons.

2. Suly - Dmitriyevka - Semipolka - Arkhangel'skoye - Presnovka (station on the projected railway line Aydyrlya - Mamlyutka) (130 km.)
Freight density at Suly 331,000 tons, and at Presnovka 175,000 tons.

3. Mar'yevka - Dmitriyevka (25 km.)
Will link the Kreshchenka-Petropavlovsk road with the Suly - Dmitriyevka road.
Freight density: 69,000 tons.

4. May-Bulak - Blagoveshchenka - Presnovka (50 km.)
Will link up the western part of the Presnovka rayon.
Freight density: 61,000 tons.

5. Bulayevo - Oktyabr'skoye - Konyukhovo (35 km.)
Freight density: 81,000 tons.

6. Smirnovo - Sholak - Doshchan - Poltavka - Ivanovka (50 km.)
Freight density: 140,000 tons.

7. Novo-Petrovka - Korneyevka - Voroshilovka - Bezlesniy - Kiyaly (115 km.)
Freight density within the borders of the North Kazakhstan oblast, 324,000 tons.

8. Krasnoyarskoye - Sokolovka - Petropavlovsk (61 km.)
Freight density: 208,000 tons.

9. Mamlyutka - Senzharka - Presnovka - Ekaterinovka - to the border of the oblast (156 km.) The road will cross the north-western section of the oblast; the first section is already under construction.

Kokchetav Oblast (78,600 sq.km.)

A. Railways

At present there is one main railway in the oblast, Petropavlovsk-Akmolinsk, which runs from north to south. The Kustanay - Kokchetav - Kaymanchikha railway which is under construction will run crosswise, and the western sector of the oblast will also be crossed by a section of the Kurgan - Peski - Atbasar line.

The total length of existing railways and of those under construction is 1,130 km.; of these 850 km. are broad- and 280 km. narrow-gauge.

B. Roads

The road network is extremely inadequate; for every 100 sq.km. there are only 9 km. of motor-road, and of these roads only 0.2 km. are passable at all times of the year.

On 20th September 1954 the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the construction of two inter-oblast roads: Yelenovka - Takhtabrod - Dzhaksy (110 km.), and the Stavropolka - Mar'yevka (110 km.) to link the Kokchetav, Akmolinsk and North-Kazakhstan oblasts. To provide adequate communication within the oblast the following roads with a total length of 925 km. (680 km. of which will have a gravel surface) are to be built by 1965:

1. Yelenovka - Aryk-Balyk - Takhtabrod - Chistopol'ye (155 km.)
   Freight density: 180, 90, 30 and 70 thousand tons respectively.

2. Aybadul' - Zerenda - Kokchetav (85 km.)
   Freight density: 70, 200 and 270 thousand tons respectively.

3. Nikolayevka - Shchuchinsk (60 km.)
   Freight density: 120,000 tons.

4. Letovochnoye - Kellerovka - Taincha (55 km.)
   Freight density at the approaches to Taincha station, 190,000 tons.

5. Taincha - Novo-Sukhotino - Donetskoye - Chkalovo (80 km.)
   Freight density: 130,000 tons.

6. Ayrtavskiy sovkhoz - Kachilovka - Volodarskoye station (65 km.)
   Freight density along most of the road, 40-50,000 tons; at the approaches to Volodarskoye railway station, 70,000 tons.

7. Volodarskoye - Ruzayevka (95 km.)
Freight density: 80,000 tons.

8. Karasevka - Lavrcka - Volodarskoye station (40 km.)
Freight density: from 40-70,000 tons.

9. Stavropolka - Peski (55 km.)
Freight density at the approaches to Peski station: 200,000 tons, and along the rest of the road 130-190,000 tons.

10. Nevskiy sovkhoz - Kazgorodok - Makinsk (70 km.)
Freight density: 100,000 tons.

11. Berlik - Chistyakovka station (55 km.)
Will serve as an approach to the new railway line Kokchetav - Kzyl-Tu - Kaymanchikha.
Freight density: 110,000 tons.

12. Gor'kiy sovkhoz - Leningradskoye - railway line (75 km.)
Will serve as an approach to the Kokchetav - Kzyl-Tu railway and provide communication for a number of new sovkhozes in the eastern and northern sections of the Leningradskiy rayon.
Freight density of the section nearest the railway will be 160,000 tons.

13. Budaikskiy sovkhoz - Kundybay - Kzyl-Tu (55 km.)
Will serve as an approach to Kzyl-Tu railway station.
Freight density: 130,000 tons.

Akmolinsk Oblast (152,700 sq.km.)

A. Railways

The following railways run through the oblast:

1. Dzhanyspay - Akmolinsk (a 418 km. section of the line).

2. Akmolinsk - Pavlodar (to the point where it crosses the river Ulenty near the Intaly settlement) (200 km.)

3. Makinka - Osakarovka (300 km.) section of the Petropavlovsk - Karaganda line.
The oblast section (145 km.) of a broad-gauge railway from Yesil' to the Turgay bauxite deposits is currently under construction and work is to start shortly on the construction of the following narrow-gauge lines:

1. Peski - Atbasar - Krasnoznamenskiy sovkhoz (188 km.)

2. Yesil' - Uritskoye (a 30 km. section will cross the oblast).

The total length of existing railways and of those under construction is 1,281 km.; of these 1,063 km. are broad- and 218 km. narrow-gauge.

B. Roads

Until the beginning of the new lands campaign there were no motor roads passable all the year round in the oblast. On 20th September 1954 the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the construction of 260 km. of roads, mostly with a gravel surface:

1. Makinka - Dzhaltyr - Astrakhanka (110 km.)

2. Kokchetav - Balkashino (25 km.)

3. Yesil' - Ishimskoye (75 km.)

4. Akmolinsk - Romanovka - border of Karaganda oblast (50 km.)

The following roads with a total length of 1,601 km. are to be built within the oblast by 1965:

1. Kokchetav - Atbasar (Akmolinsk oblast section - 115 km.)
Freight density: 123-257,000 tons.

2. Astrakhanka - Dzhaltyr - Zhuravlevka - Voznesenka - Makinsk (170 km.)
Freight density of the northern section, 176,000 tons, and of the southern section 233,000 tons.
The road will fork at Voznesenka and a branch will run to Otradnoye and Koluton, a distance of 125 km.

3. Kamenka - Ostrogorskiy sovkhoz - Adyr station (86 km.)
Freight density: 153,000 tons.

4. Ishimskoye - Yesil' (with a branch running to Bratolyubovku and Barankul') (140 km.)
The road will run along the right bank of the Ishim river.
Freight density at the approaches to Yesil': 163,000 tons.

5. Khar'kovskiy sovkhoz - siding No.78 (65 km.)
Freight density: 152,000 tons.

6. Ushakov sovknoz - Koko station (75 km.)
Freight density: 199,000 tons.

7. Tersakanskiy sovkhoz - Ken station (100 km.)
Will provide communication for a number of sovkhozes situated along the lower reaches of the Ishim river.
Freight density: 274,000 tons.

8. Kostychev sovkhoz - Ken station (40 km.)
This road will be an extension of the preceding one and will serve as an approach to Ken station from the north-west.
Freight density: 90,000 tons.

9. Akmolinsk - Kurgal'dzhino (160 km.)
From Akmolinsk the road will run in a north-westerly direction till it reaches the Srakram and Mukhor canals, and thereafter along the Nur river valley.
Freight density will vary at different sections from 88-364,000 tons.

10. Bersuat - Vishnevka station (50 km.)
Freight density: 120,000 tons.

11. Makinsk - Bestobe (200 km.)
This road was originally used by the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy to link the gold centres - Stalinskoye and Bestobe. At present it is administered by the Road Department attached to the Kazakh Council of Ministers. It follows the boundary of the Akmolinsk and Kokchetav oblasts. It is to be widened and resurfaced by 1965 to meet the estimated freight density of 88,000 tons at Bestobe and 255,000 tons at Makinsk.

12. Kiyma - Perekatnoye (45 km.)
Freight density: 104,000 tons.

13. Kalmakkol' - Dzhaksy (70 km.)
The first 40 km. of this road will form part of the main highway Kustanay - Akmolinsk.
Freight density: 140,000 tons.

14. Akmolinsk - Kazgorodok (Kiyevka) border of Karaganda oblast (50 km.)
Within the Akmolinsk oblast the road will serve Rozhdestvenka and Zhangyzguduk.
Freight density: 71,000 tons.

15. Abay sovkhoz - Krasnoznamenskaya (40 km.)
The road will run in a southerly direction from the terminal station of the narrow-gauge railway Atbasar - Krasnoznamenskaya.
Freight density: 131,000 tons.

16. Ushakov sovkhoz - Krasnoznamenskaya (40 km.)
Freight density: 119,000 tons.

Pavlodar Oblast (134,000 sq.km.)

A. Railways

One railway the Kulunda - Akmolinsk runs through the oblast. The following are to be constructed:

Kzyl-Tu - Kaymanchikha which will intersect the north-western part of the oblast, and a 250 km. section of the Ekibastuz - Omsk main line.

B. Roads

The road network is fairly extensive on the right bank of the Irtysh but is inadequate in the south-western part of the oblast, particularly in the Bayan-Aul rayon. On 20th September 1954 the Council of Ministers of the USSR authorized the construction of two roads:

Pavlodar - Kachiry - Mikhaylovka (190 km.)
Irtyshskoye - Novotroitsk - Bestobe (140 km.)

By 1965 it is proposed to construct the following additional roads with a total length of 1,325 km.:

1. Semenovka - Pavlodar - Kachiry - Zhelezinka - Urlyutyub (490 km.)
This will be one of the main roads in the oblast and will run along the right bank of the Irtysh crossing the oblast from the south-east to north-west. It will form the middle section of the main highway Omsk - Pavlodar - Semipalatinsk. The southern section provides communication between the Beskaragaysk, Lebyazhinsk and parts of the Pavlodar rayons. The freight density of this section will be relatively small as most of the freight is carried by river transport. From Lebyazhevo it will increase, and on the section Pavlodar - Yamyshevo will reach 276,000 tons

2. Chalday - Chigirinovskaya - Pavlodar (150 km.)
Freight density will range from 60,000 tons on the Chalday - Chigirinovskaya section to 300,000 tons at the approaches to Pavlodar.

3. Chigirinovskaya - Galkino - Shcherbakty (45 km.)
Freight density: 120,000 tons.

4. Oblast section of the Novo-Pokrovka - Shcherbakty road (50 km.)

5. Veselyy Klin - Uspenka (60 km.)
Freight density: 120,000 tons.

6. Ivanovka - Voskresenka - Trofimovka - to the railway line Zhelezinka Karasuk (75 km.)
Freight density: 135,000 tons.

7. Alimbay - Mikhaylovka - to the railway line Zhelezinka - Karasuk (70 km.)
Freight density: 63,000 tons.

8. Krasnokutskoye - Zhdanov sovkhoz - to the railway line Ekibastuz - Omsk (90 km.)
Freight density: 100,000 tons.

9. Irtyshskoye - Koskul'skiy sovkhoz (110 km.)
Freight density: 60-90,000 tons.

10. Krasnokutskoye - Pavlodar (140 km.)
Freight density: 200-300,000 tons.

11. Ekibastuz - Maykain (60 km.)
Freight density at the approaches to Ekibastuz: 100,000 tons.

All the proposed roads will link rayon centres or important industrial and agricultural areas with railway stations and wharves.

Excavations in southern Turkmenistan

Excavations are taking place in south Turkmenistan at the site of Namazga-Tepe near the railway station Baba-Durmaz. According to A.F. Ganyalin, the archaeologist in charge, a number of finds have already been made which throw light on the development of the ancient peoples who inhabited this territory in 3000-2000 B.C. TI. 7th June 1958

INDUSTRY

ELECTRIC POWER IN KAZAKHSTAN

Within the next ten to fifteen years electric power in Kazakhstan is to be greatly expanded and worked through a unified grid, which in turn is to be linked to the network covering the rest of the USSR. The project for a unified grid for Kazakhstan is described in an article in VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR, 1957, No.9 (pp.3-13), from which most of the following article is taken.

Kazakhstan has the largest reserves of chromium and vanadium in the world, and holds first place in the Soviet Union for many other minerals, such as iron ore, copper, lead and zinc, and is rich in several more, particularly coal. With these enormous natural resources, prospects for the development of industry in the republic are excellent; but any such development will need a large supply of electric power and thus it is planned that in twenty years time power production should reach 100-150 billion kw/h per annum.

In 1958 power generated is to be 8.6 per cent above 1957; more than 1.5 billion kw/h will be generated by hydroelectric power-stations alone. Capital investment in power-station construction should be more than doubled, and the total capacity of the power-stations to be brought into operation during 1958 will reach 200,000 kw. (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 25.1.58.)

The northern oblasts

The bulk of the power resources in Kazakhstan are situated in the north-east of the republic and it may be assumed, therefore, that the nucleus of the future network will be situated here, where the present grids of the Altay, Pavlodar, Karaganda and Kustanay, will serve as a basis for the unification of the power lines. This network is adjacent to that of the Urals in the west, and the Siberian in the east.

The Altay grid is the backbone of the East-Kazakhstan economic region, and upon this will depend the economic expansion not only of this oblast, but also of the Semipalatinsk oblast and the Altay region. The completion of the Bukhtarma hydroelectric power-station (see also CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.3, pp.273-4) and of a number of thermal power-stations will treble power output in the East-Kazakhstan region. The linking up of the

Altay, central Siberian, central Kazakhstan and, ultimately, the Ural grids is projected, and will result in immense economic gain as it will make possible the maximum use of the hydraulic power of the upper Irtysh. A large number of high voltage feeders are to be built; one of these will connect Bukhtarma GES with Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Nikolayevka, the Shul'ba GES, Semipalatinsk and, eventually, the thermal power-stations in the Karaganda economic region and the mines of the Rudnyy Altay. The entire grid is ultimately to be controlled from a single point.

In the Pavlodar oblast vast coal reserves and the resources of the Irtysh basin create exceptionally favourable conditions for thermal electric power-stations, and for industry working on electric power. The Pavlodar network, because of the neighbouring coalfields, will be able to generate electricity more cheaply than many areas, and it will be transmitted to the Urals, Omsk, the Altay and other regions. It is estimated that power from the large thermal stations, operating on coal from the Ekibastuz or Maykyube fields near by, will probably not cost more than 2-3 kopeks per kw/h - thus competing in price with the large hydroelectric stations of Siberia.

The Karaganda power network, one of the largest in Kazakhstan, will include the Karaganda-Pavlodar transmission line which is to link it with the unified grid of the USSR. The Karaganda-Altay transmission line will supply the areas between Karaganda and Semipalatinsk.

The Kustanay network is to be the largest in northern Kazakhstan. The total capacity is to be raised to 6-7m. kw. out of which 2-3m. kw. will be consumed in the region, and 4-5m. kw. will be exported to the southern Urals, western Siberia, the Aktyubinsk oblast, the Dzhezkazgan area and the western part of the Akmolinsk oblast. Most probably the centre of the Kustanay grid will be situated in the area of the Kushmurun coal deposits. The projected transmission line will cross the whole of the Kustanay industrial region from west to east, thus connecting almost all the industrial towns with the generating centre. Another line, Kushmurun-Orsk, will supply the Orsk and Aktyubinsk industrial regions. The Kustanay-Dzhezkazgan line is to provide power for the new industries of Turgay. By connecting Kustanay and Akmolinsk, the former will also be linked to the Karaganda network. Finally, the Kushmurun-Akmolinsk line will serve for the electrification of the South Siberian railway.

The Ekibastuz-Akmolinsk high voltage transmission line, which will be used also for the electrification of a sector of the South Siberian railway belongs to one of the less important links of the planned network.

The southern oblasts

The plans for south-western Kazakhstan are less ambitious; the present grid is to be extended to cover the industrial areas of Aktyubinsk, and Gur'-yev. In the south-east lines are to be extended to cover the Alma-Ata, Dzhambul and Chimkent regions; this area is linked geographically to the other Central Asian republics and to north-eastern Kazakhstan; new transmission lines will link up the various grids. There will, for instance, be a new line between Chimkent and Tashkent.

There are to be a number of new hydroelectric power-stations along the Ili river and its tributaries and this will enable the Alma-Ata network to be extended. The first hydroelectric power-station on the Ili river, at Kapchagay, will regulate the flow of the Ili and around this the power network will be built up. (See also CAR. Vol.IV, No.3, p.274) This grid will be linked with the Naryn hydroelectric stations in Kirgizia and with the Karaganda network. (The Naryn grid is to become one of the main generating centres of the future Central Asian section of the unified Soviet power network.) Around the Alma-Ata network will be grouped the Naryn (total capacity 5m. kw.), Upper-Ili (China), and Dzhungar (Taldy-Kurgan) hydroelectric systems, and these in turn will be linked through the central nucleus of the Kazakh grid to the rest of the Soviet Union through its unified grid.

Link-up with the rest of the USSR and China

With the unification of the European Russia grid - by 1960 - its eastern edge in the Urals will adjoin the economic regions of Aktyubinsk and Kustanay. A vast network is now being built up in western, central and eastern Siberia, and the south-western edge of this system will join up with the Altay and Pavlodar grids. The Alma-Ata grid is to link up with the Central Asian republics. In this way Kazakhstan is to become the link between the three main grids of the Soviet Union - those of European Russia, Siberia and Central Asia.

The future unification of the grids of the Soviet Union and China is envisaged in a plan for linking the two national networks in the Ili river basin and other adjoining areas. The Chinese, who have yet to build up a power system, will soon begin harnessing the power resources of north-west China, while the Alma-Ata grid is to be extended by means of a number of hydro-electric stations along the Ili and its tributaries. The Chinese border hydroelectric stations will be linked to the Kazakh and Central Asian network. By this unification of Sino-Soviet power resources, a part of Kazakhstan will thus form the northern edge of a vast Central Asian hydroelectric network.


To Moscow
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Chelyabinsk
Omsk
Petropavlovsk
Barnaul
Kuybyshev
Balakovo
Magnitogorsk
Kushmurun
Pavlodar
Rubtsovsk
Ural'sk
Orsk
Akmolinsk
Ust' Kamenogorsk
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Karaganda
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Emba
Dzhezkazgan
Sary-Su
Balkhash
Taldy-Kurgan
CASPIAN SEA
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Ili
Alma-Ata
Syr-Darya
Dzhambul
Frunze
Chimkent
Tashkent
Naryn
Projected scheme
of a single power-grid for Kazakhstan
Hydro-electric stations.
Thermal power stations.
600 kwt. Transmission line.
400 kwt. " "
200 kwt. " "
J.P. - 1958.

In the above scheme for the development of electric power the problem of the generation of nuclear power in Kazakhstan was not examined. Nevertheless, the growth of nuclear technology will doubtless exercise its influence on the final form to be taken by the projected unified power system of the USSR.

Radio in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan there are 1,244 radio exchanges, 224,000 radio sets, and 857,000 relay units; approximately 70 per cent of the families are provided with some form of radio receivers. PV. 7th May 1958

Anniversary celebration for Tadzhik writer

The Tadzhik Academy of Sciences has called a special session to mark the eightieth anniversary of the birth of S. Ayni, the founder of contemporary Tadzhik literature. SV. 1958, No. 2

Uzbek cotton exports

Finland is to receive this year over 10,000 tons of cotton from Uzbekistan. PV. 27th May 1958

BOOK ANALYSES

MATERIALY K ISTORII SOVETSKOGO UZBEKISTANA: SBORNIK STATEY (Material on the History of Soviet Uzbekistan: A Symposium of Papers.) Published by AN/Uzb. SSR, Tashkent, 1957, 298pp.

This book is a collection of four articles of different lengths dealing with the political and economic history of Uzbekistan from 1917-45.

1. "The Destruction of the Bourgeois Counter-Revolutionary 'Autonomists'", by Sh.A. Shamagdiyev (pp.5-33).

Declaration of the rights of the peoples of Russia (including that of secession); proletarian solidarity; the appeal of 22nd November 1917 "To all Mussulman Workers in Russia and in the East"; foreign imperialist interventionists; Dutov at Orenburg; the South-Eastern Alliance; the border areas of Russia were to have been made mandates or protectorates of some other power; the mixed membership of the IIIrd Mussulman Turkestan Congress, November 1917, at Tashkent; the importance of Kokand; the fourth kurultay (constituent assembly), a counter-revolutionary congress, held there, November-December 1917, of bourgeois-nationalists, representatives of Shuroi-Islamin, Shuroi-Ulemy, Ittikhady Tarakki, Toli-Magruf, Dashnak-Tsution, Zionists, Alashordyntsy, Russian capitalists, great-power chauvinists, SR, KD and Mensheviks proclaim "Kokand autonomy" (names of leaders given)(1); Zaytsev; the struggle of the masses of Turkestan against "the Kokand autonomy" has not had sufficient light thrown upon it; some articles have contained gross mistakes and perversions: e.g. P. Alekseyenkov's, who says that "the Russian workers looked rather de haut en bas at their Uzbek, Turkmen, or Kirgiz brother-workers" (p.10); support and opposition to the "Kokand autonomy"; E.A. Babushkin and his local helpers; Irgash; Poltoratskiy; basmachestvo in Fergana; fighting at Kokand (Irgash)(2); "Dutov's stopper" removed, 23rd January 1918; founding of the Red Army; siege of Kokand citadel; Zaytsev's men disarmed; treachery of Osipov; rout of Irgash; Kokand autonomous government destroyed, 20th February 1918 (pp.22-25); counter-revolutionaries seek help from Khiva, Bukhara, Turkey, France and Britain; difficult position of revolutionary Turkestan; resolute Soviet measures; cotton industry (March 1918) and railways nationalized (pp.26-30); land reforms; irrigation taken over by government; Turkestan autonomy, May 1918 (pp.30-32).

Notes and references to sources follow (pp.32-33).

2. "From the History of the Collectivization of Agriculture in Uzbekistan. (Data from the Fergana Valley)", by I.Yu. Ibragimova (pp.35-123) (3).

(a) Basic pre-conditions: Lenin on the necessity for collectivization by stages, based on industrialization; land measures based on the decree of the IInd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 8th November 1917; government help for irrigation, etc. (pp.36-39, 125-202); intervention and civil war; NEP; the Agrarian Code of 1923; contradictions in NEP; demand for land; some waqf land redistributed; opposition from landowners, and mullahs who sometimes allotted water unfairly (4); the setting-up of sovkhozes from 1921 onwards; their use as training-centres; the razmezhivaniye, 1924, reinforces the friendship of the peoples of Central Asia with the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union; land and water nationalized in Uzbekistan; opposition from the "Group of Eighteen", but support from the overwhelming mass of poorer people after instruction by Party organizations (5); irrigation figures; numbers of kolkhozes; state help; class differentiations persist; the reconstruction period at an end, 1926, and the pre-war level reached in industry and agriculture: now the national economy must be re-organized - socialism based on heavy industry; the XIVth Party Congress; agriculture, metallurgy, hydroelectrical resources, and chemical works (artificial manure) in Uzbekistan; Trotskyist and Zinovievist opposition overcome (pp.55-61).

(b) The Path to the Collectivization of Agriculture and the Beginning of Mass Kolkhoz Movement (pp.62-85): Agriculture must be based on mechanical production; the XVth Party Congress (December 1927) was "the Congress of Agricultural Collectivization"; conditions in the Fergana Valley; open opposition and infiltration of the Party by the landlord class (pp.62-66); growth of the Party, 1925-27, supported by local peasants stimulated by state advances in money and kind, increased in 1928 (figures) especially to communal enterprises; special conditions in Uzbekistan were a powerful cause of attraction to kolkhozes; the control of irrigation used as a weapon in liberating (orudiye osvobozhdeniya) the peasants from kulaks and landlords; only by collectivization could irrigation be effectively used and expanded; encouraging experience of the first kolkhozes and sovkhozes (pp.67-71); agricultural and cultural backwardness needed special help - funds, engines, tractors, manure, qualified specialists - from the state; numbers, inspection, and purgation of kolkhozes (1926-28); the agricultural artel'; lack of organization and tools in some kolkhozes, fluctuating staffs, scattered holdings (difficulty over water); proposed measures to combat this (pp.57, 70-72, 97); the Assaka experimental area; more kolkhozes formed (figures); the first Five-Year Plan (1929); tax adjustments encourage kolkhozes and poor and "medium" peasants, and discourage kulaks; Bukharin, Rykov; the Party CC, 25th May 1929, comments on weaknesses in collectivization in Uzbekistan, and emphasizes the need for the Union to become independent of

imported raw cotton; Glavkhlopkom's plan considered inadequate; 15,000 tractors to be brought into cotton areas; cotton-works, implement-factories, and repair-shops to be set up; defective book-keeping and planning in kolkhozes; the part played by sovkhozes (6), opposition to socialist re-organization of agriculture, and the emancipation, labour, and political activity of women from kulak elements backed by mullas; parandzha, kalym; socialist competition over the first Five-Year Plan between cotton producers and textile-workers in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere; kulaks to be liquidated on a basis of complete collectivization (pp.79-85).

(c) Complete Collectivization in the Fergana Valley (1930-33) (pp.85-118): Expropriation of the kulaks made possible by growth of heavy industry and increase of sovkhozes and kolkhozes; Trotskyists and Zinovievists had wanted to do it too soon (1927); Uzbekistan to be completely collectivized by 1933; credits to kolkhozes to be doubled and building of agricultural-implement works hastened; by Party decree of 2nd February 1930, kulaks' land to be confiscated and themselves evicted "into other rayons and oblasts" (pp.85-87, also pp.95, 98, 100); 25,000 technical workers with political training (dvadtsatipyatitysyachniki) sent at this critical moment to kolkhozes, MTS's, etc., 430 of them to Uzbekistan; much help given by them in the Fergana Valley; local industry also "adopted" kolkhozes; growth of the movement in 1930 in spite of opposition, assassination, etc.; razkulachivaniye: what was confiscated and how it was used, evictions and imprisonments; some people wrongfully forced into kolkhozes, some wrongly accused as kulaks (pp.89-94); Uzbek CP decreed (December 1929 and January 1930) the complete collectivization of the Fergana Valley by spring 1931; dekretirovaniye often substituted for patient explanation and preparatory work; artificially inflated figures of collectivization; the artel' stage often by-passed; swollen "giant" kolkhozes set up; many peasants left kolkhozes; Party CC emphasizes need for preparatory work with an eye to local conditions; Uzbek Party abolished decrees of December 1929, and January 1930 (confirmed by the Plenum of the Uzbek Party in April 1930); state taxes from kolkhozes dispensed with for two years; movement again takes on "mass" dimensions, many who had left return; work of the dvadtsatipyatitysyachniki, especially among those who had been told that "the Russians were going to take away their land" (pp.95-99; for artel' pp.57,72); after March 1930, a temporary lull in collectivization, a sign not of weakness but of strength; spring sowing of 1930 (this to be the first year of "cotton-independence") successful, and reasons therefor; Vth Congress of Uzbek CP now decrees that collectivization is to be basically complete by the end of 1933; application of the Leninist nationalities policy; mechanization increased (pp.24-104); MTS's (7); the idea of kolkhozes "giving a tow" to ones that were lagging; peasants attracted into collective work by the harvest of 1930, and also actively recruited; work of the dvadtsatipyatitysyachniki, and of the workers from textile factories which had "adopted" kolkhozes, in the spring cotton-sowing, 1931; growth of the movement by autumn

1931; by June 1931, it was hoped that collectivization in the Union would be complete by spring 1932 (pp.105-11); some defects: profits of kolkhozes distributed equally, instead of by quantity and quality of work done; bad accounting, leading to embezzlement; class enemies had abandoned open attack in favour of sapping from within - especially easy in the peculiar circumstances obtaining in Uzbekistan; VIth Congress of Soviets abolished day-labour in favour of the trudoden' (March 1931); earnings-changes in the Fergana Valley; collectivization here 72.2 per cent by the end of 1931, and basically complete in 1932; figures of growth in number of kolkhozes, areas put down to cotton, and fulfilment of plans (pp.111-16); the achievement in Uzbekistan, under the leadership of the CP and the mighty help of the Russian people; a short reference to the XXth Congress (pp.116-18).

Notes and references (pp.118-22).

3. "The Popular Movement in Irrigation-construction in Uzbekistan (1939-40)", by R. Aminova (pp.125-202).

Introduction: most of what has been written on this subject has been devoted to the Great Fergana Canal: nothing has been published about the Lyaganskiy, North and South Fergana, and Tashkent Canals; even Yu. Ibragimov's dissertation on the Great Fergana Canal dwells too little on the mass of the people and the toiling heroism of the rank and file; irrigation is fundamental to agriculture in Central Asia, but not dealt with fundamentally even after the prisoyedineniye (pp.125-9).

(a) Pre-conditions for the popular movement for water (pp.129-41).

(i) The struggle of the Uzbek people to reconstruct and develop irrigation: the Revolution and early efforts after it; the Turkkomissiya; under the razmezhivaniye (1924) each republic has its Water Authority; the Zeravshan Dam; figures of expansion and expenditure, 1924-27 (pp.129-34).

(ii) Industrialization and collectivization of agriculture; irrigation concentrated in the hands of the state (pp.134-9).

(iii) The growth of consciousness of the Uzbek people, and the development of socialist competition (pp.139-41).

(b) Development of the popular movement for water (pp.141-67).

(i) Accumulation of popular experience: beginnings; staff, funds, tools, etc.; the mirabs help; construction of several canals (pp.141-50).

(ii) Mobilization of all Uzbek popular forces to build the Great Fergana Canal: varying shortage of water; the Sazvodproiz; transfer of water from the River Naryn; table, etc., of achievement in 1940; other canals (pp.150-66).

(c) Popular irrigation-construction, a school of Communist training for the workers (pp.167-202).

(i) Heroic labour of the masses in high-speed construction; names of distinguished workers (pp.167-85).

(ii) Party and mass culture work: training organization, "agitation"; musicians, singers, reciters, poets (pp.185-93).

(iii) The cultural and daily-needs services: medical, food, shopping, post, telegraph, newspapers (by aircraft), dining-rooms, cold-drink kiosks; cobblers, tailors, barbers; artists painting and exhibiting; cinemas, sometimes unsuccessful; Uzbek musicians and actors, with topical pieces, a great success (pp.193-9).

A summing-up (pp.199-202). Notes and references (pp.202-6).

4. "Heroic Exploits of the Warriors of Uzbekistan at the Fronts in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1941-1945)", by A.S. Kazakova (pp.207-97).

This is an account in eleven sections of the war on various fronts with the actions and names of Uzbeks who distinguished themselves, from Major General Rakhimov (p.234) downwards. It is followed by notes and references (pp.295-7).

Notes

(1) Pp.5-8. For Dutov see this article, passim and VOSPOMINANIYA, pp.66, 104, 116; A.G. Park: BOLSHEVISM IN TURKESTAN, 1917-1927. New York, 1957. This book covers the subject in very great detail. For political tendencies among Russian Mussulmans and the Kokand autonomy see R. Pipes: THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. Harvard UP., 1954, pp.75 ff., 86 ff. For the Alash-Orda see Pipes, pp.84-5; Zen'kovskiy, p.4, "The Alash-Orda".

(2) Pp.13-20. For Irgash see also VOSPOMINANIYA, p.174; Park, p.31.

(3) See also Park, pp.337-46: THE AGRARIAN REVOLUTION IN UZBEKISTAN.

(4) Pp.40-9. For the non-existence of feudal property see Park, p.334.

(5) Pp.50-4. See also Park, pp.337-8. For Stalin's message to the Uzbek CP see ibid, p.332.

(6) Pp.72-9. For "cotton-independence" see also pp.101, 111, 115, and Park, pp.311-18.

(7) Pp.104-5. See also (6) above.

VELIKAYA OKTYABR'SKAYA SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA I GRAZHDANSKAYA VOYNA V KIRGIZII (1917-1920gg): DOKUMENTY I MATERIALY (The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War in Kirgizia (1917-1920): Documents and Material). Compiled by D.M. Budyanskiy and S.B. Zhantuarov. Published by Kirgizgosizdat, Frunze, 1957. 428pp.

The preface (pp.5-7) says that some documents are included which deal with Tashkent, Vernyy and Fergana. Dates up to 14th February 1918 are given in O.S. with N.S. in brackets.

The introduction (pp.8-24) gives a brief account of events including the 1916 rising, Kerensky's opinion, expressed in that year, that Turkestan "must be regarded as the English and French regard their colonies" (p.11), (1916 is not covered by the documents), the "Kokand autonomy" (p.18). the counter revolutionary attempts of Dutov, Kolchak, Annenkov, and Furmanov (pp.18, 20-23), and Anglo-American intervention (p.22).

Part I (pp.25-106) contains 107 numbered documents and is entitled "The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Establishment of Soviet Authority in Kirgizia: the First Step in the Consolidation of Soviet Authority (October 1917 - June 1918)".

Part II (pp.107-367) contains 299 numbered documents and is entitled "Kirgizia during the Period of Foreign Intervention and Civil War (June 1918 - December 1920)".

These are followed by a list of abbreviations (pp.369-70), notes (pp.371-5), a chronology of events (pp.377-95), and a descriptive list of the 406 documents in the book.

The format is much the same as that of a Foreign Office publication of the same sort.

VOSPOMINANIYA UCHASTNIKOV REVOLYUTSIONNYKH SOBYTIY V GRAZHDANSKOY VOYNE V KIRGIZII (Reminiscences of Participants in the Revolutionary Events in the Civil War in Kirgizia). Ed. B. Baybulatov, S. Zhantuarov, V. Mirtov, K. Orozaliyev. Published by Kirgizgosizdat, Frunze, 1957. 187pp.

Twenty-five pieces of reminiscence, of varying length and interest, from eye-witnesses of events in Kirgizia, followed (pp.181-5) by biographical notes on the writers. The book deals (passim) with the activities of A.I. Ivanitsyn, G.I. Shvets-Bazarny, I.S. Merkun, N.S. Abramov, and the Union of Workers and Artisans; events at Pishpek (Frunze), Osh, and Tokmak, the Belovodsk mutiny, and the establishment of Soviet authority by force of arms and other means. There is an interesting account (pp.129-130) of the first communal enterprise in Kirgizia.

VAZHNYY ETAP IZ ISTORII KIRGIZSKOGO NARODA (An Important Period in the History of the Kirgiz People). By B.D. Dzhamgerchinov under the editorship of M.P. Vyatkin (for the centenary of the Union of Kirgizia with Russia). Published by Kirgizgosizdat, Frunze, 1957. 93pp.

This is a careful and detailed account of the known history of the Kirgiz. It is not divided into chapters, and there is no index or table of contents. Authorities are given in footnotes.

"The hard and tragic history of the small Kirgiz people" (p.3) originally from the River Yenisey. After their expulsion from the Tyan'-Shan' by the

Kalmyk-Oyrots, and their return after the fall of the Dzhungarian state (1758), ten clans (listed on p.5) became dependent on China (for tribute only). The Kazakh Ablay Khan attacked and destroyed them as a people, and they led a nomadic existence, fighting among themselves, over what is now Kirgizia and parts of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, China, and Afghanistan (pp.4-5). The Khanate of Kokand was paramount over Kirgizia and built forts there; government by Kokand; forcible spread of Islam; the zeket (1) and other imposts; exploiting by "collaborating" Kirgiz manapy and bii commemorated in folk-songs (pp.7-15); led by the Kirgiz of Issyk-Kul' basin, most of Kirgizia threw off Kokand yoke (1842), and northern Kirgiz tribes (c.1845) opened negotiations with Kashgar, the Great Horde, Russia, and others (pp.16-17). Sultan Kenesary, as representing the tribe of Ablay Khan, attempted to set up an independent Kazakh khanate, approached the Kirgiz, and was rebuffed; his barbarous reprisals, defeat, and death; Russian colonization movement's opportunity (pp.18-23) (2).

By the end of the 1840s all Kirgizia again subject to Kokand (forts of Pishpek, Tokmak, and Kurta); Kokand's internal troubles and the "Massacre of the Kipchaks" (1853); Kirgiz feudal nobility begin to carry political weight; backward condition of Kirgiz people under Kokand: their own adat and Muslim shariat; embassies sent by Kirgiz tribes in 1786, 1814, and 1824 to ask for Russian protection, especially against their own inter-tribal quarrelling (pp.24-28) (3); the growth of capitalism in Russia after 1861 led to acceptance of Kirgizia as a market, a source of raw cotton and livestock and their products, and of revenue, and a means of palliating the agrarian problem by immigration - a colony, in fact; it would be useful, too, for protecting the caravan routes to Kashgaria and western China; aspiring to the conquest (zavoyevaniye) of Central Asia the Tsarist government came into collision with British aggressive policy (described) (pp.32-3) (4); unsuccessful appeals to Russia for protection between 1845 and 1853; Kokand alarmed, and stirred up barymta and a cruelly-fought war among Kirgiz tribes (especially the Bugu and Sarybagysh), Cossack detachments from Vernyy occasionally trying to restore peace (pp.34-47) (5); a survey made (1856) of much of the north shore of Lake Issyk-Kul' and a study of its natural wealth; the expedition of P.P. Semënov ("Tyan-Shanskiy") to explore the eastern end of Issyk-Kul'; no Bugu ails found, but traces of great carnage; he discovers that the lake has no outlet; he becomes a tamyr of the Sarybagysh; Valikhanov's expedition through the Kirgiz country to Eastern Turkestan (pp.48-56) (6); Kazakh and Kirgiz rising against Kokand, 1857; Russia (after three years of inaction) sends help, and her authority is firmly established in the Chu Valley after 1862 (pp.56-61).

So much for Semirech'ye: central Tyan'-Shan' (the whole still under Kokand) very important for its products from stock bred there; Russian troops appear on the River Naryn, May 1863; permanent detachment at Issyk-Kul', 1863, and Fort Aksuyskoye built, 1864; penetration of Kokand: Aulie-Ata,

Turkestan, and Chimkent taken, 1864, and Tashkent, 1865; all north Kirgiz tribes came in, 1856-64; Russia decides to consolidate; Governorate General (von Kauffmann) of Turkestan formed, 1867, with very wide powers (pp.62-6). The Khan of Kokand signed (1868) an inequitable treaty, himself to be a vassal of the Russian Empire and to cede all territory taken from him up to 1865, which left practically only the Fergana Valley; the Emir of Bukhara became a Russian vassal in this year, and the Khan of Khiva in 1873. (The Khanate of Kokand was liquidated in 1876, there being important economic and political reasons, as in north Kirgizia, which urged south Kirgizia to a union with Russia)(p.67) (7); a rising (1874) of various classes against Khudoyar Khan of Kokand, successful at first, but Russia's careful Central Asian policy refused help, and it was crushed, with fearful reprisals (pp.70-5); a rising (1875) led by the khan's son and brother, among others, became a gazavat, a holy war against him and his protector, Russia; Khudoyar Khan fled, and von Kauffmann occupied Kokand and exacted a treaty even more crippling than the former; after the annexation of the "Fergana oblast", 19th February 1876, General Skobelev extinguished the last embers of the revolt (pp.75-8) (8).

It was not the Tsarist government, reactionary and autocratic, but the Russian people, the revolutionary, democratic culture of Hertsen, Chernishevsky, Dobrolyubov, and Plekhanov which brought progress and civilization to the peoples conquered by and united with (zavoyëvannykh i prisoyedinënnykh) the territory of Tsarist Russia; Tsarist colonial policy and Lenin's comment (p.79); the fate of the peoples of Central Asia. . . was definitively bound up with the fate of the Russian people. . . Russia. . . became by the end of the nineteenth century the centre of the world revolutionary movement: it was exactly this which distinguished Russia from England (pp.80-1) (9); effects of capitalism in Kirgizia (not to be overrated): railways, increase of settled agriculture (though discouraged by traditionalists), improvements introduced by Russian settlers (lessened the danger of dzhut), stopping of internal dissensions and external raiding, hitherto fostered by Kokand, abolition of slavery (and in the rest of Central Asia), Kirgizia a field of research for Russian savants, agricultural and Russo-native schools opened at Pishpek, Tokmak, Przheval'sk, and Osh (to fill the lower ranks of the civil service and industry), medical centres to combat smallpox and typhus, growth of revolutionary thought, and the 1916 rising (pp.81-92) (10).

Notes

(1) Cf. PRISOYEDINENIYE KAZAKHSTANA K ROSSII+, E.B. Bekmakhanov, Moscow, 1957, pp.54-6, 78 (zakyat).

(2) For Kenesary Kasymov see also Bekmakhanov, pp.110-20.

(3) For the adat and shariat see also Bekmakhanov, p.41; Park, pp.288-9.

(4) For the consequences in the Kazakh-Kirgiz territories of the emancipation of 1861 cf. Pipes, pp.83-4.

(5) For the barymta see also Bekmakhanov, p.59.

(6) For tamyrstvo see also Bekmakhanov, pp.154, 173; for Valikhanov, see ibid, pp.221-8, 258-9.

(7) For political reasons why this was not done sooner, and for the condition of the khan's subjects at this time, see pp.67-70.

(8) Cf. Pipes, p.86 ff.

(9) Nothing is said about geographical differences in the two empires.

(10) For the Kazakh-Kirgiz rising of 1916 see Pipes, pp.84.

+ This book will be analysed in the next number of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW.

IDEOLOGICAL CONFUSION IN KAZAKHSTAN

FALSE DOCTRINE BRINGS CHAOS

(Translated from an article in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 17.5.58 by V. Skorobogatov)

The sages of old used to say: "Seek counsel not from those who have lived long but from those who have seen much and who know how to write". We did not know whether X - an inhabitant of Gur'yev - had seen much in his time but we had heard that he was irresistibly drawn to pen and paper and we decided to consult with him on problems of the theory of state. This did not disconcert him and he began to explain in detail what was what. This was our conversation. Listen:

"Please tell us your views on the state", we said turning to our interlocutor.

"Every state," he declared, flattered by our attention, "is the organ of the ruling class, and the class achieves its supremacy with the help of the army, privileged officialdom, the police, prisons, punitive organs, intelligence service and so on. The ruling class uses this instrument of force and its power against other classes in order to protect the economic conditions of its supremacy and to protect those conditions of production and distribution which also ensure its political supremacy."

We will not deny that we were struck by the strangeness of this reply. For we had thought that it was by no means "every" state, that there were radical differences between a bourgeois state and a socialist state. And while the former is the instrument of the exploiting classes, the latter organizes and leads the economy, educates the people in the spirit of Communism, and defends the interests of the workers. We asked him:

"During a proletarian revolution does the bourgeois state machine break up or not?"

And we received the reply:

"It is impossible finally to abolish the old order without transforming part of the superstructure and adapting it to new problems of economic development. The proletariat must use all that is valuable in the old state apparatus, ridding it of all its capitalist disfigurements. The banks - which are the nerves of the capitalist system and without which socialism cannot be realized - are particularly important."

"And now explain to us the functions of the bourgeois state."

On this question he gave us the following information:

"The main inherent function of a bourgeois state is to keep the exploited majority in a noose."

Our interlocutor smiled, evidently pleased with his unexpected comparison.

"Your 'noose' is a graphic description. Tell us, what do you think about political and economic laws?"

Here again our question left him at no loss for an answer:

"The laws of political economy are objective and reflect the processes of economic development which perfect themselves independently of people's will."

"What part did the power of the Soviets play during the first period of its existence?"

"The duty of Soviet power was not to change one form of exploitation for another, as was the case with all the other preceding socialist ? revolutions, but to abolish all exploitation. . ."

After this curious remark we could only remain silent. We waited in vain for him to say something instructive, if only briefly, about Lenin's national policy, about how the Kazakh workers have built and are building their own state system; and we waited for him to criticize opportunist-revisionists who are trying to misinterpret and distort revolutionary doctrine on the state. Carried away by his own eloquence, and not noticing that we were no longer able to sort out the inner meaning of his words, he continued:

"A planned economy presupposes that production in those branches of industry whose products are especially necessary to the popular masses will increase."

Then, as if by the way, he added dogmatically:

"Socialism is built by workers who are educated and corrupted by capitalism, who have not been transformed into new people cleansed of the dirt of the old world but are still up to their knees in it."

"Enough."

. . .

"What nonsense is this?" the reader will ask with legitimate indignation, aware of the ignorant arguments behind the would-be answers. Perhaps the sentences in inverted commas are invented or uttered by some dunce student at an exam to gain a good mark? If only it was so! Unfortunately matters are worse. The reader will find the illiterate expressions quoted in a pamphlet by O.S. Shpakov, the Deputy President of the obispolkom, which was recently published by the Gur'yev section of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. The leaders of the society and the editor O.S. Rakhmetov, who authorized the pamphlet's publication, this time disseminated not knowledge but something else, blindly trusting to a man who, although he was literate, was not yet ready to begin writing; he undertook to instruct others instead of instructing himself.

And as everyone knows, false teaching brings chaos!

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers, periodicals, etc., received during the period 1st April - 30th June 1958.

TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Uzbekistan

By decree of 22nd March 1958 the settlement Gazli of the Rometan rayon, Bukhara oblast, to have the status of a workers' settlement.

VVS. 4th June 1958

By decree of 16th April 1958 the settlement Kyz-Ketken and the settlement by the Nukus wharf in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR to have the status of workers' settlements.

By decree of 8th May 1958 the following villages in the Fergana oblast to have the status of urban settlements: Besh-Aryk, Kirov rayon; Rishtan, Kuybyshev rayon; Yaypan, Uzbekistan rayon.

By decree of 8th May 1958 the settlements Chinaz and Noviy Chinaz, Chinaz rayon, Tashkent oblast, have been amalgamated and named Chinaz.

VVS. 18th June 1958

Tadzhikistan

By decree of 6th June Khavalingskiy rayon has been abolished and its territory incorporated into the Dangarin and Aral'sk rayons.

KT. 7th June 1958

On 19th May in Shurab representatives of Kirgizia signed over to Tadzhikistan the Samarkandyk section which in effect forms an extension of the Shurab coalfields.

Such a gesture is regarded as another proof of the strong brotherly relations existing between the peoples of the Soviet Union.

SK. 21st May 1958

FUEL AND POWER

Gas

Work has started on the construction of a gas pipeline Kyzyl-Kum - Krasnovodsk. The line which will be 205km. long will pass through Kum-Dag and Nebit-Dag. TI. 24th May 1958

Oil

At the Kum-Dag oilfields a control panel has been installed whereby any one of the 96 pumping machines can be either set in motion or switched off. Moreover by means of electronic devices the engineer on duty can carry out dynamometric measurements of the depth of pumping. TI. 24th May 1958

IRRIGATION

By 1966 the area of irrigated land in the Golodnaya Steppe is to be increased to 380,000 ha., and in the Dal'verzin and Samgara steppes of the Leninabad oblast, Tadzhikistan, to 50,000 ha. A single inter-republican administration for the irrigation and cultivation of new lands in the Golodnaya Step' (the Glavgolodnostepstroy) is to be set up; it will be responsible to the Councils of Ministers of the republics concerned. KT. 15th June 1958

Great subsurface thermal water basins have been discovered in south Kazakhstan near Chimkent. Here a well dug to a depth of 1,000 metres yielded water with a temperature of 90° C. Similar hot water was found in the Ili depression in the Taldy-Kurgan oblast.

Preliminary estimates put the quantity of water at 10 milliard cubic metres. PV. 4th April 1958

Canals

By the end of 1957, 250 miles of the Kara-Kum had been built. When completed it will cover a total distance of 600 miles. The first section stretches 254 miles into the desert and this year will irrigate 250,000 ha. in the Murgab oasis. For further details see CAR, Vol.II, No.3, pp.255-62, and Vol.V, No.3, pp.277-8. SU. 1958, No.98

Specialy drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre. – 1956. – J.P.

The canal Pyandzh-Kurban Shait in the Aral rayon, Tadzhikistan, has been completed. KT. 17th April 1958

A number of irrigation canals with a total length of 280km. and 860 hydro-technical installations are to be built in the Samgar mountain range in the Leninabad oblast. KT. 26th April 1958

Work was recently started on the construction of the Piyazy canal in the Dzhirgatal' rayon, Tadzhikistan, and the first 14½km. have been built. The canal represents only the first step in the irrigation of the Lyakhsh valley. KT. 31st May 1958

The irrigation canal Vostochnyy in the Chu valley has been completed. It is 100km. long. KP. 1st May 1958

In the vicinity of Uch-Kurgan work has started on the construction of a 50km. canal from the left bank of the Naryn river to the Main Fergana Canal. When completed it will supply the Fergana Canal with an additional 70 cubic metres of water per second. PV. 17th April 1958

Work has started on the construction of a feeder canal for the upper reaches of the Main Fergana Canal. The canal will run from the Naryn river near Uch-Kurgan and will be 15km. long, 23 metres wide and 4 metres deep. PV. 6th May 1958

The Dzhakhanabad canal in the Fergana oblast has been completed. It is 16km. long and lined with concrete. PV. 9th May 1958

Pumping Stations

The Samgara floating pumping station in the Khodzhent rayon of the Leninabad oblast, and the Khodzha-Bakirgan floating pumping station on the Kayrak-Kum have been completed. Both stations are completely automatic and will deliver 29 cubic metres of water per second to a height of 60 metres. KT. 11th June 1958

The Dal'verzin pumping station has been completed. When fully in service it will deliver 8,000 litres of water per second to a height of 30-50 metres. A 23km. canal has also been completed. KT. 24th May 1958

Reservoirs

Work has started on the construction of a large reservoir with a capacity of 900m. cubic metres on the river Surkhan in the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast. PV. 29th April 1958

The construction of the Sary-Yazyn reservoir on the Murgab river in the Turkmen-Kalinsk rayon has been completed. It covers an area of over 50 sq.km. TI. 23rd April 1958

The Sergeyev reservoir on the river Tobol has been completed. It has a capacity of 5m. cubic metres, and a powerful pumping station. KP. 6th June 1958

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Art

An Art Conference of painters, sculptors, book illustrators, stage and textile designers working in Tadzhikistan and attended by cultural representatives from Moscow and Leningrad, was held in Stalinabad between 23rd-25th April 1958 when the present position of various aspects of Tadzhik art was reviewed and, on the whole, adjudged unsatisfactory. Certain forms of traditional native art such as ceramics, metal work and jewellery design have almost completely disappeared. Embroidery still flourishes and is much in demand but, with the exception of gold thread embroidery which is still practised by a few devoted and skilled craftsmen in various parts of the republic, most of the work is machine made in artels and of inferior quality. The colours are dull and the designs uninspiring or in plain bad taste. Indeed examples of bad taste abound; the most common embroidery designs represent ladies with umbrellas, or kittens with sequined eyes and golden ears sitting solemnly amid a scatter of roses. This, together with a preference for paper flowers in interior decoration is considered to reflect a nineteenth century bourgeois taste. A sorry state indeed for "it is in the applied arts that the national culture of a people is most clearly reflected".

Much of the painting in the republic is also hackneyed and unsatisfactory. The Tadzhik section of the all-Union jubilee exhibition held in Moscow on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution, was the poorest of the lot. Stereotyped portraits set within a framework of traditional decorative motifs are presented as innovations and manifestations of realism. And, ex-

cept for such genuine and consummate artists as the landscapist Khoshmukhamedov and the painters of typical Tadzhik scenes as Boborykin and Lisikov, most painters lack originality of conception and a deep understanding of the national character of the people, and produce works which are inexpressive and of a most disconcerting sameness. There are, allegedly, endless portrayals of visits to factories, exchanges of information among cotton cultivators, meetings of kolkhozniks and Party officials, harvest scenes and scenes depicting shepherds listening to a wireless in mountain pastures. All these receive a standardized treatment, there are the usual smiling faces, bunches of flowers and unwarranted or theatrical gestures; frequently too the kolkhoznitsas are overdressed. The paintings moreover have no life in them, they carry no conviction but show all the signs of having been painted in a hurry.

Book illustration - as distinct from miniatures - although a relatively new art form appears to be the only one which has reached a more or less satisfactory standard. It is bright, expressive, dynamic and bears a close connection with the text. Judging by names alone, however, most of the illustrators working in the republic today appear to be Russians.

The organization of painters, sculptors and craftsmen is far from satisfactory and at present all the work is left to the initiative of the individuals. Moreover only a few of those practising in the republic are members of the Artists' Union and there are not enough natives among them. Of the 54 members of the Union only 11 are of local origin, and of the 174 students at the Stalinabad art school 71 are natives.

The conference proposed various corrective measures; among these are the establishment of a closer and more active contact between the Union and the painters, the organization of regular lectures by the Union on political themes, the aims and tasks of art, and on the principles of aesthetics. The selection methods are to be improved and amateur works are to be scouted for signs of special talent. A Fine Arts Commission is also to be set up to advise on and approve the designs of buildings, interior decoration schemes, textile designs etc.

The Kirgiz art conference has also been treated at length in the republican newspapers; but although numerous articles on the subject have appeared very little of significance has emerged, beyond the fact that the Kirgiz Union of Artists managed to achieve a number of successes without at the same time falling into the pitfalls of formalism or naturalism, or under the influence of the personality cult, mistakes, which alas, the other republics were not able to avoid.

- KT. April 3rd, 9th, 18th, 19th, 22nd, 24th, 25th and 27th 1958
- SK. April 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th and May 17th 1958

Archaeology

Excavations at the site of the ancient town of Kuva in the Fergana valley show that the upper layers date from the tenth and thirteenth centuries and reveal a high degree of craftsmanship. Among the finds are a number of glass, earthenware and metal objects of fine workmanship, and a hoard of eleventh and thirteenth century coins. The remains of a seventh century temple or palace to the north of the thirteenth century citadel have also been uncovered. It bears all the signs of having been burnt, probably at the beginning of the eighth century, by the armies of the Arab caliphate.

PV. 11th June 1958

Books, Maps, Periodicals

A medical publishing house has been established in Tashkent. It is the fourth in the whole of the Soviet Union, the other three being in Moscow, Kiev and Tiflis. The publishing house, which is under the direction of K.Yu. Yusupov, will publish medical textbooks in both Russian and Uzbek.

PV. 23rd May 1958

The Institute of Scientific-Technical Information and Propaganda of the Scientific-Technical Committee of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan has issued the first number of the Bulletin of Scientific-Technical Information. This bulletin, which will henceforth be issued monthly, will provide information on the achievements and prospects of industrial development and on the building industry. PV. 9th April 1958

Geomorphological and lithological charts of the Golodnaya Step' have been compiled and will be published in IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK UZBEKSKOY SSR.

PV. 11th June 1958

The first number has been published of a systematic symposium (metodicheskiy sbornik), RUSSKIY YAZYK V TADZHIKSKOY SHKOLE (The Russian Language in Tadzhik Schools). In future it will be issued regularly as an appendix to the journal MAKTABI SOVETI. It will systematically examine the achievements of the foremost teachers in such a way, it is hoped, as will assist young teachers in mastering the best methods of instruction.

KT. 6th June 1958

The first volume of S.K. Kenesbayev's comprehensive dictionary of contemporary Kazakh (15,000 words), a Kazakh-Russian dictionary (50,000 words) compiled by G.G. Musabayev and Kh.Kh. Makhmudov, and an orthographic dictionary of the Kazakh language (17,000 words), are to be issued this year by the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences.

KP. 8th June 1958

Conferences

In October 1958 the Executive Committee of the Union of Writers is to hold a conference of African and Asian writers in Tashkent. The first meeting of the organizing bureau presided over by Sh. Rashidov and attended by A.F. Sofronov, M. Auezov, I. Braginskiy, K. Simonov, G. Sevunts, P. Surkov, K. Seytliyev and others, was held on 7th February. SV. 1958, No.2

Delegations and visits

Trade-union delegations from Ceylon, India, Burma and Indonesia have arrived in Tashkent to study the activities of the Uzbek trade-union organization. PV. 9th May 1958

A. Aliyev, Finance Minister of Tadzhikistan, has paid a visit to the Brussels exhibition. KT. 31st May 1958

Education

At present there are in Uzbekistan 5,797 schools with 1,300,000 pupils, and 10 boarding schools with 2,000 pupils; 32 VUZ, and 98 intermediate specialized educational institutions with 131,000 students. Approximately 50,000 students are propagandists and "agitators" and 45 per cent of the total number of pupils and students are girls.

In the Tashkent Pedagogic Institute, SAGU and the Central Asian Polytechnic in Tashkent, 23, 38 and 41 nationalities are represented among the students. PV. 8th and 11th June 1958

In Turkmenistan there are over 1,300 schools with a total of 240,000 pupils. In the various educational establishments there are 252 persons for every 1,000 of the population, and in the higher educational establishments only 99 students per 10,000 of population. The number of school teachers working in the republic is 13,118; of these 7,364 have higher and incomplete higher education and 5,659 secondary education.

The republic also has 426 houses of culture, 430 technical and specialized libraries with a stock of 3,700,000 books, 1,189 public libraries (massovyye biblioteki), and 520 reading rooms with a stock of 4.5m. books.
KOM.TURK. 1958, No.5
TI. 17th April 1958

In 1957, 31 day and 8 boarding schools were built in North Kazakhstan oblast. In the current year schools with a total number of 920 places are to be built, and within the next few years 79 day schools (3 middle, 30 7-year and 46 primary) and 28 boarding schools are to be built at the expense of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the oblast. KP. 8th June 1958

There are 51 Uygur schools in Kazakhstan with a complement of 400 teachers and over 7,300 pupils. Tass, 2nd April 1958

A technical school providing 10 and 12 month courses is shortly to be opened in Khorog. It will train graduates of 10-year schools in agricultural mechanization. KT. 31st May 1958

Oriental studies

The Association of Arabists, which operated in Leningrad from 1934 - 38 under the direction of I.Yu. Krachkovskiy, was re-established at the end of 1957 under the auspices of the Arabic Department of Leningrad University. The following were elected to the Council of the Association:

V.F. Belyayev (Chairman of the Association)
I.A. Orbeli (Chairman of the Council)
N.V. Pigulevskaya
V.A. Krachkovskaya
I.N. Vinnikov
D.A. Ol'derogge
A.F. Iskanderov
T.A. Shumorskiy
A.A. Dolinin

The Association will periodically hold conferences and sessions to which orientalists from all parts of the country will be invited. One of the main tasks of the Association will be the extension of the links with Arab scholars
SV. 1958, No.2

A Soviet East-West Committee has been established which will co-ordinate the activities of all organizations, institutions and individuals interested in the promotion of East-West cultural relations in the Soviet Union. The chairman of the new Committee is B.G. Gafurov, and the Committee consists of 25 members - orientalists, and representatives of the publishing houses concerned with the publication of books on oriental studies, editors of oriental journals, and representatives of libraries, museums and the press.
SV. 1958, No.2

Party membership

In his report to the IXth Congress of the Kirgiz Communist Party held in Frunze on March 21st-23rd, the First Secretary, I.R. Razzakov, gave the membership of the Republic's Party organization as 51,594 full members and 4,138 candidate members. In the last two years membership has increased by 7,500 and 4,411 persons have been promoted to advanced Party, soviet and economic work. Of these 2,392 or 54.2 per cent are Kirgiz, and 502 or 11.3 per cent are women. The number of workers with higher, incomplete higher and secondary education on the nomenclature (nomenklatura) of the Central Committee has risen from 93.5 to 95.5 per cent, for oblast committees the percentage has risen from 74.7 to 79.1, and for town and rayon committees from 33 to 62 per cent.

In November 1957 instructor groups of Party rayon committees were abolished and a new Party structure adopted. (For a detailed description of the changes see Central Asian Review, Vol.V, No.4, pp.384-88.) SK. 22nd March 1958

Research

An institute for the study of water problems has been established by the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences. It will study methods of exploitation, types of waterworks with regard to their local suitability, methods of combating evaporation and silting, and the development of mechanical irrigation.
KT. 25th May 1958

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Railways

The southern section of the Tashkent railway has been linked up with the Ashkhabad railway at the Khadzhi-Davlet station. The sections Kaganskoye and Stalinabadskoye (1,100 km. running through the Bukhara, Kashka-Dar'ya and Surkhan-Dar'ya oblasts) formerly part of the Ashkhabad railway, have been transferred to the Tashkent railway which is now over 3,500 km. long.
PV. 1st June 1958

Roads

In the course of 1958-59 an asphalt road is to be built from Bukhara to Gazli where large deposits of oil and natural gas have been discovered.
PV. 13th May 1958

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

MASHHAD 1911 - 1912

At the Conference of Soviet orientalists held in Tashkent in June 1957 particular attention was paid to the part to be played by orientalists in the eastern republics of the Union in "unmasking" colonialism and imperialism. During the past few years a number of studies have been made in the Central Asian universities and Academies of Sciences, of the pre-Revolutionary historical events in adjacent countries such as Persia and Afghanistan. These studies usually have the dual object of exonerating the Tsarist regime of charges of imperialism and colonialism, and of denigrating Britain, who is steadily accused of planning the conquest and colonization of the Bukhara and Khiva Khanates. That if Britain had had such a plan and had put it into effect, these parts of Central Asia would now be as independent as Pakistan, India, Burma and Ceylon, where as they are still in fact dependencies of Russia, is of course never mentioned.

A good example of the studies just referred to is the article published in 1954 by A.M. Matveyev in the Bulletin of the Central Asian State University on "The Part played by British Provocation in the Mashhad Events of 1911-12."+ This article is an attempt to fasten on Britain responsibility for the best remembered of these events - the bombardment by a Russian military force of the Shrine of Reza, the Eighth Imam, often known as the Glory of the Shiah World. The Mashhad incident was closely connected with the activity of the ex-Shah of Persia, Mohammad Ali, and in fact coincided with his final removal from the Persian scene in March 1912. A brief recapitulation of the events leading to this denouement may be of some interest.

As a result of pressure brought by the more liberal minded Persian middle classes in 1906, Muzaffar-ud-Din had been compelled to consent to the creation of a representative assembly (Majles). Muzaffar-ud-Din died in 1907 and was succeeded by his son Mohammad Ali. He, while nominally subscribing to the Constitution in actual fact opposed it. Serious disturbances broke out all over the country, an attempt was made on the Shah's life in 1908, and in June of the same year the so-called Cossack Brigade, which was officered by Russians

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+ A list of sources used by Matveyev will be found in the Appendix at the end of this article.

bombarded the Majles. The Shah took refuge in the Russian Embassy and with Russian assistance withdrew to Astrabad (Gorgan) and later to Russia. In 1911 he returned to Persia landing near Astrabad, and attempted to march on Tehran. He was, however, defeated and by the end of 1911 it was clear that the ex-Shah's attempt to regain his throne had failed. The civil war that had engulfed nearly the whole of northern Persia since his landing in July petered out, and he withdrew to Astrabad where during January and February he negotiated with the Persian, Russian and British Governments over the terms of his withdrawal. He finally left Persia on board the Russian gun-boat "Geok-Tepe" on 10th March 1912.

The treatment of the Persian Revolution and its consequences by Soviet writers was fully dealt with in CAR, Vol.IV, No.3, p.288 ff., but Matveyev's article has only subsequently become available. From the Persian point of view the Mashhad incident can hardly be regarded as directly connected with the Persian Revolution. There is, of course, no doubt that the Russian Government actively supported Mohammad Ali Shah and arranged for his return to Persia. What actually happened in Mashhad was that the Russians introduced a military force ostensibly for the purpose of preventing disturbances but which could have played a leading part in supporting Mohammad Ali Shah if he had been successful in regaining the throne. Whatever the reason or provocation may have been, this Russian force did in fact bombard the Mashhad shrine on the 29th March 1912.

The event attracted little attention in Britain at the time as it was overshadowed by the tragedy of the s.s. Titanic. Even Major P.M. (later Sir Percy) Sykes's[+] well-known HISTORY OF PERSIA devotes a bare two pages to it. Matveyev has therefore been able to make great play with the far more voluminous Russian source material. Recently, however, Mr. Edward Sykes has kindly placed his late Father's private papers relating to the incident at the disposal of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW and it is now possible to put the whole matter into proper perspective.

. . .

+ British Consul-General at Mashhad at the time.

I. THE CHARACTERS

(A key to the references will be found at the end of the article)

1. The Russian Consulate-General

Prince Dabizha

Russian Consul-General.
Described by Matveyev (M.I p.16)(1) as an active sympathizer with Mohammad Ali's cause: "His benevolent attitude". . . "was expressed in assistance to his supporters" and "was against the very definite instructions of the Government about non-interference".
This is denied by D. himself (see M.II p.4) although M.II (p.5) admits that he "sympathized with the Shah's followers".
Is criticized by Lieut.-Col. Skurat for inconsistency and interference with the army authorities (M.II p.6).
Is described by Sykes as unscrupulous, stupid and superstitious (S.I); and even corrupt (S.I); and as constantly disobeying instructions from his Legation (e.g. S.I).

Lieutenant-Colonel Skurat (Scouratt)

Military Attache in Khorasan.
Described by Matveyev (M.II p.18) as "naive" and a "Tsarist minion", for failing to realize the significance of Sykes's activities.
Appeared drunken and incompetent on night of the bombardment (S.VI).

Grigor'yev (Grigorieff)

First Secretary at the Russian Consulate-General.
Described by Sykes as "a refreshing contrast" to Dabizha (S.I).

Akbar Buland or the "Tall"

An ex-servant of Mohammad Ali and a gholam (consulate servant) at the Russian Consulate (S.I).

Abdul Hamid

Chief interpreter at the Russian Consulate (S.IX).
Described by Yusuf as "a dishonest official of the Russian Government" who turned against Yusuf (Ibid).

2. The Russian Army

General Redko

In command of the Russian troops which came to Mashhad on 2nd January 1912 (M.II p.3). Critical of Dabizha's waverings and anxious to use force (M.II p.8).
Described by Sykes as "a man of about forty-five. . . of an active abstemious habit and. . . mentally on a somewhat higher plane than the usual Russian officer" (S.II) who was plotting independently of Dabizha and other Russian officials for the return of Mohammad Ali (S.II).

Lieutenant Khoranov (Kharanoff)

Appointed Chief of Police in Mashhad on 24th March 1912.

3. The Agitators

Mirza Ebrahim

A mojahed. Believed by Dabizha to be one of the leaders of the Shahists in Mashhad (M.II p.4).

Taleb-ol-Haqqeh

A mojahed and one of the leaders of the Shahists (M.II p.4).
Described by Sykes as "the leading religious agitator" (S.II). Was present in the Shrine during the bombardment (S.VI).

Kaimaqam-ot-Towliyeh

A mojahed. One of the Shahist leaders (M.II p.4).
Described by Sykes as head of the Rizaiyeh Sayyeds and working with the Russians (S.II).

Mamad (or Mohammad)

"The Nishapur bandit" who joined the Shahists in February 1912 (M.II p.4).
Believed by Sykes to have had relations with Dabizha (S.VII).

Haji Rahim

A merchant and Shahist leader (M.II p.7).

Haji Mo'avin-ot-Tojjar

A merchant and Shahist leader (M.II p.7).
Described by Sykes as working for the Russians (S.I) and as "the notorious Harati banker" (S.IV). Owned land at Veirani (S.VII).

Yusof Khan Harati

Leader of the insurgents. Reported by Dabizha (M.II p.5) to be "an astute and unprincipled man who gave himself out to be a russophile".

Described by Skurat as a native of Afghanistan who at least since 1892 had served the Russian Consulate as an intelligence agent; about 1906 he had been dismissed when it was discovered that he was a British agent. In January 1912 he became head of the Shahist party in Mashhad and Skurat believed was in contact with the British Consulate (M.II pp.16-18).

Described by Sykes as "a noted scoundrel" who was given sanctuary by Dabizha in February 1912 and started demonstrations in favour of Mohammad Ali (S.I). In a letter to General Redko Yusof recalled his services to the Intelligence Branch at Tashkent (S.II).
Described by Sykes as Dabizha's "chief agent provocateur" (S.III).

According to Yusof's letter to General Redko, Yusof had "served the Russian Government for 22 years", i.e. since 1890, in Bukhara, Khiva, and Mashhad. Had visited St.Petersburg. Took sanctuary in the Mashhad shrine for a year and eleven days, i.e. since January 1911; then in the Russian Consulate and again in the Shrine (S.IX).
Apparently acted as go-between for the Russians and Shahists (S.X).

4. Persian Officials

Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh

Governor of Khorasan.
Described by both Matveyev and Sykes as a weak character and unable to cope with the disturbances. Matveyev implies that he may have been in the pay of the British Consulate (M.II p.17).

Nazir-od-Dowleh

Succeeded Rokn-od-Dowleh as Governor of Khorasan sometime just before 30th March 1912. Described by Sykes as rich and powerful (S.IV).

II. THE PRELUDE

(January to March 1912)

Russian troops in Mashhad

Although the civil war had not directly affected Khorasan, the situation there was disturbed, and in November 1911 Prince Dabizha, Russian Consul-General in Mashhad, asked for additional forces to augment the 70 Cossacks already stationed there. In December 1911, therefore, troops were sent from Turkestan to Khorasan and a force of 1,500 entered Mashhad under the command of General Redko on 2nd January 1912 (M.II p.35). Although the British and Russian Governments had officially agreed to observe strict neutrality during the civil war, it appears that many Russian officials, notably the consuls in northern Persia, were active supporters of Mohammad Ali. Sykes certainly believed this to be true of Dabizha and this is largely confirmed by Matveyev (see above).

Matveyev ascribes the need for additional troops in Mashhad to the disturbed state of the town and quotes Prince Dabizha as reporting in November 1911: "The situation in Khorasan is very serious. . . There are many passportless Caucasian emigrants here; the local revolutionaries and the clergy are agitating and arming the people against foreigners." Matveyev continues, however, to describe the results of the strengthening of the Russian force: "Many Persian revolutionaries, including Agha-Zadeh and Sardar Saed, who were not strong enough to give armed resistance, left the towns of Khorasan with the result that Mohammad Ali's supporters raised their heads, although the days of his revolt were numbered. . . Mohammad Ali's supporters decided that the Russian troops in Mashhad were the allies of the ex-Shah and organized demonstrations demanding his return. The Persian authorities in Mashhad announced that his agitation was proceeding with the active cooperation of the Russian Consul-General. Prince Dabizha firmly denies this and points to internal reasons provoking disaffection with the constitutional regime." (M.II pp.3-4). In both his books, Sykes sees the introduction of Russian troops as part of a sinister plot by Dabizha: Yusof Harati was employed by the Russian Consulate-General to create disturbances in favour of the ex-Shah; this gave Dabizha the excuse to ask for additional forces to protect Russian lives and property, and so to attempt to gain control of the town. In a report written before the bombardment of the Shrine Sykes describes the effect of the new troops on the town: ". . . The Russian troops duly reached the capital of Khorasan and thanks to the incessant activity of the Kargozar and Chief of Police, supported by this Consulate-General, there was no hostility of any description shown. Even drunken Russian officers and men are treated with the utmost consideration and politeness, the police

authorities telephoning for a party of their own countrymen to take them home. Marches through the city, too, which were calculated to excite the populace passed off without any incident, and Meshed, after a few days of curiosity, ceased to think about the new arrivals. This tranquil state of affairs was apparently most displeasing to my colleague. Ever since the return of the ex-Shah, he has openly expressed his opinion to me and to everyone else that he would regain the throne. An astrologer foretold that he would be first defeated and then, after reaching Meshed, would march on Tehran and this prediction Prince Dabija has adopted." (S.I)(2).

The disturbances in favour of Mohammad Ali

Sykes's report continues: "In pursuance of these views, he [Dabizha] recently gave sanctuary to a noted scoundrel, Yusuf Herati, who had been demonstrating in favour of the Shah for some months from the security of the Shrine: but had apparently outstayed his welcome there. The Persian authorities who were most anxious to get rid of this individual gave him one hundred tomans and it was apparently arranged that he should leave Meshed. However, my colleague decided otherwise and one morning I heard that this worthy together with a gholam of the Russian Consulate by name Akbar Buland or "The Tall", a former servant of the ex-Shah, were demonstrating and creating a disturbance. The custom on these occasions is to pitch a tent and provide plenty of tea and sugar, which procedure speedily collects a crowd of loafers. In this particular instance, Yusuf Herati had a flag with 'Let us pray the Russian Consul-General to restore our Shah to us' and it is unnecessary to inquire who paid for the tea and sugar. Meanwhile the Kaimaqam, head of the Rizaiyeh Sayyeds, and the notorious Muavin-u-Tujjar [Mo'avin-ot-Tojjar], who were working in close touch with my colleague, had started similar demonstrations in every quarter and, needless to say, the whole city was disturbed and shops were shut in some cases. Russian officers were cheered by the mobs and in one case at any rate replied in Turki that the ex-Shah was considered by the Tsar to be his own son." (S.I).

Unfortunately Sykes does not give the date of this disturbance; it can, however, be presumed that since, as a result of the demonstration, Sykes visited Dabizha to "urge him to obey his instructions" (i.e. to observe neutrality towards the ex-Shah), on 6th February, the disturbance took place at the beginning of February, that is, about a month after the Russian troops entered Mashhad. Mr. Grigor'yev, First Secretary at the Russian Consulate-General, confirmed to Sykes that Dabizha had received instructions from the Russian Legation on 4th February (S.I). Nonetheless, Sykes reported, "on 10th February not only did Prince Dabija send telegraphic petitions to the Tsar and ex-Shah from the royalists: but he even allowed them to despatch inflammatory messages to the chief cities of Persia. He is thus again breaking the spirit,

if not the actual letter of the agreement." (S.I). Thanks to the instructions from his Legation, and presumably to pressure from Sykes, it was agreed that Dabizha should write to Sykes that he withdrew his protection from Yusof Harati and would calm the mob. "My Russian colleague," reported Sykes, "who had probably received further instructions warned his agent to withdraw and the disturbances which at one time threatened to justify Russian intervention gradually ceased." (S.I). Such was the situation in Mashhad during the first half of February as reported by Sykes.

A somewhat different picture emerges from Matveyev's account: "In February 1912 the reactionary group [i.e. the royalists] became more active, mainly because the Governor of Khorasan, Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh, took no steps to curb the disturbances. . . Mohammad Ali's supporters, headed by the clergy, then concentrated their activity round the Reza mosque, and on 10th February they evicted the police from its precincts. . . According to Prince Dabizha's reports in January and the first half of February the ex-Shah's supporters behaved reasonably and did not harass ordinary citizens; the sympathy of the latter was on the whole with them and against the police who by February had become quite undisciplined. Various elements joined the ex-Shah including the Nishapur bandit, Mamad, and several hundred peasants whose disappointment with the constitutional party for its failure to effect any land reforms is thus demonstrated. A certain Yusof Khan was elected commander of the Shah's supporters and became the de facto Governor of the mosque precincts and its adjoining caravanserai. . . Eventually he started dictating terms to the Mashhad authorities, demanding a total amnesty for his followers and the abolition of all the constitutional reforms. Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh was ordered from Tehran to attack the mosque precincts, but his attempts were repulsed and the police instead began looting adjoining houses. . ." (M.II pp.4-5)

Yusof Harati

Yusof, Matveyev explains later in his article, had been a Russian agent for over fifteen years, but had been dismissed about 1906 or 1907 "as it had been discovered that he was a British agent. The British Consulate, having no need for an exposed agent, or, on the contrary, trying to re-establish his reputation in the eyes of the Russian Consulate, quickly dismissed him. Yusof Khan then tried to re-ingratiate himself with the Russians and wrote and edited a pamphlet in which he argued that all Persia's troubles came from Britain and recommended Russia as Persia's friend. This had no effect on the Russians whereupon Yusof re-wrote the pamphlet transposing the names of Britain and Russia; he presented it to the British consul who ostensibly at least did not re-employ him. Then Yusof tried a new move: he appeared in the Emam Reza mosque declared himself a fervent supporter of the ex-Shah and, at the end of January 1912, became head of this 'party' in Mashhad." (M.II pp.16-17)

Matveyev thus implies that there was no contact between Yusof and the Russian Consulate during the early months of 1912. He does not, however, even mention Sykes's charge made in his reports and in his books, one of which at least - PERSIA (1922) - was available to him. Here Sykes writes (p.152): "I was Consul-General in Khorasan at the time, and had watched with deep misgiving the intrigues of my Russian colleague, who worked hard in favour of the ex-Shah. He even went so far as to encourage Yusuf Herati, a noted agent provocateur, to carry on propaganda from the shelter of the Russian Consulate." Matveyev quotes only from "I was Consul-General" to "my Russian colleague". (M.II p.16.) The information given in Sykes's reports about Yusof's whereabouts in the early months of 1912 is, however, somewhat confusing. In the translation of a letter from Yusof to General Redko dated 30th March 1912 (S.IX), Yusof writes: "On my return to Meshed from Petersburg, from fear of the constitutional Government and of the police, I took sanctuary in the Shrine for one year and eleven days. I was besieged there and on this occasion no help was given to me by the Russian Consulate-General. At last I came to the Russian Consulate-General. . . By the orders of the Russian Consul-General I made the public who were against the Russians to be their friends. . . In spite of all this, Abdul Hamid who was a dishonest official of the Russian Government turned against me and disappointed the public. This compelled me to leave the Russian Consulate-General and I took sanctuary in the Shrine." This account is to some extent confirmed in one of Sykes's earlier reports (see above p.329). Exactly when Yusof left the Shrine for the Russian Consulate and when he returned to the Shrine is, however, not clear. From Sykes's report quoted above (p.330) it would seem that Yusof came to the Russian Consulate late in January or early in February since Sykes writes of Dabizha "recently" giving sanctuary to Yusof; it also seems likely that Yusof left the Consulate for the Shrine as a result of Sykes's protests (see above p.330) and this may be borne out by Matveyev's statement that on 10th February, the Shahists evicted the police from the Shrine and made it their headquarters. (See above p,331.) Against this evidence, however, is the letter from Sepahdar to Yusof found when Yusof was eventually captured; it is dated 14th February and instructs Yusof "to quit the Shrine immediately and to take sanctuary at the Russian Consulate-General." (S.X.) Sykes did not doubt the authenticity of this letter, but he does not comment on this point.

The declaration of martial law

Matveyev gives the following account of developments in Mashhad from the middle of February to 24th March when martial law was declared: "Prince Dabizha who sympathized with the Shah's followers was forced to admit that from the middle of February a change came over the demonstrators and that they changed 'from at first peaceful, and then active, champions of an idea into real bandits'. . . Thefts and robberies, even against Russian subjects, were

rife. Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh was quite powerless to stop this, and in spite of repeated requests, he received no help from Tehran. The disorders soon had an adverse affect on the trade of Russian merchants and the consular authorities tried to bring the leaders of the Shahists to reason. They, however, were disappointed at receiving no help from Russia and took an openly hostile attitude to the Consulate. At the beginning of March, Dabizha reported that the Russian unit of 1,500 men was in an invidious position since it could only be a passive spectator of the disorders because its least activity could be interpreted as an attempt 'to occupy the mosque's territory'; this must be avoided at all costs as it would be interpreted as Russian defilement of a Muslim sanctuary. In his subsequent reports to Sazonov, Dabizha describes further robberies and the total inability of the local authorities to deal with them. Thus in the first half of March the Russian authorities were in a difficult position: they were not on good terms with the supporters of the constitution and the Shahists too were hostile and encouraged the robbery of Russian property. Dabizha was well aware of the impossibility of using armed force against the mosque; thus on 21st (8th) March he telegraphed: 'Consider unthinkable any action of our force against the Shahists since this would lead to the inevitable occupation of the mosque and the consequent indignation of the Muslims against us.'" (M.II pp.5-6.)

Some interesting additional information on the situation is to be found in Sykes's reports on this period. It appears that early in March Yusof wrote to General Redko to complain of Prince Dabizha: he said that he had obeyed his instructions by creating disturbances but that the Russian Consul had suddenly withdrawn his encouragement and ordered him to disperse his following. General Redko replied three days later telling Yusof to expect the ex-Shah and to continue his agitation. On 11th March General Redko sent a message to Yusof and Taleb-ol-Haqqeh saying that the ex-Shah was expected shortly near Bojnord. Sykes further reported that the General had previously sent a small force with machine guns to Bojnord (S.II). On 13th March both consulates received the news that the ex-Shah had left Persian territory. "This information exploded like a bomb scattering the General's plot to the winds. His language and that of other Russian officers has been extremely strong testifying to the genuine depth of their chagrin. As a result Yusuf has now been informed that he must disperse his party at once as the ex-Shah has really gone and his action is doing much harm to Russian trade! He is furthermore threatened if he does not obey." (S.II.) Sykes added that it seemed likely that Prince Dabizha was not aware of General Redko's intrigue.

Sykes further reported that "on 6th March I received a telegram from the Legation to the effect that my colleague recommended the proclamation of martial law on the grounds that a Russian officer had been shot at and that Russian lives and property were in danger. . . I stated that neither I nor

the Persian authorities could obtain any information corroborating this story: but that even if true it was of slight importance considering all the circumstances. I added that as the Russians were aiding the agitation they incurred no danger. I concluded by reiterating my belief that the Russian Consul-General had himself organized the disturbances with a view to taking over the administration of the city." (S.III.) On this occasion, however, martial law was not established.

Matveyev does not mention this episode, nor that towards the middle of March, Sykes attempted to reconcile the various parties and induced Dabizha to join with him in his efforts. "K.S. Mubarik Ali Shah who conducted the negotiations on my behalf induced the leaders to accept certain terms. and on 20th March they had agreed to seal them when my colleague withdrew his representative alleging that the Persians did not mean to make terms. I was subsequently informed from more than one independent source that my colleague secretly informed the leaders that the ex-Shah had already landed at Bandar Gaz and was on his way to Meshed!" (S.III.) Ali Shah's negotiations with "the leaders" are probably at the origin of Lieut.-Col. Skurat's report, quoted by Matveyev as evidence of Sykes's intrigues and provocations, that there was "systematic contact between the insurgents' leaders and members of the consular staff. . . Three of Yusof Khan's supporters, questioned after the occupation, 'confirmed the constant and frequent contact between the British Consulate and the insurgents; the senior mirza, Shah Sahib, came to the mosque two or three times a week and had long talks with Yusof. . . The subject of their talks was no secret to members of the band; it was said quite confidently that the agent of the British Consulate was egging on Yusof Khan.'" (M.II p.18.)

The failure of the negotiations, Sykes reported, "reacted unfavourably on the general situation and on 24th March there was an attack on the Shir-i-Shur Police Station close to the Consulate garden. . . The Yezdi merchants of Meshed approached my colleague and asked him to restore order and at last he felt himself in a position to carry out his wicked scheme. He sent for the Governor-General and Kargozar and with needless rudeness said that they must either immediately restore order or confess their inability to do so. As both officials knew that the cause of the disorder was the Russian Consul-General himself they discreetly replied that they had not sufficient force at their disposal. My colleague, who had not asked me to this meeting, thereupon instructed General Redko to take charge of the city and proclaimed martial law. Before this had occurred a telephone message was tapped in my office. It was a conversation between Yusuf and the Russian Consulate-General. Yusuf reported that he had captured the Shir-i-Shur Police Station and was now ready to seize the telegraph office when instructed to do so. The reply from the Russian Consulate-General was to wait a little." (S.III.) These events are thus described by Matveyev: "On 24th March the Shahists sortied into the town, looted and fired at houses. Dabizha called a council to which he invited Prince Rokn-od-

Dowleh and General Redko. Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh announced that he could not restore order, whereupon Prince Dabizha replied that 'in view of his refusal . . . he is forced by circumstances to declare the town to be in a state of emergency and to hand over all authority to the commander of the Russian forces. Prince Rokn-od-Dowleh acknowledged this to be the only solution to an impossible situation.' Thereupon Prince Dabizha invited General Redko to 'assume command of the town'. Redko appointed Lieut. Khoranov to be chief of police in Mashhad. Control posts and mounted patrols of Russian troops were established in the town. The Shahists withdrew into the mosque precincts." (M.II p.6.)

Mashhad under Russian military rule (24th-30th March)

On 25th March, the day after the proclamation of martial law, Dabizha telegraphed to the Russian Foreign Minister that the population was grateful to the Consul for the restoration of order, that the Shahists were behaving quietly and were expected to evacuate the mosque without further inducement. (M.II p.6.) "This, however," comments Matveyev with foreboding, "was not to be. As will be seen from subsequent events, the situation in Mashhad deteriorated because the provocative activity of the British Consul began to bear fruit." (M.II p.6.) Matveyev quotes Lieut.-Col. Skurat's reports where Yusof's intransigence is ascribed to "Dabizha's inconsistent actions and interference with General Redko. Such inconsistencies. . . were Dabizha's announcement on 25th (12th) March which might have been taken to mean that the Russians would not attack the mosque precincts, and his proposal to disband the Persian police. As a result the situation in the town hardly changed and the bazaar remained closed." (M.II pp.6-7.)

Sykes, however, reported that on the same day (25th March) "several interesting messages" were intercepted. "One of them, from Yusuf, was to the effect that Prince Dabija was acting contrary to his promises, that he had done everything according to Russian instructions and was being badly treated by having Russian troops sent to surround the Shrine as people were now turning on him for having betrayed them. He begged that in any case the Persian police might be withdrawn and Persian soldiers be substituted. In a subsequent reply Prince Dabija wished him to be at ease as he would take away the police and the Russian soldiers had nothing to do with the agitators. The Russians simply intended to carry out their own policy. The Talib-ul-Hak /Taleb-ol-Haqqeh/, the religious agitator, had a conversation with mirza Abdul Hamid of the Russian Consulate-General and was similarly reassured." (S.III.)

On 26th March, Sykes reported, "the police were marched into the lines of the Russian soldiers where they were surrounded and disarmed. They were

then interned and on the following day were paid off and dismissed. . . Persian soldiers have now been posted with the Russian troops." (S.III.) Matveyev does not describe this event, nor the fact that on 26th March "a body of 150 men declared a Jehad, or Holy War, and donned shrouds. They were joined by two or three thousand villagers and a strong fanatical outburst appeared probable as they charged out on some Russian soldiers who were posting notices and the latter ran away. However, the efforts of the Attache to induce the leaders to withdraw have been successful to some extent. . ." (S.III.)

Dabizha, writes Matveyev quoting from a consular report, "began to make contact with influential persons, clerical and lay, whom he had reason to suspect of being in touch with, and even actively supporting, the bandits, to ask them to persuade Yusof Khan to leave the mosque peacefully. On 28th March Dabizha summoned the chief behind-the-scenes advisers of the insurgents - the mojaheds Mirza Ebrahim, Taleb-ol-Haqqeh, Kaimaqam-ot-Towliyeh, the merchants Haji Mo'avin-ot-Tojjar, Haji Rahim, and others, to persuade them to lay down their arms, leave the city and not to resist the opening of the barriers. 'If they refuse the Consulate will consider itself forced to take measures to evict the insurgents from the mosque precincts by force of arms.'" (M.II pp.7-8.) Sykes does not mention this meeting. He reported however that owing to the Attache's influence, on 29th March "a fatwa was issued to the effect that to carry arms in the Shrine was disrespectful to it and inadvisable, and that shops should be reopened. At the time of writing /i.e. 30th March/ a few shops are opened, the crowds in the Shrine appear to be dispersing and only Yusuf, Mohamed, the Talib-ul-Hak and their followers remain." (S.III.) Sykes further reported that the motavallibashi had told him that on 29th March Dabizha had called on him and "declared that in no case would the Shrine be attacked: but that the agitators would be blockaded." Sykes added: "Prince Dabija volunteered a similar statement to me some days previously with much emphasis." (S.VI.) Matveyev does not describe either the issuing of the fatwa, or the calmer situation, or Dabizha's visit to the motavallibashi, or finally, the appointment of Nazir-od-Dowleh, which apparently took place sometime at the very end of March, was a further cause for optimism. "This rich official had instructed his agent who was arranging to offer Yusuf Ts60 per month and also a sum down if he quitted the Shrine. Indeed, on the morning of 30th March there were many shops open and generally speaking there was a hopeful feeling." (S.IV.)

According to Sykes, all that marred the situation on the morning of 30th March was that "Naib Ali Akbar Hussani, one of the Russian agents provocateur, collected a band of 200 women at two krans a head who rushed down the bazaar shouting that they wanted their Shah. This action caused the closing of the shops: but was however of slight importance." (S.IV.) Matveyev, however, gives another picture: "Prince Dabizha reported that on 30th March 'the

emissaries of the chief instigators appeared and instead of opening the bazaars and clearing the place of bandits, began haughtily to impose all sorts of impossible conditions, for example, that I should guarantee the abolition of all constitutional reforms. . . To this I replied that I had already been negotiating with them for over a month without any results. . . I therefore consider myself forced to stop all further discussions with them and if, by 3 p.m. on this 30th March, the bandits terrorizing the whole population of Mashhad do not disarm and disperse, I shall hand over all authority to the commander of our forces.' General Redko and. . . Lieut-Col. Skurat were convinced that the Consul's negotiations with the Shahists were undermining Russian prestige and making the Shahists think that the Russians did not dare use force. Redko considered that things had gone too far to withdraw. In that spirit, on the morning of 30th March, he telegraphed to his immediate superior, General Samsonov, the Governor of Turkestan as follows: 'Consul conducting fruitless discussions with the insurgents, refuses to influence matters by arms. Final limit is set for this evening. This is already the third postponement and I think it will not be the last.' Samsonov, in passing on this telegram to the Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs, added: 'Request permission to give orders to the commander to act with arms if necessary.' Following this telegram from Tashkent, however, Petersburg was informed, on the basis of a further telegram from Redko that 'at the suggestion of the Consul, on 30th March the mosque sanctuary was fired on by artillery, stormed and taken.'" (M.II p.8.) It thus appears from Matveyev's account that Redko acted without the knowledge or sanction of the Petersburg authorities, although presumably with at least the sympathy of his superior in Tashkent. It is intriguing to speculate when the two previous postponements took place.

III. THE BOMBARDMENT

(30th March 1912)

To continue Matveyev's account: "Once Dabizha was convinced that the leaders of the insurgents would not disarm, he 'asked General Redko to take over all authority from 3 p.m. and, in the event of resistance to our forces by the bandits, to clear the mosque precincts by force of arms'." (M.II p.9.) At 2.30 p.m. Prince Dabizha telephoned to Sykes "that he was starting a bombardment of the Shrine at 3 p.m. unless Yusuf left it by that time". Sykes "was utterly surprised at this information: but I came to the conclusion that to protest would serve no good purpose." (S.IV.) Sykes reported that the same afternoon "the motavallibashi received a letter from General Redko to the effect that the Shrine would be bombarded in an hour's time unless

Yusuf and the other agitators quitted. He was telephoning this message to Yusuf and had sent the original to Aga Mirza Ibrahim /Mirza Ebrahim/ when he was informed that two Russian officers wished to see him. They stated that he must go to the General and without allowing him to order a horse took him off on foot. When he passed the British Consulate the bombardment started." (S.IV)

According to Matveyev, "from 3 p.m. General Redko spent an hour and a half in the last peaceful efforts to persuade the bandits to surrender their arms and disperse. At 4.30 p.m., however, they opened fire on the Russian troops; Russian artillery replied. Then General Redko ceased fire and sent representatives from the clergy with offers for surrender. This new attempt also failed. Then the troops began to storm the courtyards and bazaars next to the mosque. After little resistance, some 2,000 of Yusof Khan's supporters surrendered; Yusof Khan, Mamad, and Akpara had fled before the assault began." (M.II p.9) "When. . . ", Matveyev continues, "General Redko sent his letter to the insurgents with his last offer to lay down arms, there was complete calm among them. Yusof Khan read the letter and said: 'Do not worry. These are the usual Russian threats which they will never dare implement. The British Consulate is on our side.'" (M.II p.18)

It can be assumed that the "representatives from the clergy" whom General Redko sent to negotiate with Yusof after the start of the bombardment was none other than the motavallibashi, who gave the following account to Sykes of his adventures after he had been brought to General Redko and the shelling had started: "He was spoken to roughly and abused for not turning out the agitators. General Redko among other things stated that he would level the Shrine to the ground. He was then ordered to proceed up the Pain Khiaban to the Shrine and to warn Yusuf that unless he surrendered the Shrine would be assaulted. The motavallibashi replied that to go up the avenue swept with shot was almost certain death: but he was told that if he refused he would be dealt with by martial law. The Russian Military Attache, Lt.Col. Scourratt took him into the avenue where there were two field guns and several maxims. These were fired and he was then sent off. After he had gone two or three hundred yards the guns and maxims again fired and he was in a hail of bullets. Upon reaching the base he was seized by Mohamed's men who alone had fired any shots. They took him to Yusuf who was in the New Court: but Yusuf beyond exclaiming that he had ordered his men not to fire, refused to surrender on the grounds that everyone would think him a coward. He pretended to be fortified in this resolution by a message that the Persian gunners had bombarded the Russian Consulate-General and killed my colleague. As a matter of fact," Sykes added, "I saw them cowering under a wall close to this consulate during the entire bombardment." (S.VI)

"The bombardment," reported Sykes, "was continued until sunset, some two hundred shells being fired altogether, and the machine guns screamed out incessantly. The Russian troops advanced over roofs to the mosque courtyard and

also by rushes up the Bala and Pain Khiaban: but the fact there were no casualties on their side beyond two or three men wounded while carrying messages proves that, as all my informants state, there was practically no resistance. Had there been resistance the Russians might have lost very heavily. It was almost dark when the Russians entered the sacred buildings where they made prisoners of the crowd and broke open and looted the shops in the courts which contained jewelry. . . A certain number of men took refuge in the haram or sacred tomb chamber and eight to ten were shot down through the silver lattice in the Dar-ul-Siada by a maxim which was brought up. However, so far as I can learn the Russian troops were guilty of no excesses in the way of raping women and so forth although charges to this effect were made." (S.IV) The account given to Sykes by the motavallibashi corresponds to Sykes's own account, with the difference that the motavallibashi says that it was "perhaps two hours after nightfall" when the shooting ceased and the Russian soldiers entered the haram.

Damage and casualties

Matveyev writes that according to Dabizha's information 39 Persians were killed and 26 wounded; "Lt.Col. Skurat, however, estimated that the casualties were greater." (M.II p.9) Sykes indeed, reported that "the total number of killed is 74 and of wounded 31. The official number of killed is 39." (S.IV)

Matveyev mentions no looting, but Sykes reported that when on 1st April he went with Prince Dabizha to inspect the Shrine, "my colleague did not wish to take us to the tomb chamber on the alleged ground that there might still be some lurking fanatics! Actually the reason was that everything had been taken away from it the night following the bombardment, and Prince Dabija was naturally unwilling for me to bear witness to this fact. He informed me that he was handing back the Shrine on the following day to its custodians and that night most of the carpets and other valuables were brought back. . . The Attache visited the Shrine on 3rd April and states that the top of the zari or grating which was a gold knob studded with valuable jewels had been hit by a bullet and the jewels had disappeared. The safe in the treasury had not been forced but a chest containing such precious objects as the bow of Shah Abbas and the shield of Mohamed Shah, the Moghul emperor vanquished by Nadir Shah, had been broken open; these two objects had, however, been restored. Altogether the losses in the Shrine are not, so far as is known, serious. The looting by the Russian soldiers included a covered bazaar known as a timcha in which fifty-two shops are situated; it is occupied by stone cutters and seal engravers, one of whom is a British subject. These shops were all looted and the loss is reckoned at Ts.12,000. All other shops in both the courts were looted and prisoners were invariably relieved of their money and valuables." (S.IV) Sykes added in a later report: "There is no doubt whatever that the Russian

officers and men looted shops and houses extensively. Every Persian was made a prisoner and only Russian soldiers and subjects were allowed in the sacred zone for several days and needless to say the Persians were much too frightened to have looted during the bombardment. Consequently the entire responsibility for the looting falls on the Russian troops. . . The loot has remained in Meshed, the soldiers selling valuable turquoises for a few krans to Russian traders. I have not mentioned these cases to my colleague as I had no desire to upset our good personal relations and owing to his lack of accuracy in making reports he may omit to state that there was any looting done by Russian soldiers." (S.V)

Damage to the fabric of the Shrine was, Matveyev argues, negligible. To prove this he quotes from the document signed by the motavallibashi when the Russian authorities handed the Shrine back to the clerical commission which read: ". . . God be praised, when we made an inspection we found that thanks to the enlightened conduct of the Russian troops, nothing had been touched or looted, except for the damage resulting from the shelling or from the searching out of hooligans. . ." (M.II p.10) The British press, Matveyev says, following Sykes's exaggerated reports, "in every way exaggerated the damage to the mosque; restorations were to cost about 50,000 tomans. Sykes sent photographs to London which were intended to confirm these accusations. In a covering note sent with copies of these photographs made at the British Consulate, Prince Dabizha wrote to St.Petersburg that they were made not entirely honestly, in particular the one which made the damage look extensive as it was taken as a close-up. He reckoned that the repairs would cost 1,000 tomans. Although it seems likely that Dabizha minimized the cost of repairs, the British exaggerations were very typical of their whole handling of these events." (M.II p.12)

According to Sykes, the motavallibashi accompanied Dabizha and Sykes on their inspection of the Shrine on 1st April "and upon his return to the Russian Consulate, a document, which has subsequently been used to justify my Russian colleague was drawn up by Mirza Abdul Hamid on behalf of Prince Dabija. Its contents have been published. The motavallibashi at first refused to take the responsibility but reflecting that it was most important to regain possession of the Shrine he did not seal but signed the precious document with half his usual signature, this being a usual method of protest in Persia where a seal is alone fully valid." (S.VI)

Sykes wrote the following account of his visit to the Shrine on 1st April: ". . . It was finally arranged that I should accompany my colleague there and after driving through the bazaars we walked along a covered bazaar inside the bast to the Old Court which we were the first Englishmen to enter. The general effect of the tile work and of the Golden Portico of Nadir was very fine but, as I expected, there was a general air of neglect. There were some marks of the bombardment in this court. We then went to the New Court. . . Here too little damage had been done by the bombardment. We then moved by some squalid passages

to the Gauhar Shad mosque which Vambery considers to be the finest in High Asia. Whether or no the dome has suffered severely I could not ascertain. It had been repeatedly struck but is very solidly built. The tile work was damaged but not very seriously. Indeed, owing to the high walls the effects of the bombardment must have been almost entirely moral. The golden dome had been struck in four places and the golden tiles were twisted; the tiled gateways were also damaged to a considerable extent." (S.IV) In A HISTORY OF PERSIA (1921, p.427) Sykes writes: "My colleague at first reported that no shells had struck the Shrine, but this false statement I was able to refute by posting to the Legation and to the British Embassy at St.Petersburg copies of photographs specially taken by my instructions." One of these photographs is reproduced in the book, facing p.426.

Matveyev's accusation that the damage to the Shrine was greatly exaggerated is not without some grounds if one compares Sykes's report of the damage as seen by him on 1st April with, for instance, Edward Browne's letter to the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN dated 9th April. Browne writes: ". . . As regards the sanctuary itself the great cupola and most of the Shrines, dormitories, and other buildings have suffered grievously from the cannonade while all the doors have been or are being broken down. . . Of the precious things with which the munificence of many kings and great men of past time had endowed the sanctuary many are missing or destroyed. We must go back six centuries to the savage Mongol invasion of Persia by Chingiz Khan to find a parallel to these acts of vandalism and violence. . ." It was Browne's attitude, rather than Sykes's more moderate account, that seems to have gained currency.

The escape of the agitators

Matveyev states clearly that Yusof and Mamad fled from the Shrine before the assault began (see above p.338). He adds that they "fled to Nishapur and were carrying out robberies there. The despatch of a Russian force there made them leave that district too." (M.II p.10) Their subsequent fate is not described.

Sykes, however, made a special investigation of the agitators' movements after the bombardment which he reported as follows: "I have heard from numerous sources that the city walls which are in a good state of preservation . . . were surrounded by a cordon of troops; there was also a bright moon. Consequently it is obvious that as there are no houses or gardens touching or even close to the walls, it was almost out of the question for any armed agitators to escape without Russian assistance. Furthermore no prisoners were taken from the Shrine until three or four days after the bombardment. Half an hour after the bombardment three witnesses saw from the roof of a house close to the New Gate firstly a waggon containing some men whom they believed to be

the agitators and secondly a batch of men on foot. Both bodies were surrounded by Russian soldiers. The witnesses did not recognize Yusuf or any of the agitators. . .

"Two days later one of my gardeners was returning from Jaghark when he met a friend who told him that Yusuf and his party had passed through Veirani, a village situated between Meshed and Shandiz and perhaps twelve miles from Meshed. One of our employees owns land at this village and so he was sent to make enquiries and a second man was sent independently to inquire as far as Shandiz. The results of this inquiry are that Yusuf reached Kala Imamia near Veirani on the night of the bombardment in a waggon. The villagers seeing a party of armed men refused to open their gate; but gave them some bread. The driver of the waggon then rode on one of his horses to Veirani where the Muavin-u-Tujjar /Mo'avin-ot-Tojjar/ also owns land and he returned with two horses and two mules. Yusuf sent in a letter to my Russian colleague and a second one to the Muavin-u-Tujjar by the waggoner and then rode on to Shandiz with Mohamed /Mamad/ which he reached in the morning. . . We have to add to the above evidence the fact that the bombardment was not started until 4.45 p.m. whereas elementary military prudence would have fixed it early in the morning and the fact that although the position was of exceptional strength, there was not a single casualty in the attacking force. Given this accumulated evidence it is hard to doubt that the Russian authorities were acting throughout in collusion with Yusuf. . ." (S.VII)

In a later report dated 30th April 1912 (S.VIII), Sykes confirmed the information that he had given before as the basis of fresh reports, but added that the agitators left Mashhad between 10 and 11 p.m. on the evening of the bombardment.

Notes

(1) Key to references used in text is as follows:

M.I Matveyev's article "On the Question of Russo-Persian Relations in the Latter Period of the Persian Revolution". TRUDY SAGU, Vyp.XXVII, 1951.

M.II Matveyev's article "The Part Played by British Provocation in the Mashhad Events at the End of 1911 and Beginning of 1912". Ibid., Vyp.LVII, 1954.

S.I Sykes's report probably No.8 of 14th February 1912.
S.II " " No.10 of 15th March 1912.

S.III	Sykes's report	No. 12	of 30th March 1912.
S.IV	"	" undated, probably	about 2nd April 1912.
S.V	"	" undated, probably	mid-April 1912.
S.VI	"	" dated	12th April 1912.
S.VII	"	" dated	13th April 1912.
S.VIII	"	" dated	30th April 1912.
S.IX	"	" undated, probably	mid-April 1912.
S.X	"	" undated, after Yusof's capture	(? early May).

(2) Sykes's spelling has been retained in passages quoted from him.

APPENDIX

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+ All the following items are references to files - many of them classified as secret - in the Central Historical State Archives of the Uzbek SSR.

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

THE 1917 - 1920 UPRISING IN PERSIAN AZERBAYDZHAN

A NEW APPRAISAL

Until Peter the Great's invasion of the northern provinces of Persia in 1722 the whole of the territory peopled by the Azerbaydzhanis had lain within the confines of the Persian Empire. As a result of this invasion and of the various treaties which followed it what is now the Azerbaydzhan SSR became part of Russia, only the present province of Azerbaydzhan remaining to Persia. Both Tsarist and Soviet governments have always been interested in and sensitive to events in Persian Azerbaydzhan, which has been occupied by Russian troops for varying periods since 1909. Since the Revolution, disturbances in the province have usually gained Soviet support and at times its separation from Persia has seemed inevitable. Nevertheless the province has remained an integral part of Persia, even the separatist movement of 1945-46, which was actively supported by the Soviet government and the Red Army, being successfully withstood.

The theme of the so-called national-liberation movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan has always been a favourite one with Soviet writers, and since the failure of the separatist movement of 1945-46 a special need has been felt to justify the Soviet attitude. It is this need which seems to have prompted a book entitled THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN PERSIAN AZERBAYDZHAN 1917-1920 by Sh.A. Tagiyeva.+ (1) Apart from giving a very much fuller account of the events than previous Russian writers, the author is at pains to stress the decisive influence which the October Revolution in Russia exercised over the Persian movement. In her introduction she accuses previous writers of failing to appreciate this fact. "The national-liberation movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan 1917-1920", she writes, "is still poorly accounted for in Soviet historical writings. . . The main shortcomings of these works. . . is the fact that the movement, and in particular the rising in Tabriz, is regarded as unconnected with the events of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and with the general struggle of the peoples of Persia against imperialism and

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+ NATSIONAL'NO-OSVOBODITEL'NOYE DVIZHENIYE V IRANSKOM AZERBAYDZHANE V 1917-1920. Baku, 1956.

internal reaction." M.N. Ivanova's article on the subject (2), she maintains, "contains few elements of research"; and she continues: "The works of a number of Soviet historians give briefly the general outline of the national-liberation movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan 1917-1920. But the authors of these works did not aim at giving an analysis of the question and therefore have provided no exhaustive answers to the main problems connected with the movement, and sometimes have incorrectly elucidated some of its features." As an example she quotes M.S. Ivanov's OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA (3) criticizing him sharply for failing to appreciate that Khiabani - the leader of the uprising - was well-disposed towards the Soviet government.

The following is an attempt to provide some account of a little known incident of Persian history by giving the substance of Tagiyeva's work together with an indication of the political angle adopted.

The special pleading employed throughout the book is too obvious to require detailed comment. It is, however, particularly noteworthy that in seeking to represent the Azerbaydzhani population of the Persian province as completely downtrodden and as hostile to the Persian government, Tagiyeva omits to mention the prominent part traditionally played by Azerbaydzhanis in the Persian state machine and in recent Persian history. Taqizadeh, the hero of the Persian Revolution of 1906 and now President of the Senate, Hakimi and Sa'ed, Persian Prime Ministers who successfully resisted Soviet threats during and after the last war, and Jamalzadeh, the popular writer, are all Azerbaydzhanis as have been and are a large number of other Persian statesmen and civil servants. One other point that requires comment is Tagiyeva's statement (p.66) that after the First World War a military unit of Indian sepoys occupied most of Persian Azerbaydzhan. In fact, no part of the province has ever been occupied by British or Indian troops. The nearest British troops were in Qazvin, where a brigade was stationed between 1918 and 1921.

Since Tagiyeva aims not only at recounting the course of events during the Azerbaydzhan rising but also at accounting for the movement and revealing its vital association with the Russian revolutions of February and October, three-quarters of her book is devoted to two long chapters entitled "The Social, Economic and Political Situation in Persia on the Eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia", and "The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and Persia". Owing to considerations of space the account given here will be divided into two parts: the first will consist of an abridged translation of the first two chapters which deal with events leading up to the rising; and the second, which will appear in the next number of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, will consist of an abridged translation of the last chapter, entitled "The Tabriz Rising of 1920", and a comparison of this with previous accounts in Russian and in English.

PART ONE

I. Conditions in Persia before the October Revolution -
II. The Influence of the October Revolution in Persia

I. Conditions in Persia before the October Revolution

Persia at this period was a backward agrarian country where feudal relationships prevailed and capitalism was very poorly developed. Conditions for the peasants and for the workers in the primitive industries were extremely hard, and the population of Persian Azerbaydzhan was subjected not only to feudal but also to national oppression: Persian officials were appointed to various institutions instead of Azerbaydzhani nominees, and these officials maltreated the local population attempting to "ruin Azerbaydzhan, enslave the Azerbaydzhani nation and abolish their native language, way of life and traditions". During the First World War the situation in Persian Azerbaydzhan worsened: famine and epidemics raged over the whole of Persia, and the authorities did nothing to combat rising food prices, speculation and starvation. "The prevailing bribery and lawlessness in the country roused the indignation of the toiling masses. The peasants and the urban poor rose against the feudal and national oppression."

The introduction of foreign capital into Persia brought ruin to the people for it subjected the economy to the interests of "imperialist states"; (in connection with this British, German and American enterprises are mentioned). Unemployment grew and an increasing number of people migrated from Persian Azerbaydzhan to Russia in search of work. On returning to their homeland these people brought new revolutionary ideas and experience gained from the Russian workers. Not only did foreign powers exploit Persian Azerbaydzhan for commercial gain, they tried as well to secure a predominating influence in the country. (There follows here a description of the efforts of Britain, America, Germany and her ally Turkey to gain political and economic control including the attempts of the Turkish and German armies to seize Persian Azerbaydzhan and other Persian territory in 1914). By the beginning of 1917 Persia was occupied by three warring nations - the Russians in the north, the British in the south and the Germans and the Turks in the west. The transformation of a considerable part of Persia into an arena for military operations "lay like a heavy burden on the shoulders of the workers of Persia".

During the years of the war Persia's foreign trade, in particular trade between Persian Azerbaydzhan and Russia, suffered considerably. (Here a detailed account is given of the importance to Persian Azerbaydzhan of her

trade with Russia.) "Traditional economic links between Russia and Persia, particularly Persian Azerbaydzhan, Gilan, and Khorasan, in spite of the essentially colonizing policy of Tsarism, to a certain extent contributed to the development of the economic life of the northern regions of Persia, although of course this development was one-sided. . . On the eve of the First World War 85-90 per cent of the exports of the whole of Persia fell to the lot of Russia". When this trade was brought to a temporary halt during the October Revolution and the Civil War, the economy of Persian Azerbaydzhan suffered a crushing blow and poverty and unemployment rose sharply. Such was the economic and political situation that the people were ripe for rebellion against the Shah and against foreign elements in the country.

News of the overthrow of Tsarism and of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia gave impetus to the national-liberation and democratic movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan. "With the victory of the February Revolution in Russia the attitude of the population of Persia towards Russia sharply changed. Owing to the skilful work of the Bolsheviks among the Russian soldiers in northern Persia, the local population no longer regarded the Russian soldiers as the instruments of Tsarist policy, but as their friends." In some places the people, crushed under feudal oppression, turned for help to the Soldiers' Committees which had been formed in the Russian military garrisons and units in northern Persia, and even asked to become Russian subjects. "The Russian soldiers in every way tried to defend the local population against the reactionary authorities." The rebellious movements of the Azerbaydzhan population were led by the Azerbaydzhan Regional Committee of the Democratic Party of Persia with Mohammad Khiabani at the head. (There follows at this point a brief biographical note on the life and beliefs of Khiabani and stress is laid on the strong influence which revolutionary ideas, assimilated during his sojourn in Russia, exercised upon him.)

Under the influence of the victory of the February Revolution in Russia the popular movement in Persia and Persian Azerbaydzhan became more active, and in 1917 in Tabriz members of the Regional Committee of the Democratic Party demanded a convocation of the majles, the dismissal of Persian government officials and especially of the Governor-General of Tabriz - Sardar Rashid. The Democratic Party, which led the movement, had branches in Tabriz, Ardebil, Qazvin, Zanjan and Urmia; in Tabriz close ties were maintained with the Soviets of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies. The Azerbaydzhan Regional Committee, together with the Executive Committee of the Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies of Tabriz, took concrete measures to organize the people for their fight for national liberty, fostered friendship between the local population and the Russian soldiers in Persian Azerbaydzhan and organized demonstrations and meetings in which both Russians and Azerbaydzhanis participated. (There follows here an account of these demonstrations to prove that the revolutionary movement was gathering strength for a climax.) On the 17th June 1917 a rising against the

arbitrary rule of the Governor-General - Sardar Rashid - started in Tabriz led by the Azerbaydzhan Regional Committee. Under pressure from the populace the Vice-Regent of Persian Azerbaydzhan was obliged to agree to the demand for Rashid's retirement, and three days after his departure from Tabriz his successor - Sharif-ad-Dowleh - was appointed. At the same time the democrats of Tabriz succeeded in getting their representative elected to the local town council, and in Urmia (Rezayeh) too the local population managed to bring about the removal from office of their arbitrary Governor-General.

On the 5th of July 1917 the Regional Committee published a proclamation on the necessity of organizing a regional anjoman, i.e. a local council similar to the anjomans which were set up during the revolutionary events of 1905-11. And on the 10th July the democrats of Tabriz sent the government a telegram containing a number of demands, including a demand for permission to organize a regional anjoman in agreement with the existing constitution.

In Persian Azerbaydzhan there existed no working class to lead the growing revolutionary movement, nor a united revolutionary organization. The only political party in Persia was the Democratic Party which, in spite of its professed policy of defending the rights of the workers, in fact served the interests of the big commercial bourgeoisie of which it was mainly made up. In 1917 even this broke up into separate groups "of which one gravitated towards Germany, another towards Britain, a third towards Russia and the fourth towards the USA". The Azerbaydzhan Regional Committee of this party differed radically in its structure from the similar organization in Tehran. It consisted mainly of representatives of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, landowners, the intelligentsia and the lowest ranks of the clergy, and also contained representatives of the workers and peasants. After the victory of the February Revolution in Russia, members of the Committee put forward a proposal for the creation of an independent Democratic Party in Persian Azerbaydzhan. Preparations for the organization of such a party began from the moment the first number of the party organ TAJADDOD was published. At the end of August 1917 a conference of the Azerbaydzhan Regional Committee was held in Tabriz. The conference declared the Democratic Party of Azerbaydzhan independent, elected its central committee and took a comprehensive resolution in which the tasks of the party were made clear. The programme of the party, as far as it can be ascertained from the material available, consisted in the following points:

1. To cause the principles of the constitution to be put into practice, using non-violent methods.

2. Throughout Persia to elect deputies for the majlis from "the democratic sections of the population".

3. To start elections to the regional and district anjomans and obtain autonomy for Persian Azerbaydzhan within the confines of Persia.

4. To achieve democratic reforms in the domain of the economic and cultural life of the country. After the conference, sections and local committees of the party were formed in a number of towns and villages of Persian Azerbaydzhan. The Democratic party however "acted indecisively, and did not organize mass political demonstrations of the people"; at the same time Khiabani and other Democrats considered that their end could be gained without the use of force. Their error was proved by subsequent events.

The second chapter, which is subtitled "The Struggle of the Workers of Persian Azerbaydzhan against the British Interventionists and the Turkish Invaders 1918-1919", appears to aim chiefly at showing the influence of the October Revolution on the movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan, and revealing the predatory policies of Britain and Turkey in Persia, in order to contrast them with the friendly overtures and peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. Stress is laid on the influence which the revolutionary proletariat of Baku exercised on the movement in Persia. The chapter is introduced by a brief description of Russian concessions to Persia immediately after the establishment of Soviet power.

II. The Influence of the October Revolution in Persia

In disseminating democratic ideas among the workers a special part was played by the revolutionary committees of the Russian military units in Persia and Persian Azerbaydzhan; and during the evacuation of Russian troops from Persian Azerbaydzhan in 1918 a small Russian garrison remained in Tabriz headed by a Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies with which Khiabani was in close contact and through which he learned of events in Russia. Meanwhile the leaders of the Democratic Party of Persian Azerbaydzhan informed the people in speeches and articles of the desire of the Soviet government for the independence and prosperity of the peoples of Persia. In May 1917, after the dismissal of the cabinet led by Vosuq-ad-Dowleh, the government formed a new cabinet which consisted of democrats and which at first was very popular with the democratic sections of the population of Tehran, Tabriz and other towns. Supporters soon became disillusioned with it, however, owing to its inactivity; and when Vosuq-ad-Dowleh was again included the opposition of all the democratic sections of the population was aroused, and a wave of protest swept the country. It was demanded that the cabinet "which had been transformed into a puppet of

the British imperialists" should be dismissed, that a democratic government should be created, and that close and friendly relations should be established with the Soviet Union. "As a result of the popular movement against foreign imperialism and the reactionary Persian government which had arisen in Persia and Persian Azerbaydzhan at the end of 1917, Vosuq-ad-Dowleh and his confederates were obliged to retire". The democrats of Persian Azerbaydzhan put forward eight demands, namely, that a new national cabinet of men worthy of the post should be organized as soon as possible; that elections to the majles should be begun; that an election of provincial anjomans should be arranged; that the participation of the people in the foreign policy of the state should be ensured etc.

"From the first days after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, Persia, and in particular Persian Azerbaydzhan, became the arena for ever-growing political activity on the part of the imperialist powers which was closely linked with their armed intervention against Soviet Russia". While the Soviet government was starting to evacuate Russian forces from Persian Azerbaydzhan and other northern regions of Persia at the beginning of 1918, the British powers were trying to strengthen their influence in these provinces, occupying them with their armies. . . The special military mission of Dunsterville, who commanded the invasion, was faced with the problem of seizing Anzeli and Resht, invading Transcaucasia and occupying Baku. Towards the Spring of 1918 the British succeeded in penetrating Zanjan and Mianeh under the pretext of eliminating dangers which threatened Persia from the direction of Turkey. Gradually they seized other towns in Persian Azerbaydzhan (for example Khoy and Urmia), and established in them police and military forces under the command of British officers. The British also sent experienced agents to Tabriz, and attempted to prevent the establishment of friendly relations between Persia and the Soviet Union.

With the help of Persian feudal lords the British persecuted the politically most advanced people in the country, and attempted to quell the risings of the workers of Persian Azerbaydzhan against foreign domination and the reactionary Persian government. During this period a terrible famine raged in Persia and Persian Azerbaydzhan, and the misery of the people was further increased by the activities of the British who accumulated stores of bread in Tehran, Qazvin, Kermanshah and other towns and sent them to Mesopotamia. Two successive governments, one of which attempted to secure the evacuation of British forces from Persia, and the other to adopt a less conciliatory policy towards Britain, were eliminated by the British, and Vosuq-ad-Dowleh was reinstated. Protest against the British on the part of the people manifested itself in numerous meetings, and in attacks on the consulates and on British property and garrisons.

In 1918 the Turks took advantage of the evacuation of Russian forces from Persian Azerbaydzhan to seize the north-western regions of the country. In spite of the already miserable position of the people and the famine and epidemics prevalent in the country, they mercilessly pillaged the countryside, robbing and ruining the inhabitants, and in Tabriz appropriated property in banks and state institutions. The Persian government made no effort to repulse the Turkish invaders, but on the contrary made use of them to put down revclutionary demonstrations of the Azerbaydzhanis against the Persians and enlisted their help in quelling the Democratic Party of Persian Azerbaydzhan. On their side, the Turks used the local khans and "musavatists" to disseminate counter-revolutionary pan-Turkic ideas with the aim of turning Persian Azerbaydzhan into a province of Turkey. Later, abandoning religious propaganda they "decided to make use of the hatred of the population of Persian Azerbaydzhan for the Persian officials and feudal lords and put forward the idea of uniting Persian Azerbaydzhan with Turkey. They forgot however that the hatred of the people for the Turkish invaders was no less strong than for the Persian officials and feudal lords". The struggle of the popular masses against the Turks was led by the Democratic Party of Azerbaydzhan; for this reason members of the party were persecuted by the Turks, and on the 13th August 1918 Khiabani and a number of his associates were arrested. In spite of the arrests, however, the party continued to lead the people's opposition to further penetration of the Turks into the country.

After the defeat of Turkey in the First World War and the evacuation of Turkish forces from Transcaucasia and Persian Azerbaydzhan, the British began to appropriate the whole of Persia, and a military unit of Indian sepoys, who during the period of Turkish occupation of Persian Azerbaydzhan were in Tikmedashe (60 km. from Tabriz), occupied most of the province. "While the imperialist states regarded Persia as a source of profit and tried to turn the country into a colony, the Soviet Union recognized the sovereignty of Persia and expressed readiness to enter into friendly diplomatic relations with her." In July 1918 the first Soviet ambassador was sent to Persia - I.I. Kolomiytsev, who was "received with great enthusiasm by the workers of Persia". Under the influence of the British, however, the Persian government refused to recognize the diplomatic powers of Kolomiytsev, and after an attack by white guards, instigated by the British, the staff of the embassy was arrested and Kolomiytsev forced to go into hiding. Later in August of the same year he was killed by "agents of the British imperialists and their myrmidon Vosuq-ad-Dowleh".

After the end of the war the British not only did not withdraw their forces from Persia, but actually increased their number, in preparation for attacking Soviet Russia from Persian territory. In 1919 the anglophile Persian government concluded the "enslaving Anglo-Persian Agreement thrust on it by Britain. . . The conditions of the agreement ensured Britain's domination over

the economy of Persia. . .and politically and economically subjected Persia to British imperialism". An attempt was made by Britain to conclude an agreement with the "musavatists", mensheviks and SR's of Transcaucasia, whereby Azerbaydzhan was to separate from Russia and join Persia on the basis of a confederation.

/After a brief description of the predatory activities of the USA in Persia the chapter reverts to the progress of the Democratic party./

Popular indignation against British dominance in Persia grew, and meetings and demonstrations were held at which the workers demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. "The Persian government, under pressure from the popular masses, was obliged to make a formal protest to the British government, but in fact it submitted entirely to the demands of the British imperialists." The Anglo-Persian Agreement also aroused considerable dissatisfaction, and in order to quell the disturbances which it caused, the government of Vosuq-ad-Dowleh was obliged to take repressive measures. Every effort was made to pass the agreement through the majles, and to this end Vosuq-ad-Dowleh attempted during the elections of the fourth majles to see that only anglophiles (representatives of the big landowners and the reactionary clergy) were chosen. "Elections to the fourth majles took place in Persian Azerbaydzhan under very strained circumstances in August and September 1919. Persian reactionaries persecuted representatives of the Democratic Party of Persian Azerbaydzhan, and threatened and maltreated those who voted for its candidates." In spite of this six candidates out of nine put up by the Democratic Party received a majority and were elected to the majles; and among those chosen was Khiabani. This victory brought down further persecutions on the head of the Democratic Party and it was forced to go underground.

The revolutionary movement against the British and the "reactionary Persian government", however, continued to grow. "The people did not limit themselves to protest demonstrations and meetings; they carried on armed resistance to the imperialists and Persian reactionaries". As a result Vosuq-ad-Dowleh intensified his repressive measures in Persian Azerbaydzhan: the most active revolutionaries were expelled from the province, newspapers were suppressed, public buildings where meetings took place were closed etc. In spite of these measures the movement had grown to such an extent by the end of 1919 that the Governor-General was driven out of Tabriz, the centre of the rising, and Vosuq-ad-Dowleh was forced to make a number of small concessions to the revolutionaries.

"The rising of the popular masses in Persian Azerbaydzhan in 1918-19 created favourable conditions for the further development of the national-liberation movement in Persian-Azerbaydzhan, of which the culminating point was the Tabriz rising in 1920".

The chapter ends with a re-emphasis of the important part played by the October Revolution in the development of rebellious movements in Persian Azerbaydzhan - a point which the author is at pains to establish throughout her work. The Democratic Party, she maintains, and the struggle of the population of Persian Azerbaydzhan, which was supported by the whole of progressive Persian society, exercised considerable influence on the political life of the country and brought about the forced retirement of the reactionary cabinet. "All this became possible only owning to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which put an end to the predatory policy of Tsarism and created effective conditions for the legal operation of democratic forces in Persia."

With the description of the economic plight of Persian Azerbaydzhan, the oppressive influence of the Persians and the British, the ravages of war and the stimulation and encouragement derived from the October Revolution, the scene is set for the account of the rising in Tabriz in 1920.

Notes

(1) Sources include works in Russian, Persian and Azerbaydzhani. Russian works particularly mentioned are: "The Revolutionary Movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan" by A. Vishnegradova in NOVYY VOSTOK, No.2, 1922; "Sheykh Mokhammed Khiabani" by G. Il'inskiy in REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK, No.6, 1934; "The National-Liberation Movement in Persian Azerbaydzhan 1918-1920" by M.N. Ivanova in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA AN/SSSR No.XIV, Moscow, 1955; OCHERK ISTORII IRANA by M.S. Ivanov, Moscow, 1952; works of Lenin on the international significance of the October Revolution and its influence on countries of the East etc.; the Central State Historical Archive of Leningrad, and various other archives; the press of Moscow, Leningrad, Baku and Tiflis mainly during 1917-20. The principle sources in the Persian language are: MAJMU'EYE NOTQHĀYE SHAYKH MOHAMMAD KHIYĀBĀNI, Tabriz, 1945; SHARH-E-HĀL VA EQDĀMĀT-E-SHAYKH MOHAMMAD KHIYĀBĀNI, Berlin, 1926; QIYĀM-E-SHAYKH MOHAMMAD KHIYĀBĀNI DAR TABRIZ by 'Ali 'Azari, Tehran, 1951.

(2) Ivanova. See above.

(3) Ivanov. See above.

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

BOOK REVIEWS

SOVREMENNYY IRAN: SPRAVOCHNIK (A Handbook of Modern Persia). Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Oriental Studies. Moscow, 1957. 718pp. Maps; appendices; indexes.

This is one of a series of handbooks on Middle Eastern countries (including Turkey) now being produced by the Institute of Oriental Studies. Others in the same series which have so far been produced since 1957 are on Syria and Turkey. The present volume is by far the most informative and comprehensive handbook of modern Persia which has so far been published in any language, not excluding Persian. The book is divided into four main sections: the country and the population; economy; history, politics and social conditions; and culture. There are a number of appendices containing the texts of important State documents, lists of administrative divisions, tribes, and naval and military ranks, and details of such subjects as the cost of living, the monetary system, and weights and measures. Unlike most Russian books it is supported by indexes of personal and geographical names.

The book contains some unusual features, among which is a useful description of the main languages spoken in Persia, namely, Persian, Kurdish, Gilaki, Māzandarāni, and Baluchi. This is no doubt in order to emphasize the Soviet conception of Persia as a multi-national State. The sections on political parties and organizations and on the press are objectively written and contain information which cannot readily be found elsewhere. To each section is appended a bibliographical note of relevant literature in Russian, Persian, and Western languages. The details given about the dates of publication at the end of the book are of some interest. It went to press on the 6th March 1957, and was issued on the 4th October 1957. The print order was 5,000 and the price 24 rubles 80 kopecks, or 21/- in the United Kingdom. The chronological summary includes events up to the 8th October 1956.

Although this handbook contains a wealth of factual information, some of the items in the historical section are startlingly inaccurate and are calculated to undermine the reputation of the book as an objective study. For instance, 24th March 1946, is given as the date of "the evacuation of Soviet troops from Persia". Under the Tripartite Agreement of 1942, the Soviet Government was committed to withdrawing its troops from Persia by 9th March. It is a

matter of common knowledge in Persia that, in fact, so far from the troops being withdrawn, they were heavily reinforced between the 4th and 28th March. On the 26th March Gromyko informed the Security Council of the United Nations that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran "in five or six weeks, if no unforseen circumstances occurred". In fact, however, evacuation did not begin until the 22nd April. It is a great pity that an otherwise carefully prepared and scholarly work like SOVREMENNYY IRAN should be marred by palpable inaccuracies of this kind.

QIYĀM-E-ĀZARBĀYJĀN DAR ENGELĀB-E-MASHRUTIYAT-E-IRĀN (The Rising in Azerbaydzhan during the Constitutional Revolution in Persia). Karim Tāherzādeh Behzād, Tehran, 1955.

SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.1 of 1958 publishes a review of the above Persian work by Karim Tāherzādeh Behzād which appeared in Tehran in 1955. The following is the summary given in English at the end of the review:

"The author of the review points out that Karim Taherzade Behzad's book on the revolutionary movement in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1905-1911 contains new and interesting information about the Tabriz uprising of 1908-1909. The book gives a correct appraisal of the policy of the imperialist powers, and especially, of Great Britain's policy in Iran during the revolution. The reviewer notes the importance of the telegrams, letters and other documents cited by the author. Attention is also directed to the contradictions in the author's appraisal of the motive forces of the revolutionary movement in Iranian Azerbaijan.

"The reviewer considers Behzad's book to be a new contribution to the study of the history of the Iranian revolution of 1905-1911."

The review is on the whole favourable, and praises Behzād for distinguishing the policy of the Tsarist government, which "played a definite part in putting down the Tabriz uprising", from the desires of the Russian people. It is also noteworthy that, in keeping with most recent Soviet writings on Persia, the review attempts to discount the activities of Taqizādeh (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IV, No.3, p.288, and this number p.348); and it is complained that the author "plainly exaggerates the role of Taqizādeh in the Tabriz rising".

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

NEWS DIARY

AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKISTAN, PERSIA, SINKIANG

The following diary includes items from newspapers and periodicals received during the period April-June 1958 inclusive. In view of the variety of sources from which the information has been collected contradictions may occur; no responsibility can be taken for the accuracy of the information given but the source is quoted for each item.

The following abbreviations have been used throughout:

D	Druzhba
FET	Far East Trade
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
NCNA	New China News Agency
OM	Oriente Moderno
P	Pravda
SV	Sovetskoye Vostokovedeniye
T	The Times

AFGHANISTAN (April 1958 to June 1958)

May

26th. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow appears on Moscow television on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Afghanistan's independence. (P. 27.5.58)

26th. A party is given in Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of Afghanistan's independence. (P. 27.5.58)

27th. The Soviet Ambassador in Kabul visits the King of Afghanistan and in the name of the Diplomatic Corps and the Embassy of the USSR congratulates him on the fortieth anniversary of Afghanistan's independence. (P. 29.5.58)

June — By a decree of the 14th June 1958 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratifies the agreement between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on the regulation of the Soviet-Afghan frontier, signed in Moscow on the 18th January 1958. (P. 19.6.58)

25th. In Kabul a protocol between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan is signed on cooperation in the use of the waters of the Amu-Dar'ya, where the river forms the frontier between the two countries. (P. 27.6.58)

In 1958 the Publishing House of Foreign Literature plans to produce a Russian translation of AFGHANISTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY by the well-known Afghan historian and writer Rashtiya Sayyid Qasim Khan. (SV. 1/58)

INDIA

March — A trade agreement, valid until 31st December 1959, is signed in New Delhi on March 12th between India and Poland. India will pay in rupees for imports from Poland. Poland has offered mining and road-building machinery, complete textile plants, tractors, cranes etc. against Indian industrial raw materials, tea, tobacco, cottage industry products and soap. (FET. May 1958)

April — Soviet engineers and technicians arrive in India to help oil-prospecting in the state of Bombay. Prospecting will be carried out with Soviet equipment. (P. 7.4.58)

26th. Letters are exchanged in New Delhi between India and Yugoslavia extending the current trade agreement to December 1958. Indian iron and manganese ores, mica, shellac, tea, coffee, tobacco, hides and skins, textiles, jute goods, handicrafts and cottage industry products, are to be exchanged for Yugoslav dyeing and tanning goods, and industrial products including rolling stock, tractors, turbines, mining machinery, ships and electrical transformers. (FET. July 1958)

May — A delegation of Indian scientists, headed by the Director of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India, visits the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in order to familiarize themselves with Soviet scientific institutions and factories.

June

Rumanian technical and financial help is being made available for India's second oil refinery which it is proposed to build in Guahti (Assam). Rumanian estimates indicate that the refinery, with an output of three-quarters to one million tons, will cost about Rs.120-140m. (£10m.) There will be an additional plant producing lubricating oil. (FET. June 1958)

A 10,000-tons-a-year aluminium plant is to be set up in Kerala with Hungarian aid. The Hungarian Nikex Foreign Trade Co. has had initial talks with the Communist government in Kerala. (FET. June 1958)

Three major pharmaceutical plants. which the Indian government has tentatively decided to set up, are to receive West German, United States and Russian financial and technical aid to the value of Rs.500m. (£37.7m.) Russian aid, in the manufacture of antibiotics, alkaloids and synthetic drugs, will involve an outlay of Rs.300m. (£22.5m.) The projects are due to be completed by 1961. (FET.April 1958)

A trade agreement between India and Bulgaria of April 1956, which was revised in June 1957 is extended for one year, without further modifications. Indian imports from Bulgaria include machinery and equipment for industrial development, electrical instruments, drugs and medicines, diesel engines, and cement; and Indian exports include tea, coffee, spices, lac, bicycles and coir goods. (FET. July 1958)

Indian experts are in Budapest discussing the delivery of Hungarian-made hydroelectric power-plants. Complete power-stations are due to be sent to India under the existing trade agreement. At the end of last year Hungary was awarded a contract in Kashmir for the modernization and expansion of the Ganderbal and Mohara thermal power-stations. (FET. June 1958)

The Chinese government has refused permission for a private Indian air-line to operate a direct service from Calcutta to Lhasa. (T. 16.6.58)

2nd. A Government agreement is signed in Delhi for the introduction of a regular air service between Delhi and Moscow. Initially there will be one flight each way a week via Amritsar and Tashkent. (T. 3.6.58)

12th. A lecture is given in the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR by the President of the Indian Academy of Sciences - the well-known physicist Chandrasekhar Venkat Raman. (P. 13.6.58)

13th. Chandrasekhar Venkat Raman is awarded the Lenin Peace prize at a ceremony in Moscow. (P. 14.6.58)

Czechoslovakia is to provide £15m. in extended credit and technical assistance towards a £22.5m. forge foundry at Ranchi. (FET. June 1958)

30th. The Indian Ambassador to the USSR, K.P.Sh. Menon, gave a dinner in honour of a Soviet delegation of specialists of the medical industry. (P. 1.7.58)

PAKISTAN

May 2nd. The Russian Ambassador in Karachi informs the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that the Soviet government has decided to help her combat the cholera and smallpox epidemics in the country by giving Pakistan 1,000 litres of cholera vaccine and 3m. doses of smallpox vaccine. Soviet specialists will be sent to Pakistan with the necessary medical equipment. (P. 5.5.58)

June 11th. Eight American and Russian doctors arrive in Karachi to help East Pakistan health authorities combat smallpox and cholera. (P. 12.5.58)

PERSIA

March Eleven ex-official members of the Tudeh party are freed from prison. Twenty-two persons who "in former years had been in the Soviet Union" are also liberated. (OM. April 1958)

April 15th. A trade agreement between Persia and the Soviet Union is signed in Tehran. It provides for an increase of £1m. worth of goods, and runs from the 1st of April 1958 to the 31st March 1959. Persia will export foodstuffs, oilseed, cotton, wool, hides, tobacco, carpets, ores and other goods, and will receive in exchange industrial equipment, agricultural machines, cars, rolled ferrous metals. timber, newsprint, chemical preparations, medica-

ments, sugar, cotton fabric etc. Traders buying Soviet goods are offered exceptionally long credit terms by the Soviet authorities. (P. 16.4.58 and T. 18.4.58)

May — Khusrow Ruzbeh, a prominent Tudeh leader, is shot after several months' interrogation and trial. All surviving Tudeh leaders are now stated to be in Russia or in eastern Europe. (T. 13.5.58)

8th. Persian senator, Abbas Masudi and his wife, who were visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, K.A. Gubin, were received by the Deputy President and the Secretary of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR. (P. 9.5.58)

25th. The Persian Minister of Post and Telegraph Communications arrives in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Minister of Communications, N.D. Psurtsev, for a 12 day visit. (P. 7.6.58)

27th. The 700th anniversary since the famous Persian poet Saadi wrote his "Gulistan" is celebrated in Moscow. The celebrations were attended by the Persian Ambassador in Moscow, and a preliminary speech was made by the President of the Soviet Committee for the solidarity of the countries of Africa and Asia. (P. 28.5.58)

SINKIANG

April — Work has now begun on the construction of the part of the Lanchow-Urumchi railway between the village of Hunlyukhe and the town of Hami. The length of the section is 184 km. (See also CAR, Vol.III, No.3, pp.204-6, and Vol.V, No.2, pp.154-6.) (D. No.16, 1958)

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF KAZAKHSTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TADZHIKISTAN, KIRGIZIA AND TURKMENISTAN

100 0 100 200 300 Km.

Ufa, Chelyabinsk, Troitsk, Petropavlovsk, Omsk, Barnaul, Kurgan, Mikhaylovka, Rubtsovsk, Magnitogorsk, Kartaly, Tobol, Kustanay, Kokchetav, Stepnyak, Shchuchinsk, Makinsk, Pavlodar, Leninogorsk, Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Zyryanovsk, Yesil', Atbasar, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk, Chkalov, Orsk, Temir-Tau, Karaganda, Karkaralinsk, Zaysan, Aktyubinsk, Turgay, Ayaguz, Stalingrad, Kandagach, Temir, Irgiz, Dzhezdy, Mointy, Balkhash, Rostov, Tikhoretsk, Gur'yev, Dossor, Chelkar, Taldy-Kurgan, Tekeli, Astrakhan, Aral'sk, Kul'dzha, Stavropol', Kazalinsk, Dzhusaly, Kzyl-Orda, Pantilov, Alma-Ata, Kizlyar, Fort Shevchenko, Frunze, Przhevalsk, Dzaudzhikau, Groznyy, Chulak-Tau, Turkestan, Rybachiy, Issyk, Batumi, Kurgrad, Chimbay, Dzhambul, Chimkent, Talas, Tbilisi, Khodzheyli, Takhia-Tash, Tashauz, Lenger, Naryn, Tashkent, Kok-Yangak, Namangan, Andizhan, Kokand, Dzhalal-Abad, Osh, Yerevan, Baku, Khiva, Urgench, Turtkul', Kashgar, Mirzachul', Leninabad, Isfara, Yarkend, Nakhichevan', Krasnovodsk, Gizhduvan, Dzhizak, Ura-Tyube, Bukhara, Kagan, Kattakurgan, Samarkand, Penzhikent, Navoi, Garm, Nebit-Dag, Kazandzhik, Shakhrisyabz, Regar, Stalinabad, Charzhev, Karshi, Kyzyl-Arvat, Denau, Kulyab, Murgab, Tabriz, Ashkhabad, Kerki, Bossaga, Termez, Kurgan-Tyube, Nizhniy Pyandzh, Khorog, Mary, Bayram-Ali, Tedzhen, Iolotan', Meshed, Tehran, Kushka, Kabul, Herat

SEA CASPIAN SEA ARAL SEA

KAZAKHSTAN UZBEKISTAN TURKMENISTAN KIRGIZIA TADZHIKISTAN

TURKEY IRAN AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN CHINA

Borders of the U.S.S.R.
Limits of Union Republics.
Capitals of Union Republics.
Railways.
Canals.
Canals under construction or projected.
Sands.
Main arterial road with pass.

J.P. 1956.

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

INTER-REPUBLICAN FRONTIERS

Sketch-map showing the inter-republican frontiers of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia, and the interlacing of their territories in the neighbourhood of the Fergana Valley region.

The above map shows the area covered by CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW in relation to the rest of t
The total extent of the area is about 1½ million sq. miles. According to the latest available figures the total p
is 20,900,000 of whom about 13 millions are estimated to be indigenous.

The total area of what is generally regarded as Soviet Asia i.e. the Urals Region, Eastern and Western Siber
Soviet Far East, is approximately 8 million sq. miles and the population about 37 millions of whom about 7 m
estimated to be indigenous. Thus, whilst Central Asia and Kazakhstan together occupy less than one fifth of the
of Soviet Asia, their indigenous population amounts to about two thirds of the total indigenous population of
of Soviet Asia.

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